Chief U.S. District Judge Edward Nottingham Tied to Prostitution Ring In Denver

While New York Governor Eliot Spitzer is dealing with a criminal investigation into his alleged use of a high-priced call girl service, a similar investigation is being conducted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit into the alleged use of prostitutes by Chief U.S. District Judge Edward Nottingham. It is not the first alleged misconduct by the jurist.

Nottingham is alleged to have been a customer of a business called Denver Players or Denver Sugar that is alleged to have been a brothel before it was shut down.
The investigation includes records and eye-witnesses. It details how the judge was known as “Naughty” and paid roughly $300 per visit. This is considerably better than Spitzer who used the name of “George Fox” and paid as much as $5400.

Nottingham raised some eyebrows in testimony during his divorce when he admitted that he had spent more than $3,000 at a Denver strip club over two days. He explained that he was “too drunk to remember” how he’d spent the money.

For the full story, click here.

43 thoughts on “Chief U.S. District Judge Edward Nottingham Tied to Prostitution Ring In Denver”

  1. Well I am still struggling along. Now I am in the DC court of appeals, as Judge Bates ruled that publication in the Federal Register that Prisoner Tracking Systems records are used when there is a criminal conviction immunizes creation of Prisoner Tracking Systems without a criminal conviction. So that is a question of statutory interpretation right? Judge Bates decision conflicts with the U.S. Solicitor General statement to the Supreme Court

    “Absent a specific statutory provision authorizing or precluding judicial review, a contention that the Attorney General was maintaining or disseminating criminal records in violation of law would be cognizable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. (APA), in a suit brought by a person aggrieved by the alleged violation.”

    My draft questions on appeal are:

    1.) Does the First Amendment limit restraints against PRO SE speech?
    2.) Is there an exemption from the NonDetention Act, 18 USC § 4001, for the detentions and threats that the United States Department of Justice inflicted on the appellants?
    3.) When arrest and detention is accomplished without a criminal charge, and systems of records are used, is there remedy under the Administrative Procedure Act?
    4.) If either Mr. or Mrs. Sieverding does not have remedy under the Administrative Procedure Act, is there remedy under 42 USC § 1985(2), Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror?
    5.) Is DOJ required by the Administrative Procedure Act to make annual reports to OMB and the public?

    I found these really great 1st Amendment arguments in recent S.C. decisions:

    Since its enactment, the First Amendment has permitted restrictions on a few historic categories of speech—including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct—that “have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572. …. The Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, distinguished. Pp. 5–9. US. v. Stevens No. 08-769 (U.S. 04/20/2010)

    Because speech is an essential mechanism of democracy — it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people — political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” WRTL, 551 U. S., at 464. This language provides a sufficient framework for protecting the interests in this case. Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speakers, which may be a means to control content. The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in the political speech context, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this conclusion…. (1) The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for engaging in political speech…. First Amendment protections do not depend on the speaker’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.” Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, No. 08-205 (U.S. 01/21/2010)

    Content-based restrictions on speech are “presumptively invalid” and subject to strict scrutiny.” Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U. S. 177, ___. Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association, 129 S.Ct. 1093 (U.S. 02/24/2009).

    The NO PRO SE order DOJ used jail to uphold was content based so it was subject to strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is the most stringent standard of judicial review used by United States courts reviewing federal law. Strict scrutiny arises in two basic contexts: when a “fundamental” constitutional right is infringed, particularly those listed in the Bill of Rights and those the court has deemed a fundamental right protected by the liberty provision of the 14th Amendment; or when the government action involves the use of a “suspect classification” such as race or, sometimes, national origin that may render it void under the Equal Protection Clause. These are the two applications that were anticipated in footnote 4 to United States v. Carolene Products.

    In 1907, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the right “to maintain actions in the courts of the state” is a fundamental right and cannot be overridden by judicial decision:

    “It is not necessary to fully enumerate the privileges and immunities
    secured against hostile discrimination by the constitutional provision in
    question. All agree that among such privileges and immunities are those
    which, under our institutions, are fundamental in their nature… Among the
    particular privileges and immunities which are clearly to be deemed
    fundamental, the court in that case specifies the right ‘to institute and
    maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state.’… in Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418-430, 20 L. ed. 449-452, the court, after referring to Corfield v. Coryell, above cited, and speaking by Mr. Justice Clifford, stated that the right ‘to maintain actions in the courts of the state’ was fundamental…The final judgment in this case therefore denies a
    fundamental right inherent in citizenship, and protected by 2 of article 4 of the Constitution. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. But it would not be supreme if any right given by it could be overridden either by state enactment or by judicial decision.” CHAMBERS V. BALTIMORE &
    O. R. CO., 207 U.S. 142 (1907)

    There are two other factual developments in my case. One is that the original person I sued, my former neighbor Kevin Bennett, president of the city council of steamboat springs CO admitted that he pled guilty to conspiracy to sell has but didn’t disclose it when he was in office and the police reported to him. This is relevant because the NO PRO SE recommendation was made on the basis that I had suggested in 2003 he was involved with drug dealing. The attorney bills show discussion with the city attorney about Bennett’s NCIC records in 2003 so they knew I was right about that.

    Another itemization in the attorney bills is “confer with CBA and attorney general regarding NCIC records on Bennett”. The Attorney General of Colorado at the time was Ken Salazar. There are a lot of references in the attorney bills to conferring with the attorney general. I had sued a state of Colorado employee in capacity but instead of a state employee defending her, she was defended by Bennett’s attorney who was billing Lloyds of London and Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency. I had filed an open records request for CIRSA’s claims handling policies which are required annually to be filed with the state division of insurance. See CRS CRS 24-10-115.5 (5) “The commissioner of insurance, or any person authorized by him, shall conduct an insurance examination at least once a year to determine that proper underwriting techniques and sound funding, loss reserves, and claims procedures are being followed.” The state said it didn’t have the reports and the attorney bills itemize discussions with the State of Colorado insurance commissioner and with Salazar. So my experience is related to the Gulf Oil Spill since Salazar ignored regulations when he was State of CO Attorney General and this is itemized in the verified attorney bills on file in the 10th Circuit as well as the District of CO 02-cv-1950 document 465.

  2. Well you know about the concept of standing. Lots of pro se litigants try to be noble and advance public interests by filing lawsuits trying to get change through the courts and are then told that they don’t have standing.

    In my original lawsuit, I believed that I had standing against the bar associations because over 100 lawyers knew that I had been extorted but did nothing. The bar associations must have believed that too and that’s why they wouldn’t let the underlying events be acknowledged.

    Anyway, I filed a lawsuit for damages under the Privacy Act 5 USC section 552a against USDOJ because USMS used its prisoner tracking records to imprison me without a use they acknowledged to Congress. To Congress they claim that the PTS system is used to detain people accused of or convicted of federal offenses, not random people that judges don’t like, or people that try to get a hearing in a different court.

    I probably should have just left my case when I filed for summary judgment so there would be less for Judge Bates to read. However, I found out that USDOJ never filed the reports with OMB required by 5 USC section 552a(u). I do want to engage in other pro se litigation and I am afraid that USMS will harass me if I do. So I filed a motion to get a copy of the required reports. USDOJ opposed that motion. The reports that are required are supposed to include complaints that USDOJ used its computer records in unauthorized ways and what USDOJ did when receiving such complaints. These reports are supposed to be by a Data Integrity Board including policy makers from different branches of USDOJ and of course the Data Integrity Board would be subject to the Public Meetings and Open Records requirements. Really there is nothing similar in other laws that I could find. So I used my “standing” and did a good deed, I hope.

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