For the record, I have been a longtime critic of “free speech zones” which many professors and administrators pushed to limit the ability of groups and individuals to speak on campus. This case involves Chike Uzuegbunam, a former Georgia Gwinnett College student who wanted to share his religious views with other students. He was prevented twice by campus police in 2016 from handing out religious literature. He was told by the director of the college’s Office of Student Integrity that he had to apply for a permit and confine his speech to two designated “free speech expression areas.” Yet, when Uzuegbunam received a permit, he was again prevented from speaking because a security office told him that students had complained that he was disturbing the peace. A second student also claims to have been prevented from speaking under the policies and permitting.
Georgia Gwinnett College seemed to grasp for any claim to keep the students from speaking. It first said that their speech constituted incitement akin to “fighting words.” It then eliminated the policies and sought to dismiss the lawsuits as moot. It is a common pattern where universities will force students or academics to go to court and then later drop the cases when it is clear that they may lose.
The Supreme Court has now said enough. Literally. Nominal damages are enough to allow citizens to litigate the loss of free speech rights.
Yet, Roberts would again elevate Article III over free speech rights. His approach would continue to allow schools and other entities to avoid accountability because all that was lost was speech and not something more tangible like a scooter or a scanner.
Thomas disagreed with Roberts on the historical treatment of nominal damages by figures like Justice Story and further noted:
That this rule developed at common law is unsurprising in the light of the noneconomic rights that individuals had at that time. A contrary rule would have meant, in many cases, that there was no remedy at all for those rights, such as due process or voting rights, that were not readily reducible to monetary valuation. … By permitting plaintiffs to pursue nominal damages whenever they suffered a personal legal injury, the common law avoided the oddity of privileging small-dollar economic rights over important, but not easily quantifiable, nonpecuniary rights.
This is a great decision for the vindication of free speech.
Here is the opinion: Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski