Kosilek challenged the refusal of the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections to provide him with sex reassignment surgery to treat his major mental illness, severe gender identity disorder. He had previously tried to castrate himself and twice attempted suicide.
What has not been widely reported in the press is that the DOC admitted that the surgery was necessary and medically sound.
In the instant case, Kosilek alleges that his rights under the Eighth Amendment are being violated by the DOC’s refusal to provide him with the sex reassignment surgery that, following the Standards of Care, the DOC’s doctors have found to be the only adequate treatment for the severe gender identity disorder from which Kosilek suffers. Kosilek still severely suffers from this major mental illness despite the fact that he is receiving psychotherapy and female hormones. After a long period of pretense and prevarication, DOC Commissioner Kathleen Dennehy testified in 2006 that she understood and accepted the DOC doctors’ view that Kosilek is at substantial risk of serious harm and that sex reassignment surgery is the only adequate treatment for his condition. 2 However, she claimed that providing such treatment would create insurmountable security problems and that she denied Kosilek sex reassignment surgery because of those security considerations.
Wolf explained that sex reassignment surgery has also been found as medically necessary by the federal government and the denial of such surgery found to violate the rights of prisoners by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir. 2011).
With the concession of the state, the case turned on an unsupported and undefined security fear by the DOC. Also working in the favor of Kosilek was a prior trial and ruling in his favor in the district court on the underlying facts — facts given great deference on appeal.
Then there was the court’s view of the lack of truthfulness by the Commissioner Dennehy:
Rather, Dennehy testified that she was denying the sex reassignment surgery prescribed for Kosilek solely because of insurmountable security concerns. Kosilek has proven, however, that this contention is not credible. As described in detail in the Memorandum, Dennehy testified untruthfully on many matters. This contributes to the conclusion that her stated reasons for refusing to allow Kosilek to receive the surgery were pretextual. In addition, Dennehy announced that security concerns made it impossible to provide Kosilek sex reassignment surgery without conducting the security review required by the DOC’s established procedures. Such a review would have included a written assessment from the Superintendent of MCI Norfolk, who had previously advised Commissioner Maloney that providing Kosilek female hormones would not create unmanageable security problems. Dennehy incredibly claimed that, despite Kosilek’s excellent record in prison and while being transported to medical appointments and court, there was an unacceptable risk that Kosilek would attempt to flee while [*21] being transported to get the treatment that he had dedicated twenty years of his life to receiving. In any event, Dennehy ultimately admitted that the safety of Kosilek and others could be reasonably assured by placing him in an onerous form of protective custody after receiving sex reassignment surgery.
The 129-page ruling details a largely uncontested factual record, replete with expert medical and psychiatric experts on the basis for the surgery. It is without question the most detailed analysis on this question that I have read. Wolf concludes:
In summary, the court is persuaded that the decision to deny Kosilek sex reassignment surgery is not the result of a good faith balancing judgment and is not reasonable. See Battista, 645 F.3d at 454. Rather, that decision was based on fear of criticism and controversy, articulated at times as a concern about cost to the taxpayer. Neither cost nor fear of controversy is a legitimate penological objective. This court may not defer to the defendant’s decision to deny Kosilek sex reassignment surgery because deference does not extend to “actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322; see also Battista, 645 F.3d at 454. Because there is no penological justification for denying Kosilek the treatment prescribed for him, he is now being [*156] subject to the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Hope, 536 U.S. at 737 (internal quotation omitted); see also White, 849 F.2d at 325. Therefore, Kosilek has proven that, as in Battista, the DOC has violated the Eighth Amendment by being deliberatively indifferent to his serious medical need. 645 F.3d at 455.
What do you think?