http://www.jstor.org/view/00222186/sp060001/06×0032f/0

Here the subject is Congress so we are off the original thread topic abit, but since large blocks of the state judiciary are elected and do receive campaign contributions, the same dynamics may obtain to a degree.

This task is much more difficult in courts than in legislatures where ideological bent is easier to determine.

What is really troubling to me is that this article is coming out in a law journal reviewed by Palmer’s own students, who are unlikely to have much sophistication in econometric techniques, and are unlikely to be familiar with the public choice economics literature, such as the Bronars and Lott piece.

Further, neither the the Tulane Law Review, nor the authors have made their study available (I have sent a request in to Levendis, but he has not responded, out for Mardi Gras, no doubt). Yet, they have made their article news to the media, but skeptic critics will have to wait.

On the other hand, the problem with an elected state judiciary goes far beyond possible influence by campaign contributions, but rather influence by voters in the first place. If elections actually made state supreme court judges decisions accountable to the voters, decisions would certainly be based on something other than the law.
Isn’t that what happens when officials are elected? They are held accountable by those who participate in the elections, voters and donors alike.

However, once elected to the Louisiana Supreme Court, justices are almost never thrown out, so justices do not rely on having to stay in the good graces of contributors.

Econ Prof

I think outright bribery is probably fairly rare, but campaign contributions are another matter as the topic shows.

When you investigate the national scene, what becomes apparent in state after state is the concerted effort on the part of the business community to secure the election of judges friendly to their interests. And the tactics employed are increasingly those we have seen in the political arena: negative attack ads and issues lists. Two proven vote-getters are attacks on judge’s criminal cases (too lenient) and immigration cases (too lenient). These are masks for the true agenda.

A lab study is the current Wisconsin Supreme Court race between county circuit Judge Michael Gableman and the incumbent Justice Louis Butler. Wisconsin, like Minnesota, prior to White, has a bar association set of standards for judicial elections. These are now being run through a blender by one side of the contest.

It is bad enough that the average or poor defendant, who may well be totally innocent, cannot get the services of a good criminal defense attorney, and is therefore at a much higher risk of being convicted. The idea that a judge on criminal circuit courts could be influenced by money to fix a case for either prosecution or defense is even more alarming, given the considerable power such judges have.

Outside interests are increasingly trying to skew the process in their favor; even to the selection of the judges.

Minnesota had an interesting canon in place that forbid judges running for office to elaborate or even state their positions on various issues. This was challenged by the Republican party and went to the Supreme Court as a first amendment case: Republican Party of Minnesota v White (2002) where the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. This of course politicized the Minnesota process.

In Missouri, something akin in terms of politicization:

http://www.justiceatstake.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcrumb=3,570,993