The bill is in for Orly Taitz, the California lawyer leading the “Birther” litigation: $20,000 for sanctionable conduct. U.S. District Court Judge Clay Land previously issued a stern warning to attorney Orly Taitz and others in the so-called “birther” campaign: do not file another such “frivolous” lawsuit or you will face sanctions. Land threw out the lawsuit filed on behalf of Capt. Connie Rhodes who is an Army surgeon challenging her deployment orders due to President Barack Obama’s alleged ineligibility to serve as President. Land (a Bush appointee) noted that “[u]nlike in ‘Alice in Wonderland,’ simply saying something is so does not make it so.” In the most recent order, Land said that Taitz’s conduct “borders on delusional.”
Rhodes previously accused Taitz of filing new papers in Rhodes v. MacDonald without her approval and after she agreed to be deployed by the military. Taitz declared in one filing: “This case is now a quasi-criminal prosecution of the undersigned attorney.” She is already facing a California bar complaint and Rhodes is promising to file a new complaint against her for “reprehensible” representation.
When Rhodes learned that Taitz had filed a motion to stay deployment after she had decided to forego further litigation, she proceeded to fire Taitz by sending a remarkable letter from Office Max on the advice of “Tim who works in the District Clerk’s office.” She stated in the fax:
September 18th, 2009
To the Honorable Judge Land:
Currently, I am shipping out to Iraq for my deployment. I became aware on last night’s local news that a Motion to Stay my deployment had been entered on my behalf. I did not authorize this motion to be filed. I thank you for hearing my case and respect the ruling given on September 16th, 2009. It is evident that the original filing for the TRO and such was full of political conjecture which was not my interest. I had no intention of refusing orders nor will I. I simply wanted to verify the lawfulness of my orders. I am honored to serve my country and thank you for doing the same.
With that I said, please withdraw the Motion to Stay that Ms. Taitz filed this past Thursday. I did not authorize it and do not wish to proceed. Ms. Taitz never requested my permission nor did I give it. I would not have been aware of this if I did not see it on the late news on Thursday night before going to board my plane to Iraq on Friday, September 18, 2009.
Furthermore, I do not wish for Ms. Taitz to file any future motion or represent me in any way in this court. It is my plan to file a complaint with the California State Bar to her reprehensible and unprofessional actions.
I am faxing this as was advised by Tim, who works in the District Clerk’s office. I will mail the original copy of this letter once I have arrived in Iraq.
Respectfully,
CPT Connie M. Rhodes, MD
In her Motion for Leave to Withdrawal as Counsel, Taitz suggested that her client is lying to the Court.
She states that she not only has a (rather obvious) conflict with her former client but may present evidence that is embarrassing to her:
The undersigned attorney comes before this Court to respectfully ask for leave to withdraw as counsel for the Plaintiff Captain Connie Rhodes. The immediate need for this withdrawal is the filing of two documents of September 18, 2009, one by the Court, Document 17, and one apparently by Plaintiff Connie Rhodes, which together have the effect of creating a serious conflict of interest between Plaintiff and her counsel. In order to defend herself, the undersigned counsel will have to contest and potentially appeal any sanctions order in her own name alone, separately from the Plaintiff, by offering and divulging what would normally constitute inadmissible and privileged attorney-client communications, and take a position contrary to her client’s most recently stated position in this litigation. The undersigned attorney will also offer evidence and call witnesses whose testimony will be adverse to her (former) client’s most recently stated position in this case. A copy of this Motion was served five days ago on the undersigned’s former client, Captain Connie Rhodes, prior to filing this with the Court and the undersigned acknowledges her client’s ability to object to this motion, despite her previously stated disaffection for the attorney-client
relationship existing between them. This Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will in no way delay the proceedings, in that the Plaintiff has separately indicated that she no longer wishes to continue to contest any issue in this case. In essence, this case is now a quasi-criminal prosecution of the undersigned attorney, for the purpose of punishment, and the Court should recognize and acknowledge the essential ethical importance of releasing this counsel from her obligations of confidentiality and loyalty under these extraordinary circumstances.Respectfully submitted,
By:_________________________
Orly Taitz, DDS, Esq.
California Bar ID No. 223433
FOR THE PLAINTIFF
Captain Connie Rhodes, M.D. F.S.
SATURDAY, September 26, 2009
“Quasi-criminal prosecution”? The judge had ordered Taitz to “show cause” why a sanction should not be imposed in the case. He had previously told Taitz that he would consider sanctions if she filed similar claims in the future. After the denial of the Motion to Stay deployment, Land said that the latest filing was “deja vu all over again” including “her political diatribe.” He noted:
Instead of seriously addressing the substance of the Court’s order, counsel repeats her political diatribe against the President, complains that she did not have time to address dismissal of the action (although she sought expedited consideration), accuses the undersigned of treason, and maintains that “the United States District Courts in the 11th Circuit are subject to political pressure, external control, and . . . subservience to the same illegitimate chain of command which Plaintiff has previously protested.”
Then the kicker:
The Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay of Deployment (Doc. 15) to be frivolous. Therefore, it is denied. The Court notifies Plaintiff’s counsel, Orly Taitz, that it is contemplating a monetary penalty of $10,000.00 to be imposed upon her, as a sanction for her misconduct. Ms. Taitz shall file her response within fourteen days of today’s order showing why this sanction should not be imposed.
I am frankly not convinced that sanctions would be appropriate for filing for a motion to stay deployment per se. At the time of his order, Land did not presumably know that the filing was made against the wishes of the client. If Rhodes was interested in appealing Land’s decision, which is her right, a stay is a standard request. However, the fact that the filing may have been made after Taitz was terminated as counsel and after she was told that Rhodes was abandoning the case is more cause for possible sanctions. Moreover, the low quality and over-heated rhetoric of the filing can support such sanctions. Her filings appear more visceral than legal. In demanding reconsideration of the Court’s earlier order, she used language that does cross the line:
This Court has threatened the undersigned counsel with sanctions for advocating that a legally conscious, procedurally sophisticated, and constitutionally aware army officers corps is the best protection against the encroachment of anti-democratic, authoritarian, neo-Fascistic or Palaeo-Communistic dictatorship in this country, without pointing to any specific language, facts, or allegations of fact in the Complaint or TRO as frivolous. Rule 11 demands more of the Court than use of its provisions as a means of suppressing the First Amendment Right to Petition regarding questions of truly historical, in fact epic and epochal, importance in the history of this nation.
She also (as noted by Land in his later order) essentially accused Land of treason, as she has in public statements:
Plaintiff submits that to advocate a breach of constitutional oaths to uphold the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic, is in fact a very practical form of “adhering” to those enemies, foreign and domestic, and thus is tantamount to treason, as Defined in Article III, Section 3, even when pronounced in Court. The People of the United States deserve better service and loyalty from the most powerful, and only life-tenured, officers of their government.
Taitz is also facing a California Bar complaint, here. Ohio lawyer (and inactive California bar member) Subodh Chandra wrote the bar, stating “I respectfully request that you investigate Ms. Taitz’s conduct and impose an appropriate sanction. She is an embarrassment to the profession.” For that complaint, click here.
A complaint by a former client would likely attract more attention by the Bar. These are now serious allegations including misrepresentation, false statements to the Court, and other claims that will have to be addressed by a Bar investigation. This could take years to resolve — perhaps just in time for Obama’s second inauguration.
The court ruled that Taitz violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in filing frivolous papers. Declaring the filings as made in “bad faith,” the court concluded that Taitz’s legal conduct was “willful and not merely negligent.” Sanctions were warranted, he held, because “Counsel’s frivolous and sanctionable conduct wasted the Defendants’ time and valuable judicial resources that could have been devoted to legitimate cases pending with the Court.”
“When a lawyer files complaints and motions without a reasonable basis for believing that they are supported by existing law or a modification or extension of existing law, that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law,” Land writes. “When a lawyer uses the courts as a platform for a political agenda disconnected from any legitimate legal cause of action, that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law. When a lawyer personally attacks opposing parties and disrespects the integrity of the judiciary, that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law. When a lawyer recklessly accuses a judge of violating the judicial code of conduct with no supporting evidence beyond her dissatisfaction with the judge’s rulings, that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law. When a lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law, that lawyer ceases to advance her cause or the ends of justice. . .
Regrettably, the conduct of counsel Orly Taitz has crossed these lines, and Ms. Taitz must be sanctioned for her misconduct. After a full review of the sanctionable conduct, counsel’s conduct leading up to that conduct, and counsel’s response to the Court’s show cause order, the Court finds that a monetary penalty of $20,000.00 shall be imposed upon counsel Orly Taitz as punishment for her misconduct, as a deterrent to prevent future misconduct, and to protect the integrity of the Court. Payment shall be made to the United States, through the Middle District of Georgia Clerk’s Office, within thirty days of today’s Order. If counsel fails to pay the sanction due, the U.S. Attorney will be authorized to commence collection proceedings.
I expect that Taitz will appeal the decision, given her past statements. The opinion goes into considerable detail on her conduct and interaction with the court, as shown below.
For the decision, click here.
For the story, click here

News – Breaking News
Thursday, Nov. 12, 2009
Birther attorney Orly Taitz: ‘I have no intention of paying’ $20,000 sanction
BY ALAN RIQUELMY –
California attorney Orly Taitz, facing a $20,000 sanction from the federal judge presiding over the Mark Shelnutt trial, said on the payment’s deadline that she had no intention of paying.
“Absolutely not,” Taitz said Thursday afternoon when asked whether she would pay. “I have filed an appeal. It was a complete abuse of power.”
….
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/news/breaking_news/story/906241.html
Here is Justin’s: http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/11/judge_directs_us_attorney_to_collect_20k_from_orly.php?ref=fpb
Ok, here is the latest skinny on Orly. She told the Columbus GA paper she has no intention of laying 20 Grand on Judge Land.
The Judge shot back by putting out a contract on Orly’s head. The full order [from the indefatigable Justin Elliott at Josh Marshall’s TPM] read as follows: “Orly Taitz has failed to pay the $20,000.00 sanction ordered by the Court on October 13, 2009. Accordingly, the Clerk is ordered to enter final judgment in favor of the United States of America and against Orly Taitz in the principal amount of $20,000.00. The United States Attorney is authorized and directed to collect the judgment as provided by law.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 13th day of November, 2009. ”
Judge Land wanted the fine donated to the National Infantry Foundation at Ft. Benning. The Government defendant has come out against this, as it “it is the government’s position that the monetary sanction imposed upon counsel Orly Taitz must be paid to the United States Treasury.” The full brief is at the excellent Native and Natural Born Citizen site:
[The links will show up just as soon as they clear moderation].
Ok, here is the latest skinny on Orly. She told the Columbus GA paper she has no intention of laying 20 Grand on Judge Land.
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/news/breaking_news/story/906241.html
The Judge shot back by putting out a contract on Orly’s head. The full order [from the indefatigable Justin Elliott at Josh Marshall’s TPM] read as follows: “Orly Taitz has failed to pay the $20,000.00 sanction ordered by the Court on October 13, 2009. Accordingly, the Clerk is ordered to enter final judgment in favor of the United States of America and against Orly Taitz in the principal amount of $20,000.00. The United States Attorney is authorized and directed to collect the judgment as provided by law.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 13th day of November, 2009. ”
http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/11/judge_directs_us_attorney_to_collect_20k_from_orly.php?ref=fpb
Judge Land wanted the fine donated to the National Infantry Foundation at Ft. Benning. The Government defendant has come out against this, as it “it is the government’s position that the monetary sanction imposed upon counsel Orly Taitz must be paid to the United States Treasury.” The full brief is at the excellent Native and Natural Born Citizen site:
http://nativeborncitizen.wordpress.com/2009/11/11/rhodes-v-mcdonald-doc-35-defendants%E2%80%99-brief-in-response-to-the-court%E2%80%99s-order-dated-october-13-2009/#more-7236
There was another big loss for the birthers in the Third Circuit. The dismissal of Attorney Phil Berg’s case was affirmed.
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-4340
PHILIP J. BERG, ESQUIRE, Appellant
v.
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, a/k/a BARRY SOETORO, a/k/a BARRY OBAMA, a/k/a BARACK DUNHAM, a/k/a BARRY DUNHAM; THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE; THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION; THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE; PEDRO A. CORTÉS, Secretary of the Commonwealth in his official capacity; DIANNE FEINSTEIN, Chairman of the U.S. Senate, Commission on Rules and Administration in her official capacity; U.S. SENATE, COMMISSION ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION; and DOES 1-50 INCLUSIVE
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-04083) District Judge: Hon. R. Barclay Surrick
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 26, 2009
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Philip Berg, a lawyer acting pro se, filed this action challenging Barack Obama’s eligibility to run for and serve as President of the United States. The District Court dismissed Berg’s action on the grounds that he lacks standing and failed to state a cognizable claim.
I.
Before the 2008 presidential election, Berg sued then- Presidential candidate Barack Obama, the Democratic National Committee, and the Federal Election Commission, among others, alleging that Obama was ineligible to run for and serve as President because he was born in Kenya and therefore is not a “natural born citizen” within the meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution .[1] Berg sought, in relevant part, a declaratory judgment that Obama was ineligible, an injunction barring Obama from running for that office, and an injunction barring the Democratic National Committee from nominating him.
Although Berg brought a grab-bag of claims before the District Court, he appeals only the dismissal of those brought under the Natural Born Citizen Clause of the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[2] The District Court – assuming the factual allegations made by Berg to be true for the purposes of the Defendants’ motion to dismiss those claims – dismissed the first claim because “[t]he alleged harm to voters [like Berg] stemming from a presidential candidate’s failure to satisfy the eligibility requirement[s] of the Natural Born Citizen Clause is not concrete or particularized enough to . . . satisfy Article III standing,” App. at 15, and dismissed the § 1983 claim because the “Natural Born Citizen Clause does not confer an individual right on citizens or voters,” App. at 23.
[1] That clause states, “No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President . . . .” U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
[2] In the “Issues Presented” section of Berg’s brief, issue nine is whether the District Court erred in “dismissing [Berg’s] claims under Promissory Estoppel [by holding that] the DNC . . . and Obama’s promise[s] to uphold the United States Constitution are simply statements of principle and intent in the political realm and are not enforceable promises[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 3. Berg does not mention his promissory estoppel theory again, let alone explain why the District Court’s holding was in error. In any event, the District Court was certainly correct that “[f]ederal courts . . . are not and cannot be in the business of enforcing political rhetoric.” App. at 35.
Berg filed a notice of appeal and moved this court for an “emergency” injunction to stay the presidential election of November 4, 2008 pending resolution of that appeal. We declined to stay the election, noting that it appeared that Berg lacked standing and thus failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits.[3]
Obama won the election and Berg subsequently made another “emergency” motion, asking this court to issue an order prohibiting the certification of electors by the governors of each state, to stay the members of the Electoral College from casting their votes for Obama, and to stay the counting of electoral votes in Congress. We also denied that motion, reiterating Berg’s apparent lack of standing and also stating that Berg’s lawsuit seemed to present a non-justiciable political question.
The electoral votes have since been cast without objection to Obama’s qualifications by any members of Congress, and Obama was inaugurated. Berg nonetheless persists in this litigation.
[3] On the day that we denied Berg’s motion, he petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari and applied to Justice Souter, who was at the time the Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, for an injunction to stay the November 2008 election. The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari and Justice Souter denied the application for an injunction.
II.
We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is plenary. Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Because the Defendants’ challenge to subject matter jurisdiction was a “facial” one, we will accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. It is Berg’s burden to establish his standing. FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1996).
We note that most of Berg’s arguments on appeal were not made before the District Court and rest on facts that did not exist when his complaint was filed, i.e., Obama’s election and the casting of the electoral votes without objection. Ordinarily, we would not reach such arguments. See United States v. Anthony Dell’Aquilla, Enters. & Subsidiaries, 150 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, an issue not raised in district court will not be heard on appeal.”) (citation omitted); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 n.4 (1992) (“The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed.” (quoting Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989))). In light of the public’s interest in the final resolution of this case – which is one of a series of cases brought challenging the qualifications of the 2008 presidential candidates from both of the major political parties [4] – and the obvious lack of any merit in Berg’s contentions, we will exercise our discretion and address them to put some finality to the dispute.
4 See, e.g., Hollister v. Soetoro, 601 F. Supp. 2d 179, 181 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing challenge to Obama’s eligibility); Cohen v. Obama, No. 08-2150, 2008 WL 5191864, at *1 (D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing challenge to Obama’s eligibility), aff’d, 2009 WL 2870668 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (summary affirmance); Hollander v. McCain, 566 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.N.H. 2008) (dismissing challenge to Senator John McCain’s eligibility); Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing challenge to McCain’s qualifications). These cases have been denominated by the press as “birther” cases.
In sum, we agree with the District Court that Berg lacks standing to bring this suit because he has suffered no injury particularized to him. A prerequisite of standing is that the litigant has suffered or will suffer an injury in fact that is caused by the complained-of conduct by a defendant and that can be redressed by the court. Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188. An “injury in fact” is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[W]hen the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (citation omitted).
We consider first the District Court’s holding that Berg’s status as a voter did not provide him standing to challenge Obama’s candidacy.5 The District Court held that “a candidate’s ineligibility under the Natural Born Citizen Clause does not result in an injury in fact to voters.” App. at 19. Berg specifies no error in the District Court’s reasoning. Instead, he merely asserts, generally, that he was somehow harmed by each state having “plac[ed] [Obama] on the ballot when there were substantial questions concerning his citizenship status . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 17.
Berg’s worry that Obama, if elected, might someday be removed from office was not an injury cognizable in a federal court because it was based on speculation and was contingent on future events. As a practical matter, Berg was not directly injured because he could always support a candidate he believed was eligible. See Becker v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 230 F.3d 381, 390 (1st Cir. 2000) (no cognizable injury to voters when they can still cast for preferred candidate), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1007 (2001); Gottlieb v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 143 F.3d 618, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (no harm to voters who could support the candidate of their choice); Hollander, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 68; cf. Gottlieb, 143 F.3d at 621 (injury to voters’ ability to influence the political process too speculative for purposes of standing).
[5] Although the defendants argue that this point is moot because the election is over, we consider the issue because “[t]his controversy, like most election cases, fits squarely within the ‘capable of repetition yet evading review’ exception to the mootness doctrine.” Merle v. United States, 351 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 2003).
Berg’s wish that the Democratic primary voters had chosen a different presidential candidate, and his dissatisfaction that they apparently did not credit the evidence he tendered, do not state a legal harm. Similarly, Berg’s angst that the presence on the ballot of an ineligible candidate might lessen the chances that an eligible candidate might win was a non-cognizable derivative harm. See Crist v. Comm’n on Pres. Debates, 262 F.3d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 2001) (agreeing that “a voter fails to present an injury-in-fact when the alleged harm . . . is only derivative of a harm experienced by a candidate.”); Becker, 230 F.3d at 390; Gottlieb, 143 F.3d at 622.
Even if we assume that the placement of an ineligible candidate on the presidential ballot harmed Berg, that injury, including any frustration Berg felt because others refused to act on his view of the law, was too general for the purposes of Article III: Berg shared both his “interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws,” and the objective uncertainty of Obama’s possible removal, pari passu with all voters; and the relief he sought would have “no more directly and tangibly benefit[ed] him than . . . the public at large.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74; see also Crist, 262 F.3d at 195; Becker, 230 F.3d at 389- 90; Gottlieb, 143 F.3d at 622; Hollander, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (dismissing voter’s suit alleging that Senator McCain was ineligible to be President under the Natural Born Citizen Clause); Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (dismissing voter’s suit alleging that the Twelfth Amendment barred electors from voting for President George Walker Bush and Vice President Cheney), aff’d, Jones v. Bush, 244 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2000) (summary affirmance), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001); cf. Cohen, 2008 WL 5191864 at *1 (dismissing citizen challenge to Obama’s eligibility); Robinson, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 1146-47 (dismissing elector’s suit challenging McCain’s eligibility).
Now that the election is over, Berg’s stake in the legitimacy of Obama’s presidency is shared by an even greater number of people, i.e., all 300 million-plus U.S. citizens, whether voters or not. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74; see Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 441-42 (2007) (Colorado voters lacked standing to assert that a provision of the Colorado Constitution violated the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974) (citizens lacked standing to litigate under the Incompatibility Clause the eligibility of members of Congress to serve simultaneously in the military reserves); Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam) (private individual lacked standing to invoke judicial power to determine validity of Justice Black’s appointment to the Supreme Court).
The essence of Berg’s complaint is that the defendants, the states, presidential candidates other than Obama, political parties, a majority of American voters, and Congress – a list that includes some who could have challenged, or could still challenge, Obama’s eligibility through various means – have not been persuaded by his claim. That grievance, too, is not one “appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
Berg also argues that he has standing “under the Tenth Amendment because the power to determine the qualifications of the President-elect is left to the states and the people after the Congressmen and Senators failed to object to the counting of the electoral votes” pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 15 – a statute that provides a mechanism for members of Congress to object to electoral votes after they are cast. Appellant’s Br. at 18. The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const., amend. X. That clause has no apparent relevance to this case and Berg’s citation to Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), is not helpful.
In Gregory, the Supreme Court upheld a state’s ability to determine the qualifications for its state judiciary. Id. at 455-56. The plaintiffs were state court judges who alleged that the section of the Missouri Constitution mandating that they retire at the age of seventy violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 456. The Gregory opinion does not mention the word “standing,” and Berg’s citation to it is inapposite.
Berg also cites to Robinson, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 1147, for the proposition that he should be granted “automatic standing.” Appellant’s Br. at 2. The reference is baffling. The district court in Robinson held that an elector pledged to Alan Keyes lacked standing to bring a suit challenging Senator McCain’s qualifications under the Natural Born Citizen Clause. Id. at 1146-47. Berg cites to the following language of that opinion: “Judicial review [of the claim]-if any-should occur only after the electoral and Congressional processes have run their course.” Id. at 1147. Berg incorrectly takes that to mean that he can bring suit after members of Congress have declined to object pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 15. It means no such thing. The language is part of an alternative holding made in anticipation of the “plaintiff’s standing-cure suggestion that the American Independent Party . . . be allowed to intervene.” Robinson, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 1147. The Court held, in the alternative, that, even assuming that the American Independent Party had standing, the claim was unripe. Id. (citing Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300-02 (1998)).
Berg maintains that he has suffered damage to his reputation as a result of bringing this suit – he claims that he has been accused of being a racist by unnamed others. This “injury” is not attributed to the Defendants. Berg’s assertion that he has been harmed because he has spent money on this lawsuit fails for the same reason; the Defendants’ efforts to legally defend themselves cannot cause injury that gives rise to Article III standing or the doctrine would have no meaning. Berg’s passing reference that he was injured because he was denied some “information concerning the qualifications of Obama” was made in a vacuum, providing this court with no basis to analyze the claim.
Berg asserts that the District Court erred in denying him standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 because of a lack of state action. State action is not one of the three elements of standing. See Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188. In any event, the District Court did not rely on a lack of state action to dismiss his case. See App. at 23-24 n.14.
Among the litany of Berg’s claims is his argument that he was injured when the “President of the Senate failed to call for objections during the counting of the electoral votes from each state . . . .” Appellant’s Br. at 28. Berg supplies no factual basis for that assertion and we have no idea if it is true, but, assuming it is, Berg has been no more injured by that omission than any other United States citizen. Berg alternatively argues that he has standing because his First Amendment rights were somehow violated when his political representatives failed to object to the electoral votes cast in Obama’s favor, as he wished them to. That argument is frivolous. Berg’s final claim that the District Court violated his due process rights by dismissing his case is equally frivolous.
“Absent Article III standing, a federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to address a plaintiff’s claims, and they must be dismissed.”[6] Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188.
6 Berg’s arguments that the District Court ignored some of his voluminous motions and other pleadings not only suffer from fatal defects in their reasoning, but are irrelevant. If a District Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss.
III.
Because there is no case or controversy, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Berg’s action.
The Indiana Court of Appeals is right on the money. Today they handed down the case of Ankeny and Kruse v. Governor of Indiana, in the Court of Appeals of Indiana:
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/11120903.ebb.pdf
Tho pro se plaintiffs sued the Governor for failing to block the Electoral Votes for Obama. The trial court dismissed the claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court discussed the merits of the claim that a natural born citizen must be born in the United States to two United States citizens. It rejected the claim outright.
It correctly relied on U.S. v Wong Kim Ark, ruling that all persons born in the United States are natural born citizens.
One other point re: Asimove v. Adams. The laws of robotics were genius and the Foundation series a masterwork, but “Goodbye and thanks for all the fish” is to me one of the wittiest lines ever written. Also in a recent 911 hospital trip last week, I’m fine now, all I kept thinking to myself was “Don’t Panic,” which made me smile and the EMT’s told me they almost never had patients who were in the throes of what I had, who seemed to deal with it so well. “Foundation” may stimulate my brain, but “Hitchhiker” helps keep me alive.
What a great SF discussion, I feel like I’m home. I love Stross and think he is very, very, good, but my favorite writer today is another Scotsman, Richard K. Morgan. Read “Market Forces” and the three Takeshi Kovacs books, sublime fiction and a wealth of really interesting things to ponder about humanity’s future.
While I like Asimov a lot, I absolutely love Adams writing.
To have either of them “continued” is to me little more than greed. To again use a version of the analogy shall we hire someone to add to the list of Mozart’s music? What about an updated sequel to Lennon’s Imagine? No good.
Big long article at HuffPo by Terry Krepel on WorldNutOrly:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/terry-krepel/worldnetdaily-cant-stop-w_b_341684.html
Art Bulla: “The light of the body is the eye: therefore when thine eye is single, thy whole body also is full of light; but when [thine eye] is evil, thy body also [is] full of darkness.”
You tell me this town ain’t got no heart.
Well, well, well, you can never tell.
The sunny side of the street is dark.
Well, well, well, you can never tell.
Maybe that’s cause it’s midnight, in the dark of the moon besides.
Maybe the dark is from your eyes, Maybe the dark is from your eyes,
Maybe the dark is from your eyes, Maybe the dark is from your eyes,
Maybe the dark is from your eyes, Maybe the dark is from your eyes,
You know you got such dark eyes!
Nothin’ shakin’ on Shakedown Street. Used to be the heart of town.
Don’t tell me this town ain’t got no heart. You just gotta poke around.
Gyges, yeah, Charlton concluded that Obots might be snooping on you and using psycop tactics to manipulate you unknowingly, based on evidence that this snooping is being done by an obot who lives within 10 minutes of the founder of Snopes.com. Comments came from an IP in the town adjacent to the address of the registrant of Snopes.
Truly crazy.
The Ellison story was “All the Lies That Are My Life,” F&SF, Nov. 1980, Hugo nominee, collected in Shatterday: “a writer attends the funeral & reading of the will of a fellow writer & friend … might be described as fiction about science fiction …is the most intensely personal.” The writer in his will expressed his dread that scavengers would keep on churning out new versions of his works. Harlan will read the opening part of it to you at:
http://www.sundancechannel.com/digital-shorts/#/series/20958611001/20977197001
Slart,
I figure Jackson was trying to remove as much of the Arthurian elements as possible from Aragorn’s character. Movies can’t handle as much complexity as novels can. Especially psuedo-mythical novels like Tolkien wrote. By placing Aragorn in a less central role, Jackson was able to emphasize Tolkien’s theme that it wasn’t the powerful legends that made the difference, but the goodness of the simple folk. I think Tolkien overplayed his hand a little by making the Hobbits caricatures like he did.
Vince,
My view on athletes is that great players have the right to decide when to call it quits – if you want to be a Barry Sanders or Jim Brown and leave the game on top, fine, and if you want to be like Bret Favre and keep playing until your 102, that’s fine, too. (I don’t know if you can call it a comeback, but so far, I don’t think anyone in Minnesota is complaining about Farve.) I like the name sequeelers, and I agree that their works shouldn’t become cannon unless they are accepted by the fans (whatever that means).
Gyges,
It’s not what they cut out of LotR that bothers me (and you are right, a lot had to be cut to make an entertaining movie, it’s when important things are changed for no good reason that bothers me. I haven’t seen Bubba Ho-Tep yet, but as I am a Bruce Campbell fan (Hail to the King, baby), it’s on my list of movies to see.
Vince,
You should know better. I’ve had your agent stopped before he could intervene – don’t do it again!
Gyges, great site!
Slart, a great story!
I had the Time Patrol send an agent back to the 20’s to guide Adolph to Sigmund Freud for full psychoanalysis in Vienna. Adolph became a science fiction writer, famous for his novel The Iron Dream, published under the name Norman Spinrad.
As a Celt, I should be careful with the label “Brit.” Stross is now a Scot living in Edinburgh, although born in Leeds. Reynolds is Welsh, living near Cardiff. Banks is a Scot living near Forth Bridge.
See, also, Ken McLeod and Peter F. Hamilton.
Evil twin Vince from Alternate Universe seized computer and garbled my transmission. Iain M. Banks is the author of Transition, out this year, and an excellent alternate universe yarn in every respect up as far as I have read through page 250. So my parlay on the Big Three is Banks, Reynolds and Stross.
Or this may be a brain problem, so I will have to resort to my do-it-yourself brain-surgery kit ordered on the Internet. All spare excised tissue has been promised by JT to NAL. “A rind is a terrible thing to taste.”
BiL, everyone here has to get together and coin a name for these “afterauthors.” They resemble athletes trying to make comebacks. They never succeed. August Derleth kept putting out Lovecraft sequels, and encouraging others, but it is HPL, and only HPL, who is now deservedly in the Library of America. Howard’s Conan was ripped off like that. Harlan Ellison did a story in F&SF 30 years back on the subject.
The sequeelers (rhymes with squealers) have to be told: “With great power comes great responsibility. You can’t do everything. You’re not Superman.”
Slart,
I was actually thankful for all the changes in LOTR. A straight line by line adaptation would have been WAY too long, and boring. Think of how much time Tolkien spent on traveling and back stories. “It’s the journey and not the destination” story telling doesn’t generally work all that well for big budget special effects fests like LOTR needed to be. Of course, I never cared much for Tolkien anyway, so I’m biased.
Contrast that with “Bubba Ho-tep,” which is incredibly faithful to the Lansdale story. It works well because it’s a much more dialog driven story then anything Tolkien wrote. Not to mention it has the advantage of being a short story, which tend to focus less on explanation and more on mood and atmosphere. Plus, a retired Elvis fighting a mummy just makes for good watching.
Buddha,
In fairness to other stories made into movies, HHGTTG is about one-third the length of say, LotR and already had four other versions (I think) that were all different from each other (meaning there were very few scenes that HAD to be in the movie). LotR did many things really well (and the cinematography was incredible), but then something will happen like Aragorn drawing a SWORD at Weathertop and I’ll go apoplectic – and don’t even get me started about the Harry Potter movies…
Buddha,
Fred Saberhagen opened up the Berzerker series and published a book of short stories (Including stories by Larry Niven, Roger Zelazny, and Stephen R. Donaldson (another of my favorite authors)). I think this setting (like the Man-Kzin wars) is ideal for this sort of thing, and I agree with you that comedy is much harder, but I think that Colfer is in the best possible position to make it work.
Slarti,
I will stipulate that I was not deeply offended by the HGTTG film and felt it to be in the spirit of the books within the structural confines of a screenplay. I’ll even go so far as to say Sam Rockwell was perfect casting for Zaphod. As much as some authors whine about “Hollywood butchered my work”, rarely is that strictly true. Screenplays ARE different from novels and any writer honest with themselves should be honest about this fact. Alan Moore has been both right about this (V for Vendetta is a simple and worst – simplistic – shadow of the book) and wrong about this (Watchmen, as good a job making that into a film as possible even though I didn’t agree with the need to change the ending. My reactions to the LOTR films is similar.). I’ll try not to rush to judgment on a new HHTTG book given I now know they are not trying to accomplish the practically impossible. I will still, however, approach with caution.