Democratic politicians who line up to support Judge Dugan often omit the details of the arrest. It may be worth reviewing a few of those details.
The complaint details how the officers sought to satisfy Dugan who was described as angry and uncooperative. That included (upon Judge Dugan’s insistence) locating the Chief Judge and confirming that they could facilitate an arrest in the hallways as public areas. Here is the account:
After showing ID and badges, [a shift sergeant with Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office] asked that any arrest wait until after the completion of the scheduled hearing before Judge DUGAN. As this was standard practice, Deportation Officer A and CBP Officer A agreed, and they were allowed to proceed unescorted to the public hallway outside of Courtroom 615. . . .
FBI Agent A displayed his credentials to the courtroom deputy and informed him that they were there to assist ICE in arresting Flores-Ruiz. They agreed that the arrest would take place after Flores-Ruiz’s court appearance. The agents then left the courtroom and took positions at different locations in the public hallway.
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Judge DUGAN and Judge A, who were both wearing judicial robes, approached members of the arrest team in the public hallway. Judge A’s courtroom is located adjacent to Judge DUGAN’s courtroom. Witnesses uniformly reported that Judge DUGAN was visibly upset and had a confrontational, angry demeanor. Judge DUGAN addressed Deportation Officer A and asked if Deportation Officer A was present for a court appearance. When Deportation Officer A responded, “no,” Judge DUGAN stated that Deportation Officer A would need to leave the courthouse.
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Deportation Officer A stated that Deportation Officer A was there to effectuate an arrest. Judge DUGAN asked if Deportation Officer A had a judicial warrant, and Deportation Officer A responded, “No, I have an administrative warrant.” Judge DUGAN stated that Deportation Officer A needed a judicial warrant. Deportation Officer A told Judge DUGAN that Deportation Officer A was in a public space and had a valid immigration warrant. Judge DUGAN asked to see the administrative warrant and Deportation Officer A offered to show it to her. Judge DUGAN then demanded that Deportation Officer A speak with the Chief Judge. Judge DUGAN then had a similar interaction with FBI Agent B and CBP Officer A. After finding out that they were not present for a court appearance and that they were with ICE, Judge DUGAN ordered them to report to the Chief Judge’s office.
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Deportation Officer A went inside a more private area of the Chief Judge’s office to speak with him on the phone. During their conversation, the Chief Judge stated he was working on a policy which would dictate locations within the courthouse where ICE could safely conduct enforcement actions. The Chief Judge emphasized that such actions should not take place in courtrooms or other private locations within the building. Deportation Officer A asked about whether enforcement actions could take place in the hallway. The Chief Judge indicated that hallways are public areas.
However, Judge Dugan decided that it was now time for her to get down from the bench and actively guide Flores-Ruiz through a non-public door to evade arrest:
The courtroom deputy recalled that upon the courtroom deputy’s return to the courtroom, defense counsel for Flores-Ruiz was talking to the clerk, and Flores-Ruiz was seated in the jury box, rather than in the gallery. . . .
The courtroom deputy then saw Judge DUGAN get up and heard Judge DUGAN say something like “Wait, come with me.”
Despite having been advised of the administrative warrant for the arrest of Flores-Ruiz, Judge DUGAN then escorted Flores-Ruiz and his counsel out of the courtroom through the “jury door,” which leads to a nonpublic area of the courthouse. These events were also unusual for two reasons. First, the courtroom deputy had previously heard Judge DUGAN direct people not to sit in the jury box because it was exclusively for the jury’s use. Second, according to the courtroom deputy, only deputies, juries, court staff, and in-custody defendants being escorted by deputies used the back jury door. Defense attorneys and defendants who were not in custody never used the jury door.
When the team realized that he had escaped, they pursued the suspect and only apprehended him after a chase in the streets of Milwaukee.
What these politicians do not explain is where the line should be drawn if judges can now actively assist in the escape of fugitives or wanted individuals. Could Dugan order court officers to hide Flores-Ruiz? Could she put him in her trunk and drive him out of the courthouse?
Once you leave the bench to assist in alleged illegality, you find yourself on a slippery slope.
This has happened before and, according to judges like Isham, it will happen again.
I previously wrote about the case of Massachusetts judge Shelley M. Richmond Joseph who was charged with allegedly helping an illegal immigrant evade ICE agents in April 2018. Joseph and court officer Wesley MacGregor were charged with conspiracy to obstruct justice, obstruction of justice, aiding and abetting and obstruction of a federal proceeding.
I was critical of the handling of the case. While Joseph was suspended for three years, charges were dropped in 2022 during the Biden Administration.
Many of us have called for a deescalation of the rhetoric and conflicts between the judicial and executive branches. We need to maintain respect for our courts even when we disagree with their decisions.
However, that is a mutual obligation. Judges have to maintain such respect by honoring their role as adjudicators rather than accomplices in criminal matters.
As Justice Louis Brandeis stated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means — to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal — would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.
Hannah Dugan has shown precisely how “contagious” such law breaking can become when judges become “teachers” of a “contempt for law.” She yielded to the temptation to “become a law unto herself.” Frankly, it may be difficult to secure a conviction from a Milwaukee jury, but the Justice Department is seeking to offer a lesson of a different kind in bringing these charges.
