The Takings Clause provides that “private property” shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. As noted in this case, the takings clause embodied a deep commitment of the Founders to the protection of property. John Adams declared that “[p]roperty must be secured, or liberty cannot exist.'” Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 147 (2021) (quoting Discourses on Davila, in 6 Works of John Adams 280 (C. Adams ed. 1851)).
The question is whether prohibiting private owners from using their own property constitutes a regulatory or physical taking. The district court rejected the claim.
In Alford v. Walton County, Judge Barbra Lagoa (joined by Judges Brasher and Carnes) reversed:
the district court held that Ordinance 2020-09 was neither a physical taking nor a regulatory taking. We disagree. This case involves a textbook physical taking: Walton County enacted an ordinance barring the Landowners from entering and remaining on their private property; Walton County’s officers physically occupied the Landowners’ property; and Walton County’s officers excluded the Landowners from their own property under threat of arrest and criminal prosecution. In other words, Walton County wrested the rights to possess, use, and exclude from the Landowners, and it took those rights for itself. That triggers the Landowner’s right to just compensation.
Some experts, while supporting the ruling, question whether this is a physical or a regulatory taking. However, the panel insisted that it was not just a regulatory denial and thus treated it as a per se taking that did not require the balancing test under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 US 104 (1978):
Ordinance 2020-09 physically appropriated the Landowners’ property because it barred their physical access to the land. And to enforce the Ordinance, the County entered the Landowners’ property at will for the specific purpose of excluding the Landowners. The County’s officers parked their vehicles on private property to deter entry, used private property as their own highway, and forced Landowners to vacate their property under threat of arrest. Put simply, the County “entered upon the surface of the land and t[ook] exclusive possession of it,” thereby triggering the right to just compensation. Causby, 328 U.S. at 261.
Notwithstanding these infringements on the right to possess and the right to exclude, the district court found that Ordinance 2020-09 was a simple “use” restriction. In so ruling, the district court emphasized that the Landowners retained the ability to sell their property, that the Ordinance was temporary, that the Landowners could still use part of their property, and that the Landowners could still exclude other citizens from their private property. None of these points makes a difference. At bottom, Ordinance 2020-09 prohibited the Landowners from physically accessing their beachfront property under any circumstances. That is different from a restriction on how the Landowners could use property they otherwise physically possessed.
The panel put this case into the context of prior rulings, particularly Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 US 104 (1978):
Cedar Point is a useful comparison. Recognizing the distinction between physical appropriations and use restrictions, the Cedar Point Court rejected an argument advanced by California that the regulation permitting union organizers to enter private property was a mere use restriction. 594 U.S. at 154. There, a California regulation granted union organizers a right to access private farmland “for the purpose of meeting and talking with [agricultural] employees and soliciting their support.” Id. at 144 (quoting Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 20900(e)). Under the regulation, the union organizers had a right to access the private farmland for up to three hours per day and 120 days per year. Id. Importantly, the regulation in Cedar Point did not infringe on the rights of the farm owners to possess, to use, or to dispose of their property. See id. Regardless, the Court held that the regulation effectuated a physical taking because it infringed on the owners’ right to exclude the union organizers. Id. at 149–54. In the Court’s words, “[s]aying that appropriation of a three hour per day, 120 day per year right to invade the growers’ premises ‘does not constitute a taking of a property interest but rather . . . a mere restriction on its use, is to use words in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary meaning.'” Id. at 154 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987)).
In other words, the mere fact that the Cedar Point landowners retained the rights to possess, to use, and to sell their property did not undermine the fact that a physical taking occurred. Id. California still “physically appropriated” the landowners’ property by granting the union organizers a right of entry. Id. Here, the physical taking at issue is even more severe than the one in Cedar Point. Unlike the regulation at issue in Cedar Point, Ordinance 2020-09 infringes on the right to exclude and the rights to possess and use. The Ordinance prohibited the Landowners from entering and remaining on their own property, while County officers entered and remained at will. The mere fact that the Landowners could—according to the district court—still “exclude the public” from their property is immaterial. In Cedar Point, it made no difference that the property owners retained the right to exclude everyone but the “union organizers.” See 594 U.S. at 144. Likewise, it makes no difference here that the Landowners retained the authority to exclude everyone other than County officials tasked with enforcing the Ordinance.
This is a major ruling on takings, including the treatment of the limits as a physical rather than regulatory takings. It could find itself before the Supreme Court on that issue.
Unfortunately, these constitutional rulings took years to work out, allowing state and local officials to enforce sweeping limitations on individual and property rights during the pandemic. With the added censorship of opposing or dissenting views on the scientific basis for many of these policies, it allowed for largely unchecked authority by these officials in California and other states.