Bizarre, Courts, Lawyering, Society

Attorney Orly Taitz Fined $20,000 for Frivolous “Birther” Litigation

orly2The bill is in for Orly Taitz, the California lawyer leading the “Birther” litigation: $20,000 for sanctionable conduct. U.S. District Court Judge Clay Land previously issued a stern warning to attorney Orly Taitz and others in the so-called “birther” campaign: do not file another such “frivolous” lawsuit or you will face sanctions. Land threw out the lawsuit filed on behalf of Capt. Connie Rhodes who is an Army surgeon challenging her deployment orders due to President Barack Obama’s alleged ineligibility to serve as President. Land (a Bush appointee) noted that “[u]nlike in ‘Alice in Wonderland,’ simply saying something is so does not make it so.” In the most recent order, Land said that Taitz’s conduct “borders on delusional.”


Rhodes previously accused Taitz of filing new papers in Rhodes v. MacDonald without her approval and after she agreed to be deployed by the military. Taitz declared in one filing: “This case is now a quasi-criminal prosecution of the undersigned attorney.” She is already facing a California bar complaint and Rhodes is promising to file a new complaint against her for “reprehensible” representation.

When Rhodes learned that Taitz had filed a motion to stay deployment after she had decided to forego further litigation, she proceeded to fire Taitz by sending a remarkable letter from Office Max on the advice of “Tim who works in the District Clerk’s office.” She stated in the fax:

September 18th, 2009

To the Honorable Judge Land:

Currently, I am shipping out to Iraq for my deployment. I became aware on last night’s local news that a Motion to Stay my deployment had been entered on my behalf. I did not authorize this motion to be filed. I thank you for hearing my case and respect the ruling given on September 16th, 2009. It is evident that the original filing for the TRO and such was full of political conjecture which was not my interest. I had no intention of refusing orders nor will I. I simply wanted to verify the lawfulness of my orders. I am honored to serve my country and thank you for doing the same.

With that I said, please withdraw the Motion to Stay that Ms. Taitz filed this past Thursday. I did not authorize it and do not wish to proceed. Ms. Taitz never requested my permission nor did I give it. I would not have been aware of this if I did not see it on the late news on Thursday night before going to board my plane to Iraq on Friday, September 18, 2009.

Furthermore, I do not wish for Ms. Taitz to file any future motion or represent me in any way in this court. It is my plan to file a complaint with the California State Bar to her reprehensible and unprofessional actions.

I am faxing this as was advised by Tim, who works in the District Clerk’s office. I will mail the original copy of this letter once I have arrived in Iraq.

Respectfully,

CPT Connie M. Rhodes, MD

In her Motion for Leave to Withdrawal as Counsel, Taitz suggested that her client is lying to the Court.
She states that she not only has a (rather obvious) conflict with her former client but may present evidence that is embarrassing to her:

The undersigned attorney comes before this Court to respectfully ask for leave to withdraw as counsel for the Plaintiff Captain Connie Rhodes. The immediate need for this withdrawal is the filing of two documents of September 18, 2009, one by the Court, Document 17, and one apparently by Plaintiff Connie Rhodes, which together have the effect of creating a serious conflict of interest between Plaintiff and her counsel. In order to defend herself, the undersigned counsel will have to contest and potentially appeal any sanctions order in her own name alone, separately from the Plaintiff, by offering and divulging what would normally constitute inadmissible and privileged attorney-client communications, and take a position contrary to her client’s most recently stated position in this litigation. The undersigned attorney will also offer evidence and call witnesses whose testimony will be adverse to her (former) client’s most recently stated position in this case. A copy of this Motion was served five days ago on the undersigned’s former client, Captain Connie Rhodes, prior to filing this with the Court and the undersigned acknowledges her client’s ability to object to this motion, despite her previously stated disaffection for the attorney-client
relationship existing between them. This Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will in no way delay the proceedings, in that the Plaintiff has separately indicated that she no longer wishes to continue to contest any issue in this case. In essence, this case is now a quasi-criminal prosecution of the undersigned attorney, for the purpose of punishment, and the Court should recognize and acknowledge the essential ethical importance of releasing this counsel from her obligations of confidentiality and loyalty under these extraordinary circumstances.

Respectfully submitted,

By:_________________________
Orly Taitz, DDS, Esq.
California Bar ID No. 223433
FOR THE PLAINTIFF
Captain Connie Rhodes, M.D. F.S.
SATURDAY, September 26, 2009

“Quasi-criminal prosecution”? The judge had ordered Taitz to “show cause” why a sanction should not be imposed in the case. He had previously told Taitz that he would consider sanctions if she filed similar claims in the future. After the denial of the Motion to Stay deployment, Land said that the latest filing was “deja vu all over again” including “her political diatribe.” He noted:

Instead of seriously addressing the substance of the Court’s order, counsel repeats her political diatribe against the President, complains that she did not have time to address dismissal of the action (although she sought expedited consideration), accuses the undersigned of treason, and maintains that “the United States District Courts in the 11th Circuit are subject to political pressure, external control, and . . . subservience to the same illegitimate chain of command which Plaintiff has previously protested.”

Then the kicker:

The Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay of Deployment (Doc. 15) to be frivolous. Therefore, it is denied. The Court notifies Plaintiff’s counsel, Orly Taitz, that it is contemplating a monetary penalty of $10,000.00 to be imposed upon her, as a sanction for her misconduct. Ms. Taitz shall file her response within fourteen days of today’s order showing why this sanction should not be imposed.

I am frankly not convinced that sanctions would be appropriate for filing for a motion to stay deployment per se. At the time of his order, Land did not presumably know that the filing was made against the wishes of the client. If Rhodes was interested in appealing Land’s decision, which is her right, a stay is a standard request. However, the fact that the filing may have been made after Taitz was terminated as counsel and after she was told that Rhodes was abandoning the case is more cause for possible sanctions. Moreover, the low quality and over-heated rhetoric of the filing can support such sanctions. Her filings appear more visceral than legal. In demanding reconsideration of the Court’s earlier order, she used language that does cross the line:

This Court has threatened the undersigned counsel with sanctions for advocating that a legally conscious, procedurally sophisticated, and constitutionally aware army officers corps is the best protection against the encroachment of anti-democratic, authoritarian, neo-Fascistic or Palaeo-Communistic dictatorship in this country, without pointing to any specific language, facts, or allegations of fact in the Complaint or TRO as frivolous. Rule 11 demands more of the Court than use of its provisions as a means of suppressing the First Amendment Right to Petition regarding questions of truly historical, in fact epic and epochal, importance in the history of this nation.

She also (as noted by Land in his later order) essentially accused Land of treason, as she has in public statements:

Plaintiff submits that to advocate a breach of constitutional oaths to uphold the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic, is in fact a very practical form of “adhering” to those enemies, foreign and domestic, and thus is tantamount to treason, as Defined in Article III, Section 3, even when pronounced in Court. The People of the United States deserve better service and loyalty from the most powerful, and only life-tenured, officers of their government.

Taitz is also facing a California Bar complaint, here. Ohio lawyer (and inactive California bar member) Subodh Chandra wrote the bar, stating “I respectfully request that you investigate Ms. Taitz’s conduct and impose an appropriate sanction. She is an embarrassment to the profession.” For that complaint, click here.

A complaint by a former client would likely attract more attention by the Bar. These are now serious allegations including misrepresentation, false statements to the Court, and other claims that will have to be addressed by a Bar investigation. This could take years to resolve — perhaps just in time for Obama’s second inauguration.

The court ruled that Taitz violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in filing frivolous papers. Declaring the filings as made in “bad faith,” the court concluded that Taitz’s legal conduct was “willful and not merely negligent.” Sanctions were warranted, he held, because “Counsel’s frivolous and sanctionable conduct wasted the Defendants’ time and valuable judicial resources that could have been devoted to legitimate cases pending with the Court.”

s-TAITZ-large

“When a lawyer files complaints and motions without a reasonable basis for believing that they are supported by existing law or a modification or extension of existing law, that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law,” Land writes. “When a lawyer uses the courts as a platform for a political agenda disconnected from any legitimate legal cause of action, that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law. When a lawyer personally attacks opposing parties and disrespects the integrity of the judiciary, that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law. When a lawyer recklessly accuses a judge of violating the judicial code of conduct with no supporting evidence beyond her dissatisfaction with the judge’s rulings, that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law. When a lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law, that lawyer ceases to advance her cause or the ends of justice. . .

Regrettably, the conduct of counsel Orly Taitz has crossed these lines, and Ms. Taitz must be sanctioned for her misconduct. After a full review of the sanctionable conduct, counsel’s conduct leading up to that conduct, and counsel’s response to the Court’s show cause order, the Court finds that a monetary penalty of $20,000.00 shall be imposed upon counsel Orly Taitz as punishment for her misconduct, as a deterrent to prevent future misconduct, and to protect the integrity of the Court. Payment shall be made to the United States, through the Middle District of Georgia Clerk’s Office, within thirty days of today’s Order. If counsel fails to pay the sanction due, the U.S. Attorney will be authorized to commence collection proceedings.

I expect that Taitz will appeal the decision, given her past statements. The opinion goes into considerable detail on her conduct and interaction with the court, as shown below.

For the decision, click here.

For the story, click here

1,636 thoughts on “Attorney Orly Taitz Fined $20,000 for Frivolous “Birther” Litigation”

  1. As I said earlier, there was a soccer game in my neighborhood:

    QUOTE
    The guy in the windbreaker

    By Tom Satterwhite
    Washington

    The other day, while I was waiting for the light to change at Chesapeake Street and Nebraska Avenue NW, I saw about eight big black sport-utility vehicles approaching.

    My first thought was, “This looks like fairly heavy artillery, but it can’t be Him … where are all the motorcycles, the press and the 10,000 police that always seem to trail behind?” The lead car turned onto the street ahead of me and started up the hill toward the Fort Reno Park athletic fields.

    Nobody got out to redirect traffic, and I followed the procession up the hill. Then the caravan stopped, and while I watched, a guy in a black windbreaker and a few agents got out and started walking up a hill on the right toward a small crowd of people milling around for no apparent reason. I thought, “This is too much. What is going on?” So I parked in an illegal spot, got out and walked over to the field where an agent inquired, “Can I help you?”

    “Are we allowed to go on the field?” I asked. She smiled and said, “Of course. It’s public property. See the agent over there.” Another agent, who seemed to be about 10 feet tall, came over, scanned me with a wand, and said, “Thank you. Go ahead.” When I got to the top of the hill, I realized some girls were playing soccer, and the guy with the black windbreaker, who was now pretty close, looked me in the eye for a second. Still mystified, I turned and asked one of the coaches, “The president is here because … ?”

    “His daughter is on my team.”

    By washingtonpost.com editors | April 14, 2010; 9:49 AM ET
    UNQUOTE
    http://voices.washingtonpost.com/local-opinions/2010/04/the_guy_in_the_windbreaker.html

  2. He may have never told a lie, but George Washington apparently had no problem stiffing a Manhattan library on two books.

    Two centuries ago, the nation’s first President borrowed two tomes from the New York Society Library on E. 79th St. and never returned them, racking up an inflation-adjusted $300,000 late fee.

    But Washington can rest easy.

    “We’re not actively pursuing the overdue fines,” quipped head librarian Mark Bartlett. “But we would be very happy if we were able to get the books back.”

    Washington’s dastardly deed went unknown for almost 150 years.

    Then in 1934, a dusty, beaten-up ledger was discovered in a trash heap in the library’s basement.

    On its tan pages were the names of all of the people who had borrowed books from the city’s oldest library between July 1789 and April 1792.

    At the time, the city was the nation’s capital and the library – then located at Wall and Broad Sts. – was the only one in town.

    Aaron Burr, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay all borrowed books, the ledger shows.

    They returned them, too.

    The library’s boldest bold-faced name wasn’t as cooperative.

    On Oct. 5, 1789, Washington borrowed the “Law of Nations,” a treatise on international relations, and Vol. 12 of the “Commons Debates,” which contained transcripts of debates from Britain’s House of Commons.

    Beside the names of the books, the librarian wrote on the ledger only, “President.”

    The entry, written with a quill pen, contains no return date.

    The books were due by Nov. 2, 1789, and have been accruing a fine of a few pennies per day ever since.

    This week, Bartlett and his staff became even more convinced the books were filched when librarian Matthew Haugen stumbled upon the long lost 14-volume collection of the “Commons Debates.”

    Sure enough, Vol. 12 was missing.

    “It’s hard to know what could have happened,” Bartlett said. “There are as many questions for us as there are answers.”

    Read more: http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2010/04/17/2010-04-17_read_it__weep_by_george_prez_racks_up_300g_late_fee_for_two_books.html#ixzz0lSIeqLkW

  6. No Bdaman, you are seeing the understandable exasperation of someone who has been fighting an asymmetric battle against all comers for longer that I’ve been posting here. From my experiences on the 9/11 thread, I know how it works – Bob posted two videos and a couple of lines of text this morning and I’ve probably spent about 2 hours doing research (including finding at least a dozen websites, watching the videos and talking to a commercial pilot) in order to debunk him and I haven’t finished my post yet. How much time does it take you to cut and paste something, add a few sentences and post it? Less than a minute? How long do you think that it takes Vince to find the necessary citations to debunk you? When faced with something that wasn’t a question of law, he saw a way to respond quickly and took it. When the validity of the source was questioned did he try to defend it in any way? No, his response was ‘then I can’t use it’. This is a degree of integrity that you should aspire to, not denigrate.

    And remember that you’re hurling stones by the bucketful from your glass house…

  7. No Dr. Slarti, Mr Treacy knows what he’s doin.

    Guess you would of had to been there. Thats why he responded to me this way.

    “If badman sends his name and address, he will be answered by return mail”

    And let us not forget when he said I claimed Obama Traveled under a foreign passport in which you responded and which I am thankful.

    Vince,

    Bdaman only said that Pakistan was in great turmoil when President Obama visit (and that his first mention of the trip was two weeks after the passport breach). This time anyway. There was certainly an implication of shady behavior (and murder) but nothing overt (again, this time).

    So you see Dr. Slarti we are starting to see a few cracks in the wall. You know about cracks in walls don’t you? You can rub compound on it, sand it and paint it, but underneath it all the crack is still there.

  8. Bdaman,

    When you retract a statement that you can’t verify or is incorrect when it is brought to your attention, that’s intellectual honesty not spreading misinformation. Bob, Esq. tried to do the same thing to me on the 9/11 thread that you are trying to do to Vince here and it’s no more valid. If you had evidence of any sort that Vince knew the statement he had made was incorrect you would have a point (and not a very big one, either), but I don’t believe that you do. And don’t be afraid of the Mayan odometer rollover – all of the world’s computers are Mayan Y2K compliant.

  9. Dr. Slarti how bout this Icelandic volcano. After the brutal record winter Europe had in re to transportation, this is killing their economy. Kinda makes you wonder Earthquakes, Volcanoes Meteors lighting up the sky. 2012 will be here sooner than you know it.

  11. Vince,

    Mr. Noonan deserves praise for his intellectual honesty in taking up your challenge to try and prove you wrong. He seems to have been under the impression (easy to get on birther sites) that the people who agreed with him had as much integrity as he did. Learning differently must have been a very nasty shock for him and I am interested in how he reacts to it. I suggest that you invite him here (where his speech will never be censored and his integrity will be appreciated – if you give me a link to a thread on a non-censored site that he’s posted on I’d be happy to do it myself). I would be interested to know if he continues commenting on websites on the eligibility issue (pro or con) or if he just drops it altogether.

  12. American Thinker dot com refuses to post any comments contrary to its birther positions. They would not even let a right winger post, and instead they banned him too.

    I challenged the birther, Ed Noonan, to get them to post my views, but they banned him. He emailed them in protest.

    AmericanThinker censors its comments. It will not let its birthers hear any contrary view. They are afraid of the truth, and want to keep it from Lakin himself.

    HERE IS ORIGINAL MESSAGE FROM ED TO AMERICAN THINKER

    QUOTE

    One of the obamabots on NATIVE AND NATURAL BORN CITIZENSHIP EXPLORED blog complained he was ‘censored’ on the AMERICAN THINKER. As a well-known ‘birther’ I had complained that NNBCE had censored me (and heaped their normal ridicule on me as a birther.)

    He challenged me to attempt to put his rambling COMMENT on the American Thinker…So I thought I’d see if you would post my post so that I can say you gave him his say. We need to merely give him his link to his pro-soetoro (aka) NNBCE site:

    http://www.nativeborncitizen.wordpress.com/2010/04/08/from-vince-treacy-lakin/

    I do not agree with his legally-challenged claim that a BIRTH CERTIFICATE is the same thing as a CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH. If Mr. Treacy thinks so, he must be a questionable attorney there in D.C./MD? I asked him if he was the same Vince Treacy that I had GOOGLED… he did not deny it.

    Attorney Treacy (?) does not believe I can get his COMMENT to be posted on American Thinker.

    So I ask the readers of AMERICAN THINKER. Is Treacy correct and Dr. Lakin is wrong saying the bogus ‘birth certificate’ Mr. Soetoro (aka) has presented to the world as his TICKET TO THE WHITE HOUSE should NOT be accepted? Or should we accept Treacy’s claim that this bogus, concealed, hidden, and printed fraud called Mr. Soetoro’s Certificate of Live Birth is the true document of record?

    He (and his co-conspirators at nativeborncitizen.wordpress.com wants a debate — LET’S GIVE IT TO THEM!

    Thank you in advance,
    Edward C. Noonan
    Chairman – Yuba County American Independent Party
    UNQUOTE

    THAT WAS HIS FIRST MESSAGE. HERE IS THE SECOND:

    QUOTE

    From: Edward C. Noonan
    To: editor American Thinker
    Sent: Monday, April 12, 2010 8:33 AM
    Subject: Why have we been banned?

    I was going to submit this COMMENT but I discovered I was BANNED TOO! I got the message:

    The (user)name “ednoonan” has been banned from use. Please use a different name or contact the forum administrators

    END QUOTE

    There has not been a peep from Ed since then.

  13. Marcus: “Judge Lamberth relies on an extremely narrow interpretation of the Court’s holding in Newman. SCOTUS did not limit quo warranto to only those who had a claim to the office itself. The holding in Newman clearly recognizes that a person could have an interest in the office without having a claim to the that office.”

    I took a look at this issue last year:

    http://jonathanturley.org/2009/10/13/attorney-orly-taitz-fined-20000-for-frivolous-birther-litigation/#comment-95497

    Here is what the Court said , quoting:

    7. Considering the ancient policy of the law and the restrictions imposed by the language of the Code, it is evident that, in passing this statute, Congress used the words “third person” in the sense of “any person,” and the phrase “person interested” in the sense in which it so often occurs in the law, prohibiting a judge from presiding in a case in which he is interested; preventing a juror from sitting in a case in which he is interested, and permitting interested persons to institute quo warranto proceedings. In the illustrations suggested, the interest which a judge had as a member of the public would not disqualify him from sitting in a case of great public importance and in which the community at large was concerned. The interest which disqualifies a juror from serving, as well as the interest which would authorize this plaintiff to sue, must be some personal and direct interest in the subject of the litigation. The same definition has often been given in quo warranto cases. The interest which will justify such a proceeding by a private individual must be more than that of another taxpayer. It must be “an interest in the office itself, and must be peculiar to the applicant.” Demarest v. Wickham, 63 N.Y. 320; Commonwealth ex Rel. McLaughlin v. Cluley, 56 Pa.St. 270; State v. Taylor, 208 Mo. 442; Robinson v. Jones, 14 Fla. 256; In re Stein, 13 Neb. 529; State ex Rel. Depue v. Matthews, 44 W.Va. 372, 384; Com. ex Rel. Butterfield v. McCarter, 98 Pa.St. 607; State v. Boal, 46 Mo. 528; Brown v. Alderman, 82 Vt. 529; Mills v. State, 2 Wash. 572; Antrim v. Reardon, 161 Ind. 250; Harrison v. Greaves, 58 Miss. 455; Andrews v. State, 69 Miss. 740(3), 746; Tontray v. Budge, 14 Idaho, 639; Hudson v. Conklin, 77 Kan. 764; Vrooman v. Michie, 69 Mich. 47; Dakota v. Hauxhurst, 3 Dak. 205.

    The language of the Code, supported by the history and policy of the law, sustains the proposition that one who has no interest except that which is common to every other member of the public is not entitled to use the name of the government in quo warranto proceedings.

    For if the allegations in such a suit by a private citizen set out any cause of action at all, it shows on its face that it was a cause of action belonging to the whole body of the public, and which therefore should be prosecuted by the public representative. [end quote]
    238 U. S. at 550-551

    So “one who has no interest except that which is common to every other member of the public is not entitled to use the name of the government in quo warranto proceedings.” I just do not see where this “clearly recognizes that a person could have an interest in the office without having a claim to the that office.”

  14. I might be wrong, but I am pretty sure a quo warranto was not one of Mr Treacy’s choices for the ability to remove sitting president.

    The first provides that the Attorney General of the United States or the United States Attorney may institute such an action on their own motion or on the relation of a third person. D.C. CODE § 16-3502. If the Attorney General or U.S. Attorney does so on the relation of a third person, they must first seek leave of court. Id. The Code also provides that if the Attorney General or U.S. Attorney “refuse 0 to institute a quo warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ issued.” Id. § 16-3503.

    The court did not say that quo warranto could not be served on the President.

    Am I wrong in that assumption Mr. Treacy

  15. Newman: “While every citizen and every taxpayer is interested in the enforcement of law and in having only qualified officers execute the law, such general interest is not a private but a public interest, which is not sufficient to authorize the institution of quo warranto proceedings.”

    Newman: “An interested person within the meaning of the provisions of the District Code in regard to quo warranto proceedings is one who has an interest in the office itself peculiar to himself whether the office be elective or appointive.”

    Newman: “Unless the right to maintain quo warranto proceedings under the District Code were limited to persons actually and personally interested, every officer attached to the government at Washington would be subject to attack by persons having no claim in the office or interest therein different from that of every other citizen and taxpayer of the United States.”

    Judge Lamberth relies on an extremely narrow interpretation of the Court’s holding in Newman. SCOTUS did not limit quo warranto to only those who had a claim to the office itself. The holding in Newman clearly recognizes that a person could have an interest in the office without having a claim to the that office. However, when it comes to Orly Taitz, the decision of Judge Lamberth is correct. She has no direct interest in the office that could be considered anything more than that of the average taxpayer or citizen.

  16. Ironically enough, Ms. Taitz could never establish such an injury because—as far as the Court is aware—she was not elected president nor could she be as she is not a natural born citizen herself 🙂

  17. Good job Mr. Treacy u pronounced it dead at seben twenty six. Seben teen minutes for resucitation and I quess the official time of death will be marked at seben forty tree. Dats a wrap folks, pull da sheet up and contact da nexta kin.

  18. Full text from NNBCE website, http://nativeborncitizen.wordpress.com/2010/04/16/orly-v-obama-dismissed/

    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    ORLY TAITZ,

    Plaintiff,

    v. Civil Action 10-151 (RCL)

    BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, Defendant.

    MEMORANDUM OPINION

    Before the Court is the defendant’s motion [18] to dismiss the first amended complaint and Christopher Strunk’s motion [6] to intervene. Also pending before the Court is the plaintiffs motion [17] to consolidate this case with an action currently pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Upon consideration of the motion to dismiss, the applicable law, and the entire record herein the motion will be granted for the reasons set forth below. After consideration of the motion to intervene, the opposition, the applicable law, and the entire record herein the motion will be denied for the reasons set forth below. After consideration of the motion to consolidate, the opposition, and the applicable law, the motion shall be denied without prejudice as this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it.

    I. The Government’s Motion to Dismiss

    A. Quo Warranto Claims

    Orly Taitz has filed suit seeking this Court to issue a writ of quo warranto against the President of the United States to determine his eligibility for office. See D.C. CODE § 16-3501. A writ of quo warranto is a “common-law writ used to inquire the authority by which a public office is held.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1371 (9th ed. 2009). The District of Columbia Code has two statutes regarding the initiation of a quo warranto proceeding. The first provides that the Attorney General of the United States or the United States Attorney may institute such an action on their own motion or on the relation of a third person. D.C. CODE § 16-3502. If the Attorney General or U.S. Attorney does so on the relation of a third person, they must first seek leave of court. Id. The Code also provides that if the Attorney General or U.S. Attorney “refuse 0 to institute a quo warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ issued.” Id. § 16-3503. Ms. Taitz, having contacted the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia and the Attorney General of the United States, and not having received an answer to her satisfaction, has elected to seek the writ on her own. Shortly after she filed suit, the government moved to dismiss.

    This is one of several such suits filed by Ms. Taitz in her quixotic attempt to prove that President Obama is not a natural born citizen as required by Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. This Court is not willing to go tilting at windmills with her.

    The Court of Appeals for this Circuit has held that a quo warranto action against a public official may be brought only by the Attorney General or the U.S. Attorney. Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Wright, J.) (citing United States v. Carmody, 148 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1945)). The Court of Appeals reasoned that this must be the case because challenges to authority by which a public office is held “involve a right belonging to the whole body of the public which can be protected only by a public representative.” Carmody, 148 F.2d at 685.

    That holding of the Court of Appeals is rooted in the doctrine of standing To bring a case in federal court a plaintiff must establish that he or she has standing to do so, which is essentially a question of whether “the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute. . . .” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). There are three elements that form the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (Scalia, J.). If any one of these three requirements is not met, a plaintiff does not have standing

    The first of these is that the plaintiff must suffer an injury in fact. Id. That is an injury must be concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Id. Injuries which are general, rather than particularized, are not sufficient to create standing. Indeed, the Supreme Court has “consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.” Id. at 573-74. This is precisely the sort of injury that Ms. Taitz alleges and as such she does not have standing to pursue her claim. Because Ms. Taitz is neither the Attorney General of the United States nor the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, she does not have standing to bring a quo warranto action challenging a public official’s right to hold office.’ Accordingly Ms. Taitz’s quo warranto claims are dismissed for lack of standing.2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

    B. Qui Tam Claims

    To bring a claim under the False Claims Act, it must be filed under seal on behalf of the United States and not served on the defendant until ordered by the court. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). Failure to comply with these filing procedures results in dismissal of the relator’s suit with prejudice. United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. ITT Indus., 492 F. Supp. 2d 303, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing United States ex rel. Pilon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 60 F.3d 995, at 999-1000 (2d Cir. 1995)). Ms. Taitz attempts to excuse her failure to file under seal by stating that li]n this case the facts are widely known.” [Dkt. 21 at 6.] But the qui tam statute provides no exception to the requirement a complaint be filed under seal. As Ms. Taitz did not file her complaint under seal as required by section 3730(b)(2), her qui tam claims are dismissed.

    I Even if the Court of Appeals’ precedent did not firmly preclude Ms. Taitz from bringing suit to challenge President Obama’s right to hold office, the one case that discusses the circumstances under which a private person might be able to challenge a public official’s title to office despite the refusal of the Attorney General or the United States Attorney to act, suggests that the “interested person” bringing the action would have had to be actually entitled to the office herself. Newman v. United States ex rel Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 547 (1915). Ironically enough, Ms. Taitz could never establish such an injury because—as far as the Court is aware—she was not elected president nor could she be as she is not a natural born citizen herself

    2 Because Ms. Taitz lacks standing to pursue her quo warranto action her motion for a preliminary injunction is denied as moot.

    C. Freedom of Information Act Claims

    Ms. Taitz has also made a claim under the Freedom of Information Act, alleging that she requested “information from the Social Security Administration seeking explanation, why the defendant is using Social Security numbers of other individuals and numbers that were never assigned and what action is Social Security Administration is taking to prosecute this conduct.” She also asks that this Court issue a mandamus directing Social Security Administrator Michael J. Astrue to release an application for a Social Security number “submitted in the state of CT to an individual born in 1890″ and directing an investigation into “how Obama was able to obtain a social security belonging to an individual born in 1890″ and “how Obama was able to use 39 different social security numbers.”

    The FOIA claim fails for several reasons. The first and most important of which is that she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. As the government notes, Ms. Taitz appealed the Social Security Administration’s denial of her request on March 15, 2010 and the Social Security Administration has twenty business days from the date it received her notice to consider the administrative appeal. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). Even if the SSA received her appeal on the 15th of March, the period cannot have run until at least April 9th. A plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review of a FOIA claim. Wilbur v. Central Intelligence Agency, 355 F.3d 675, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Because Ms. Taitz has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies,3 her claim will be dismissed.

    Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. The writ will only issue to compel performance of a “clear nondiscretionary duty.” Pittston Coal Group. v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 121 (1988) (quoting Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 612 (1984)). Ms. Taitz has neither identified any clear nondiscretionary duty that the Social Security Administrator has failed to perform nor one that is owed to her. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Furthermore, her mandamus claim merely rehashes the claim she made under FOIA, and as another judge of this Court has noted, “[t]he exclusive nature of the FOIA precludes mandamus relief.” Strunk v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2010 WL 931197, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. March 15, 2010) (Leon, J.). As such, Ms. Taitz has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, Ms. Taitz’s claims for mandamus relief shall be dismissed. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

    3 Ms. Taitz would be well advised to review the Social Security Administration’s FOIA Regulations, in particular 20 C.F.R. § 402.100. See also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); see generally Sherman v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 244 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2001).

    D. Remaining Claims

    i. Common Law Fraud

    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that a plaintiff who alleges fraud or mistake must state with particularity the circumstances surrounding the fraud or mistake. A plaintiff must still, of course, comply with Rule 8’s requirements as well. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009). Ms. Taitz has failed to adequately plead fraud because she has not alleged that (1) that she relied on the defendant’s allegedly fraudulent statements and (2) that she was harmed by any such reliance. Aktiselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Va. Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc., 878 A.2d 1226, 1237-38 (D.C. 2005)). As such her claims for common law fraud shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

    ii. Section 1983 and Section 1985 Claims

    Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he is a federal officer, and section 1983 does not apply to officers of the federal government. Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2005). As such Ms. Taitz has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To the extent that Ms. Taitz is attempting to state a claim against Debra Bowen, the Court notes that Ms. Bowen is not a party to this action.

    The plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 likewise fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As the Supreme Court observed recently, while Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. It must contain sufficient factual allegations that when accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

    iii. RICO Claims

    Ms. Taitz’s claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) are also defective. In order to bring a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 a civil plaintiff must allege:

    (1) That the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3) constituting a “pattern” (4) of “racketeering activity” (5) directly or indirectly invests in, or maintains an interest in, or participates in (6) an “enterprise” (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce. . . . [P]laintiff must [also] allege that he was “injured in his business or property by reason of [the] violation of § 1962.”

    Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983).

    The Court first addresses the predicate acts Ms. Taitz has alleged. First of all, neither violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nor 42 U.S.C. §1985 are “racketeering activities” which could be the basis for Ms. Taitz’s RICO claim. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (defining which offenses are racketeering activities). They thus are not actionable as violations of section 1962. With respect to the various allegations of fraud—and fraud indeed is a predicate act for purposes of RICO liability—Ms. Taitz has failed to sufficiently plead her claims. To the degree a RICO complaint sounds in fraud, the plaintiff must meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements. See Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 989 (10th Cir. 1992). As the Court observed earlier, Ms. Taitz’s fraud claims fail to even meet the standards of Rule 8, much less the heightened requirements of Rule 9(b). Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954. As such, she has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and her RICO claims will be dismissed. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

    iv. Commerce Clause Claims

    Ms. Taitz has also asks this Court to declare that the recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, violates the commerce clause and/or is unconstitutional because President Obama has not proved that he is a natural born citizen and thus cannot legitimately sign the bill into law. As this Court has already decided, the latter claims presented by Ms. Taitz are generalized grievances about the proper administration of the government for which she does not have standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74.

    At the time that Ms. Taitz filed her amended complaint, President Obama had not yet signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act into law. Standing is measured, however, at the time of filing. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1267 (11th Cir. 2001). As the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was not signed into law until after her amended complaint was filed, at the time of filing Ms. Taitz did not have an injury that was concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. As such she does not have standing to pursue her claims that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and they will be dismissed.

    Even if Ms. Taitz could establish standing on this point, she has still failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as she has done nothing more than provide “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully­harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Her failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted would prevent her from proceeding here had she established standing.

    II. Motion to Intervene

    Christopher Strunk has filed a motion to intervene in this suit, which is opposed by the government. The government’s opposition was filed out of time and the government has asked for leave to file their opposition, which the prospective intervenor has not objected to. Counsel for the government has met the standard for excusable neglect and the filing shall be permitted. See Wilson v. Feldman, 1991 WL 197025, at *1 (D.D.C. Sep. 18, 1991) (Lamberth, J.).

    In order to intervene, the prospective intervenor must establish that he too has standing. Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 523 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2007) (Lamberth, J.). All of the reasons that preclude the plaintiff in this case from bringing a quo warranto action against the President, similarly apply to the intervenor. As such the motion to intervene shall be denied.

    1. Motion to Consolidate

    28 U.S.C. § 1407 requires that any motion to consolidate must be filed with the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Section 1407 also states that “[s]uch transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation. . . .” Given that this decision is committed to the panel, rather than this Court, the Court is bound to deny the motion without prejudice as it lacks the jurisdiction to consider it. Accordingly, the motion will be denied.

    1. Conclusion

    For the reasons set forth in this opinion the government’s motion to dismiss shall be granted, the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction will be denied as moot, Christopher Strunk’s motion to intervene shall be denied, and the plaintiffs motion to consolidate is denied for want of jurisdiction.

    A separate order shall issue today.

    April 14, 2010.

    ROYCE C. LAMBERTH Chief Judge

    United States District Court

  19. FFLEO, I likes ta say itsa poke in da I wita red hot poker.

    Mister Treacy here has got me on edge dis week. startin wit they’ll put ya in jail fur not payin ur taxis. U C, some how r anutter sumpin just ain’t right. When he pulled da ol Doc West stunt, I node it wudn’t right. I got my I on eem, so don’t u wurry bout dat. Like Ol Keeny u sta sang. U got ta no win ta holdem, no win foldem, no win ta walk away, n no win ta run. No what i mean vern?

  20. Why bother reading any of that stuff that was pasted up without attribution or link? It is now totally irrelevant.

    How is Orly doing?

    Her case in D.C. was dismissed on all counts in an Order and Decision filed by Chief Judge Royce Lamberth of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. I hope Professor Turley notices this major development:

    The Court’s ORDER:

    https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2010cv0151-22

    The Court’s MEMORANDUM OPINION:

    https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2010cv0151-23

    Read ‘em and weep, Leo Donofrio, Mario Apuzzo and birthers everywhere tonight.

Comments are closed.