
In the age of rage, nothing says democracy like preventing people from running for office.
These members and activists have latched upon the long-dormant provision in Section 3 of the 14th Amendment — the “disqualification clause” — which was written after the 39th Congress convened in December 1865 and many members were shocked to see Alexander Stephens, the Confederate vice president, waiting to take a seat with an array of other former Confederate senators and military officers.
Justice Edwin Reade of the North Carolina Supreme Court later explained, “[t]he idea [was] that one who had taken an oath to support the Constitution and violated it, ought to be excluded from taking it again.” So, members drafted a provision that declared that “No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.”
This effort failed on legal grounds in seeking to bar Rep. Madison Cawthorn (R-N.C.) from running for office due to his actions related to the Jan. 6, 2021. It failed on factual grounds in seeking to bar Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R., Ga.), even after a federal district court wrongly allowed a hearing to be held.
Now the Arizona Supreme Court has ruled that not only did the challengers lack the standing to bring the case but Arizona Supreme Court Chief Justice Robert Brutinel reaffirmed that this is a power left to Congress:
“Qualifications of its own Members,” appears to vest Congress with exclusive authority to determine whether to enforce the Disqualification Clause against its prospective members. However, we need not decide these issues because we hold that A.R.S. § 16-351(B), which authorizes an elector to challenge a candidate “for any reason relating to qualifications for the office sought as prescribed by law, including age, residency, professional requirements or failure to fully pay fines . . . ,” is not the proper proceeding to initiate a Disqualification Clause challenge. By its terms, the statute’s scope is limited to challenges based upon “qualifications . . . as prescribed by law,” and does not include the Disqualification Clause, a legal proscription from holding office.
The court case is Thomas Hansen v. Mark Finchem, No. cv-22-0099.
