As expected, the Supreme Court voted in Ricci v. DeStefano, the New Haven firefighters case, to reverse the decision of the Second Circuit panel, which included Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor. Also as expected, Justice Kennedy played the swing vote in giving cities a new defense in such cases. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. The fear of litigation was not sufficient to justify the discrimination against white and Hispanic firefighters. Firefighters challenged a decision to throw out promotional exam results because no African-American firefighters were among the top scoring candidates for promotion — only white and Hispanic officers. Judge Sonia Sotomayor was on the panel that upheld the city’s decision in one of her most controversial decisions.

Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held:

Our analysis begins with this premise: The City’s actions would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense. All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to certify the examination results because of the statistical disparity based on race—i.e., how minority candidates had performed when compared to white candidates. As the District Court put it, the City rejected the test results because “too many whites and not enough minorities would be promoted were the lists to be certified.” 554 F. Supp. 2d, at 152; see also ibid. (respondents’ “own arguments . . . show that the City’s reasons for advocating non-certification were related to the racial distribution of the results”). Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VII’s command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race. See §2000e–2(a)(1).

Of the forty-one applicants who took the captain exam, only eight were black. Of the seventy-seven applicants who took the lieutenant exam, only 19 were black. No of the African-American candidates scored high enough to be promoted. Only two Hispanics scored sufficiently high enough to be promoted.

The city tossed out the results due to concerns over possible disparate impact claims by minorities under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Earlier, I expressed serious reservations about the case and the way that the panel handled it. The opinion was largely conclusory and notably failed to address the difficult constitutional questions raised by the firefighters:

Nothing in the record in this case suggests that the City defendants or CSB acted “because of” discriminatory animus toward plaintiffs or other non-minority applicants for promotion. Rather, they acted based on the following concerns: that the test had a statistically adverse impact on African-American and Hispanic examinees; that promoting off of this list would undermine their goal of diversity in the Fire Department and would fail to develop managerial role models for aspiring firefighters; that it would subject the City to public criticism; and that it would likely subject the City to Title VII lawsuits from minority applicants that, for political reasons, the City did not want to defend. “[T]he intent to remedy the disparate impact of [the tests] is not equivalent to an intent to discriminate against non-minority applicants.” Hayden, 180 F.3d at51. None of the defendants’ expressed motives could suggest to a reasonable juror that defendants acted “because of” animus against non-minority firefighters who took the Lieutenant and Captain exams.

While expressing sympathy for the firefighters, the panel gives their claims short shrift. As Judge Jose Cabranes who was highly critical of the way the panel dismissed the legitimate concerns of these firefighters: “Indeed, the opinion contains no reference whatsoever to the constitutional claims at the core of this case. … This perfunctory disposition rests uneasily with the weighty issues presented by this appeal.” Not much empathy showed in this case.

Kennedy found a violation of Title VII in the decision by the city. The Supreme Court cited prior holdings to hold:

If an employer cannot rescore a test based on the candidates’ race, §2000e–2(l), then it follows a fortiori that it may not take the greater step of discarding the test altogether to achieve a more desirable racial distribution of promotion-eligible candidates—absent a strong basis in
evidence that the test was deficient and that discarding the results is necessary to avoid violating the disparate- impact provision. Restricting an employer’s ability to discard test results (and thereby discriminate against qualified candidates on the basis of their race) also is in keeping with Title VII’s express protection of bona fide promotional examinations. See §2000e–2(h) (“[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to If an employer cannot rescore a test based on the candidates’ race, §2000e–2(l), then it follows a fortiori that it may not take the greater step of discarding the test altogether to achieve a more desirable racial distribution of promotion-eligible candidates—absent a strong basis in evidence that the test was deficient and that discarding the results is necessary to avoid violating the disparate- impact provision. Restricting an employer’s ability to discard test results (and thereby discriminate against qualified candidates on the basis of their race) also is in keeping with Title VII’s express protection of bona fide promotional examinations. See §2000e–2(h) (“[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
25 Cite as: 557 U. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of the Court give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race”); cf. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 8). For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the strong-basis-in-evidence standard as a matter of statutory construction to resolve any conflict between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII.

Justice Alito wrote a concurrence solely to respond to what he and Thomas and Scalia viewed as selective presentation of facts by the dissenting justice — who accuse the majority of the same thing.

Justice Ginsburg in dissent insists that better tests were available and that the majority misconstrues the good-faith basis of the city:

The white firefighters who scored high on New Haven’s promotional exams understandably attract this Court’s sympathy. But they had no vested right to promotion. Nor have other persons received promotions in preference to them. New Haven maintains that it refused to certify the test results because it believed, for good cause, that it would be vulnerable to a Title VII disparate-impact suit if it relied on those results. The Court today holds that New Haven has not demonstrated “a strong basis in evidence” for its plea. Ante, at 2. In so holding, the Court pretends that “[t]he City rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white.” Ante, at 20. That pretension, essential to the Court’s disposition, ignores substantial evidence of multiple flaws in the tests New Haven used. The Court similarly fails to acknowledge the better tests used in other cities, which have yielded less racially skewed outcomes.1

While expressing sympathy, the dissenting justices would still allow the city to throw out the results based on the fact that whites did better in the final scores. However, she noted that there were complaints about access to materials:

A number of the exam questions, they pointed out, were not germane to New Haven’s practices and procedures. See, e.g., id., at A774–A784. At least two candidates opposed to certification noted unequal access to study materials. Some individuals, they asserted, had the necessary books even before the syllabus was issued. Others had to invest substantial sums to purchase the materials and “wait a month and a half for some of the books because they were on back-order.” Id., at A858. These disparities, it was suggested, fell at least in part along racial lines. While many Caucasian applicants could obtain materials and assistance from relatives in the fire service, the over-whelming majority of minority applicants were “first-generation firefighters” without such support networks.
See id., at A857–A861, A886–A887.

Justice Scalia’s concurrence takes a broader view, challenging the use of race-based remedial actions generally:

To be sure, the disparate-impact laws do not mandate imposition of quotas, but it is not clear why that should provide a safe harbor. Would a private employer not be guilty of unlawful discrimination if he refrained from establishing a racial hiring quota but intentionally designed his hiring practices to achieve the same end? Surely he would. Intentional discrimination is still occurring, just one step up the chain. Government compulsion of such design would therefore seemingly violate equal protection principles. Nor would it matter that Title VII requires consideration of race on a wholesale, rather than retail, level. “[T]he Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). And of course the purportedly benign motive for the disparate-impact provisions cannot save the statute. See Ada­rand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995). To be sure, the disparate-impact laws do not mandate imposition of quotas, but it is not clear why that should provide a safe harbor. Would a private employer not be guilty of unlawful discrimination if he refrained from establishing a racial hiring quota but intentionally designed his hiring practices to achieve the same end? Surely he would. Intentional discrimination is still occurring, just one step up the chain. Government compulsion of such design would therefore seemingly violate equal protection principles. Nor would it matter that Title VII requires consideration of race on a wholesale, rather than retail, level. “[T]he Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). And of course the purportedly benign motive for the disparate-impact provisions cannot save the statute. See Ada­rand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995).

All of these opinions are quite interesting. My concern with the dissent is that it sweeps far too broadly. While Kennedy does not go as far as Scalia, he creates more of a balanced approach to the use of such remedial measures without barring them entirely. It is a decision with which I expect most Americans would agree. It will be interesting to see if Congress attempts to amend the law to negate the ruling. The optics in “putting a thumb on the scale” of a test for firefighters is not good.

As for Sotomayor, these opinions have all of the substance that is missing in the Second Circuit opinion. Judge Cabranes is proven correct about the deeper issues here. One of my greatest concerns about Judge Sotomayor has been the lack of any deeper or more profound analysis in her opinions, which all too often tend to dismiss such issues. For an analysis of her opinions, click here.

Here is today’s opinion 07-1428, which is a major ruling in discrimination law.