-Submitted by David Drumm (Nal), Guest Blogger
Holdings, or ratio decidendi (Latin for “the rationale for the decision), are those parts of a court’s opinion that are binding on lower courts and later courts. This binding is referred to as the doctrine of stare decisis which provides hierarchical (vertical) and temporal (horizontal) continuity throughout the judicial system. Obiter Dicta (Latin for a statement “said in passing”), or dicta, are those parts of a court’s opinion that are not binding on lower courts and later courts. Dicta may suggest an interpretation of the law that may prove useful in future cases.
Distinguishing holdings and dicta is sometimes difficult and in some court opinions, intentionally so. Sub-categories of dicta, such as judicial dicta, and their different levels of authority, make the determination even more perilous. Dissenting opinions are always considered dicta.
Vertical stare decisis refers to the power of higher courts to bind the decisions of lower courts. All courts are bound by vertical precedent to follow the holdings in the decisions of the Supreme Court. Vertical stare decisis is generally considered absolute.
Horizontal stare decisis refers to the power of a court to bind itself. The Supreme Court while not bound by its prior decisions, does give them “substantial weight” in deliberations. There is a strong presumption that prior judicial articulations of the law are correct and generally should be followed. Horizontal stare decisis preserves a stable doctrine and prevents cycling.
While “we hold that …” or “the rule is …” are frequently giveaways to holdings, it is no guarantee in the holdings/dictum debate. In United States v. Rubin (1979), J. Friendly, in a concurring opinion, wrote:
A judge’s power to bind is limited to the issue that is before him; he cannot transmute dictum into decision by waving a wand and uttering the word “hold”.
Consider the example found in Minor v. Happersett (1875), a Supreme Court case dealing with the constitution of the State of Missouri that ordains: “Every male citizen of the United States shall be entitled to vote.” The following passage is from J. Waite’s opinion:
The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts.
Portland Examiner contributor Dianna Cotter claims the reference to the natural-born citizen clause in this passage is part of the holding. The Wikipedia entry correctly identifies this reference as obiter dictum.
H/T: Legal Theory Lexicon, Judith M. Stinson, Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell Stearns, Robert G. Scofield.
…comments…kidspost…bdaman…
martin, mandated by WKA and upheld by ROGERS V. BELLEI, 401 U. S. 815 (1971) citizenship within the United States is restricted to three factors;
“Mr. Justice Gray has observed that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was “declaratory of existing
Page 401 U. S. 830
rights, and affirmative of existing law,” so far as the qualifications of being born in the United States, being naturalized in the United States, and being subject to its jurisdiction are concerned. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 169 U. S. 688. Then follows a most significant sentence:
“But it [the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment] has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents; and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress, in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.”
Thus, at long last, there emerged an express constitutional definition of citizenship. But it was one restricted to the combination of three factors, each and all significant: birth in the United States, naturalization in the United States, and subjection to the jurisdiction of the United States. The definition obviously did not apply to any acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of an American parent. That type, and any other not covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, was necessarily left to proper congressional action.”
http://supreme.justia.com/us/401/815/case.html
Everyone born outside the United States are citizens at the discretion of the congress to naturalize and are not natural born citizens.
martin,
1) I don’t think there was ever a difference for white people.
2) Since the Constitution predates all of those things (and the definition of “natural born” predates the Constitution by at least 2 centuries), I think that’s a safe assumption.
3) That seems to be one of the arguments that birthers just ignore–presumably because they have no good answer…
Are these the rules on citizenship that we believe are in effect at the moment?
1. Babies born in this country, on land or water, are citizens
except for children of foreign ambassadors.
2. Babies born abroad of two citizens are citizens.
3. Babies born abroad of a citizen married to a non-citizen are citizens.
4. People naturalized are citizens.
Is that it?
—
1.) There was a time when citizen of a state and citizen of the USA were held to be not the same. I think that might have been an issue in Dred Scott.
2) I always assumed that natural-born was not intended to be opposed to unnatural-born (possibly meaning Caesarean, induced, in vitro, or surrogate), but was just the way they talked – all flowery, and meaning “born”.
3) If the requirement is that both parent be citizens, even if you were born in this country, then I claim the task of establishing anyone’s provenance becomes quickly impossible, since it must trust the citizenship status of the parents – can that be trusted? – or trace back to either naturalization or the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Any defect casts its shadow far and wide on all descendants.
ALCON, I think an important linchpin of the NbC argument is whether our constitution holds that A2 natural born and 14th born are synonymous, if yes, the question of eligibility is moot due WKA. The only way there can be the remotest doubt is if there is some sort of non-naturalized constitutional born citizen that is not considered natural born. Those that are born citizens due to naturalization laws are obviously not NbCs…last I checked Obama was a born citizen not solely according to naturalization statute but IAW the court’s opinion of a declarative citizenship provision of the constitution.
If I can move on from the doubt, anyone can.
Consul posted:
Wow–that parenthetical at the end is just chock full of bullshit, isn’t it? First off, teachers don’t make people smarter–they impart knowledge. I was probably smarter than most of my math teachers K-12, yet that doesn’t mean that they weren’t able to convey a solid foundation in arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and calculus that has served me well in developing a much deeper understanding than any of them had in the subjects they taught me. In college and grad school I studied with many men (and women) who were clearly both smarter and more well-educated than I–most of whom were outstanding teachers as well. This has provided me with an incredible head start to “educating myself”. In studying the martial arts, you eventually reach a point (generally marked by a black belt or some other recognition of mastery) where you can no longer be taught, but must learn on your own (and by teaching others–you don’t really understand a subject until you’ve successfully explained it to someone else…). Any intellectual pursuit is similar, but I highly doubt you’ve every reached that point in any of your own studies. Human achievement is built on standing on the shoulders of the pyramid of giants who have gone before us. Arguing (as you and the other birther hatriots do) that these giants were wrong or those giants were misinterpreted by everyone else is missing the forest for the trees– They are seen as giants because the standard interpretation of their work is considered true (and significant). If you wish to show otherwise you need an extraordinary argument–something which the birthers have proven incapable of producing. But that’s what happens when you try to interpret master-level lessons with kindergarten-level knowledge and understanding…
@Mrjr101 Your point is valid. At English Common Law there was no doubt that children were to be included as subjects without reference to the subjecthood of their parents. For this reason, I do not see how Waite meant that it was English Common Law that controled the additions to citizenship in this passage. After basically giving a lecture of citizenship inclusion in the United States in the Minor case, to make a statement that at English Common Law there were doubts about children of aliens is simply absurd, It just doesn’t make sense.
You are speculating. How do you know they were experts on the English common law when they admit they did not look into the issue. Perhaps some members of the Court did think our common law was different than that of England. Again, speculation. What it doesn’t mean is the law of nations. The trouble again of trying to read meaning into obiter dicta. If it wasn’t dicta it would have told us what common law like WKA did. I challenge you to find the Court ever using the phrase “at common law” or to say the Constitution must be defined by the “common law” to refer to anything other than the English common law. You could look all day and would not find anything. Waite used the term in Reynolds v. US, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), in The Harrisburg, 98 U.S. 145 (1886) and in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). Waite joined in this opinion:
“There is no common law of the United States, in the sense of a national customary law, distinct from the common law of England as adopted by the several States each for itself, applied as its local law, and subject to such alteration as may be provided by its own statutes. . . . There is, however, one clear exception to the statement that there is no national common law. The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.”
Justice Taft make the point even better:
“The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted it to the ratification of the Convention of the Thirteen States, were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary. They were familiar with other forms of government, recent and ancient, and indicated in their discussions earnest study and consideration of many of them, but when they came to put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly and easily understood.” Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 76, 108-09 (1925).
Sorry, but saying the “common law” doesn’t mean the “common law” the Court has always referred to and that calling someone a “citizen” means they cannot be a “natural born citizen” when the court says a “natural born citizen” is also a citizen is not legal interpretation. It is trying to read your preferred meaning into ambiguous dicta. If only we had another case that directly addressed the issue. Oh wait.
@Mrjr101 Then in the following paragraphs he discussed additions made by birth and by Naturalization. The NBC’s (children of citizen parents)without doubts were born citizens, another class were also born citizens(no parents reference) but there were doubts.”
The problem is again you are saying something Waite doesn’t say. It says another class of people, not another class of citizens. Two classes of people could be nautal born. Waite only called Minor a “citizen.” that doesn’t mean she is not a “natural born citizen” as the latter is simply a sub-category of the former.
@MRjr101 Waite did not say that natural born and born citizen are the same thing. Waite did not say that adding new citizens by birth would mean that they are natural born.
And Waite didn’t say the citizenship he was talking about with respect to aliens is something other than natural born citizenship. You are making that up trying to read between the lines to support your conclusion. You can spin all you want but unless Waite said they were a different type of citizen, it is dishonest to say that is what he meant. Hard to believe that people can’t understand calling someone a “citizen” doesn’t mean they are not a natural born citizen.
“If I say that a [U.S. born child of permanently domiciled aliens] is as much a [citizen] as a [natural-born citizen], I clearly mean that they share the characteristics which make them [citizens]–not that they are identical.”
Gibberish, Binney’s paper is on the English common law which he says we adopted. He is saying they are both citizens by operation of the same principle, i.e., the English common law. A citizen by the same principle means the same type of citizen. Binney in the previous sentence of his paper only says there are two types citizens, those born within the limits and under the jusrisdiction of the US and naturalized. The former Binney defines as natural born citizens or subjects. You ignore the clear definition of natural born in Gray’s opinion and here again are parsing, speculating and reading between the lines trying to find support in a quote from a paper on the English common law suggesting a paper on the common law didn’t define natural born by the common law.
@consul I am left to wonder what portion of the Court’s opinion in WKA leads you to believe that 14th Amendment citizenship is the same as natural-born citizenship. Please make sure to only rely on the Court’s opinion as stated, and not their acknowledgement of what was stated by someone else.
Duh, maybe the 5 pages telling us that natural born citizen be defined by reference to the English common law and natural born subject such as:
“All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens.”
If you actually read the case he clearly spells out what “birth in the allegaicne” means in both England and America as “All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens.”
The 14th Amendment is said to be “declaratory of existing rights and affirmative of existing law” and means:
“The foregoing considerations and authorities irresistibly lead us to these conclusions: the Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes.”
Uh, for those paying attention, that is the definition of natural born subject, the same definition we were told defined natural born citizen. That is what declaratory means.
“It should be observed that Tucker refers to “common law”. However, it is obvious that he is not referring to English common law. It’s overtly obvious that men like Tucker and Waite understood the distinction between common law and the common law of England. -Something Ballantine can’t seem to wrap his head around. (A failure of much of our modern legal educators. Few students become smarter than their teachers. To achieve that you must educate yourself.)”
Consul:
Your point is valid. At English Common Law there was no doubt that children were to be included as subjects without reference to the subjecthood of their parents. For this reason, I do not see how Waite meant that it was English Common Law that controled the additions to citizenship in this passage. After basically giving a lecture of citizenship inclusion in the United States in the Minor case, to make a statement that at English Common Law there were doubts about children of aliens is simply absurd, It just doesn’t make sense.
Ray,
Thanks for the links and information on St. George Tucker.
I should point out that the treatise I was relying on was from his son Henry St. George Tucker. Henry truly did follow in his father’s footsteps.
Consul,
Henry, yes, I was aware of that. I am now a two hour expert on Tucker. The second link goes heavily into the family history.
It is amazing how things came about in the lead up to the Civil War and how long it took to get to that point, knowing all the while, the the teapot was simmering and would eventually boil over. Further, how economics had a bigger hand in the breakdown than did the slave issue. Tucker and brother Beverley died many years before the war, thinking that we could avoid it.
….and 32-year-old Thomas Jefferson who proclaimed that all men are created equal.
“May you live in interesting (NBC) times.”
mrjr101,
I understand your point. I was just pointing out that you inferred that they were citizens (by calling them “born citizens”) while Waite didn’t go that far.
If you have not followed the link I provided for tucker’s treatise, I highly recommend it. It points out the problems with dual allegiance, and makes it extremely clear why John Jay (with his experience in foreign relations) would see that as a problem for any commander in chief.
“Thus, if a child of American parents were born in London, he would by the English law be an Englishman, entitled to all the privileges and bound to all the duties of a British subject; and if he returned to America, and in the event of war took arms for the country of his parents and the land of his connexions and his hopes, he would be hanged as a traitor by the British law. On the other hand, if he enlisted under the flag of England, he would be hanged as a traitor to America, because, as the child of American parents, he is by our law to he considered as a citizen, though born in another land. These are the consequences of an attempt to push too far the right of the State over its supposed members, instead of pursuing the obvious principles of natural justice and sound reason.”
These “conflicts of citizenship”, when possessed by the commander in chief of the army, who may well be captured on the battlefield, are not the product of fantasy.
Notice that I refer to the commander in chief of the army, not the Chief Executive of the United States. I do this because John Jay did not express the restriction be placed on the Chief Executive, but on the commander in chief.
Consul,
Thanks for the Tucker link. It has led me to much more reading. I though you might find these links interesting.
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2008/48/index.html
Northwestern University Law Review : Colloquy : 2008 : Hardy
The Lecture Notes of St. George Tucker: A Framing Era View of the Bill of Rights
David T. Hardy[*]
[download pdf]
Few if any legal figures in the early republic held the status of St. George Tucker. Educated in the law by William and Mary’s George Wythe, Tucker succeeded him as the College’s professor of law, a post he held from 1790 until his appointment to the bench in 1804.[1] While at William and Mary, he produced an edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries,[2] annotated in light of American law. The text became “the standard work on American law for a generation” and Tucker remained the most frequently cited American legal scholar for over two decades.[3] Tucker’s role in American legal scholarship was likewise striking. He has been termed “the first modern American law professor” and creator of the American law degree.[4]
Tucker had exceptional opportunity to observe the legal events at the Founding. His closest friend, John Page, and his brother Thomas Tucker served in the first House; they and others kept him informed, by correspondence, of its events.[5] He was temperamentally suited to analyze the Framing period. His edition of the Commentaries was far from a reprint of the original; Tucker documented at length where the American States had refused to adopt common law principles, and where the new Constitution and Bill of Rights diverged from them.[6] While Blackstone had seen the common law as supra-personal and beyond improvement, Tucker delighted in documenting how Americans of his time had improved upon it and eliminated its shortcomings.[
http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-05252005-133708/unrestricted/Vanderford_dis.pdf
RIGHTS OF HUMANS,
RIGHTS OF STATES: THE ACADEMIC LEGACY OF
ST. GEORGE TUCKER IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
The Department of History
by
Chad Vanderford
A.B., University of California at Berkeley, 1996
M.A., California State University Northridge, 2000
August 2005
Abstract
“College professors in the nineteenth-century South lavished a great deal of attention on the issues of slavery and constitutionalism, and they paid careful attention to the connections between these issues and the idea of natural rights. In this dissertation I offer an analysis of the lives and writings of three generations of college professors in nineteenth-century Virginia, focusing especially on St. George Tucker and his descendants. As a contemporary of Thomas Jefferson and as a delegate to the Annapolis convention, Tucker can rightly be considered as one of the founding fathers. But he is best known for inaugurating the academic discourse on the issues of slavery and constitutionalism in his capacity as professor of law at the College of William and Mary. His sons, Henry and Beverley Tucker, and his grandson John Randolph Tucker kept these academic traditions alive for three generations. Members of the Tucker family continuously espoused a modern theory of natural rights based upon a contractual understanding of how people come to exist in society. By the 1850s, however, some professors such as George Frederick Holmes had abandoned the philosophy of modern natural rights in favor of a rearticulation of classic or ancient natural right: a non-contractual conception of the right to rule. This recovery made possible the “positive good” defense of slavery, but it put a strain upon the orthodox theory of constitutional interpretation that had been at the center of Virginian political thought.
This dissertation examines how the Tuckers and others strove to keep the philosophy of the founding generation alive throughout the various political upheavals of the nineteenth century.”
Consul,
In this quote, he is talking about the additions to citizens by the birth path in the American society. When Waite says that some authorities go further and include as citizens children without questioning the parent descent, he was contextually still referring to additions to citizenship by birth. What Waite does not say is that all additions by birth means natural born, that’s the point I made.
mrjr101,
“Then in the following paragraphs he discussed additions made by birth and by Naturalization. The NBC’s (children of citizen parents)without doubts were born citizens, another class were also born citizens(no parents reference) but there were doubts.”
That’s not what Waite said either. Waite said;
“Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first.”
Waite acknowledged doubts as to the citizenship of children born within the jurisdiction without reference to their parents. You saying “another class were also born citizens” indicates that they were considered to be born citizens which is in direct contradiction to the opinion of Waite; for he acknowledged that the citizenship without reference to parents was in doubt.
“Again it is simply dishonest to say the doubts related to some other form of citizenship because Waite does not say that. This whoe part of the opinion was on the original Constitution where Waite tells us there are only two kinds of citizens, natural born and naturalized. Unless Waite tells us which one is he talking about, it is unethical to say he is. Of course, anyone who knows history knows it can’t be naturalzied citizen as a native born person could not be naturalized by definition and, of course, there had never been a naturalization statute prior to such time making a native child of aliens a citizen at birth”
The doubts are not related to “some other forms of citizenship”. The doubts are related to their inclusion as citizens in the society. If you really want to be honest, then you should say that Waite tells us that additions to citizenship may be in two ways, by birth and naturalization. Here is the actual quote:
“Additions might always be made to the citizenship of the United States in two ways: first, by birth, and second, by naturalization. This is apparent from the Constitution itself, for it provides that “no person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President,” and that Congress shall have power “to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.” Thus new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization.”
Again, it is APPARENT from the Constitution itself that new citizens maybe born, or they may be created by naturalization. Note the word APPARENT.
Waite never said the two kinds of citizens were Natural Born and Naturalized, this would be dishonest and making it narrower to what he actually said. He does not limit additions by birth to natural born nor does he say that all born citizens are natural born.
Then in the following paragraphs he discussed additions made by birth and by Naturalization. The NBC’s (children of citizen parents)without doubts were born citizens, another class were also born citizens(no parents reference) but there were doubts.
Waite did not say that natural born and born citizen are the same thing. Waite did not say that adding new citizens by birth would mean that they are natural born.
slartibartfast,
“A respectful exchange cannot occur until both sides accept the same logical framework–something birthers are unwilling or unable to do.”
bigot: a person who is obstinately or intolerantly devoted to his or her own opinions and prejudices; especially : one who regards or treats the members of a group with hatred and intolerance.
It may be too much to ask of a bigot. You do conform to the textbook definition of a bigot. Do you not?
Let me introduce you to <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_St._George_Tucker,_Sr." Henry St. George Tucker. I prefer to let those who don’t have a dog in this fight speak for me.
CHAPTER VII.
OF ALIENS AND CITIZENS.
Before we proceed to the subject of the domestic relations, I propose to offer to the student such considerations respecting aliens and citizenship as the plan of these lectures seems to require, and the nature of this complicated matter will permit. I speak of it as complicated, because it does not rest merely upon principles of natural right and justice, upon the doctrines of the common law, or even upon the more expanded ground of the law of nations. These would of themselves oppose sufficient difficulties to the enquirer, and offer ample field for the controversialist. But when to these are added the statutory provisions of different nations in entire conflict with each other, it becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to lay down any certain rules for our direction. I design to enquire, first, what is the common law doctrine of allegiance and alienage; secondly, the effect of the revolution and of the statutory regulations adopted in Virginia; and thirdly, what may now be considered as the law of the subject, considering it in connection with the power vested in the federal government, and long since exercised by congress, of establishing an uniform law of naturalization.
What is the common law doctrine of allegiance and alienage?
According to the dictates of natural reason, the natives or indigenes of every country, born of parents who were citizens of that country at the time of their birth, are to be considered as citizens. Society can only be perpetuated by the children of its members, who naturally follow the condition of their parents and succeed to their rights. The interests of society, therefore, demand the establishment of this principle as a concessum; and it may fairly be so considered, unless the contrary be expressly declared by the municipal law. In like manner, the interest of the offspring of a citizen justifies the inference of his tacit consent to become a citizen until he renounces that character.
But though a child be born in the country, yet if both his parents were strangers not designing a permanent change of country, it would be sufficiently obvious, that as he must follow the condition and succeed to the rights of his parents, he would on the principles of natural reason be considered as much a stranger to the country as his father. In such case it would be the place of his birth, indeed, not his country.
Moreover, as the nature of our species, and the received principles of civil society, allow, in matters of this description, the mastery to the male, we may go a step further, and advance, that if the father and mother are of different countries, the child born of them in a country to which they are both strangers will, upon principles of natural reason, belong to the country of the father rather than to that of the mother.
But though a child born of foreign parents is not, on principles of natural reason, necessarily to be considered as a citizen of the country where he is born, it does not follow that he is in no respect to be considered as a member of its society while he remains in it. Bound by their own and their parents’ residence, the children of foreigners are subject to the laws while that residence continues, and are obliged to defend it (except against their own country) in return for the protection it has afforded.
It seems also equally clear, that upon principles of natural reason, a child, on whom the character of a citizen is devolved because of his parentage, would have a right, at years of discretion, to accept or renounce the condition of his parents; and at his election, either tacitly or avowedly, might take upon himself the character of a citizen, or relinquish it by removal and by becoming a member of another community.
Thus, it appears to me, that if the different States of the civilized world had been content to follow the dictates of reason and good sense , alone, instead of pursuing the ignis fatuus of a deceptive policy, there would have been little room for controversy. We should not have witnessed the barbarism of condemning as a traitor(a) a man who was taken in arms for the country in which he had passed his life as a subject, from infancy to age, because he had been born within the dominions of another monarch; nor should we have seen a bloody war arising between two nations speaking the same language and adopting very similar institutions, about the rights to the personal services of the indigenes of the one who had become the adopted citizens of the other.
The common law, in most instances, adopts these obvious principles of natural reason. But new principles were afterwards introduced by statute, both inconsistent with reason and in their consequences demonstrative of their own absurdity. This we shall plainly perceive, even on a cursory view of the subject.
http://books.google.com/books?id=zPVBAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA56&dq=society+parents+citizens&hl=en&ei=dMfETYWjE6Xr0gGF8vGECA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=society%20parents%20citizens&f=false
It should be observed that Tucker refers to “common law”. However, it is obvious that he is not referring to English common law. It’s overtly obvious that men like Tucker and Waite understood the distinction between common law and the common law of England. -Something Ballantine can’t seem to wrap his head around. (A failure of much of our modern legal educators. Few students become smarter than their teachers. To achieve that you must educate yourself.)
Consul,
A respectful exchange cannot occur until both sides accept the same logical framework–something birthers are unwilling or unable to do.
Since you are probably unhappy that I turned your sandwich analogy against you and have tried to switch analogies in an attempt to advance your straw man argument, I’m going to ignore them.
Your restatement of what I said about sandwiches is correct* (although, per above, the phrase “permanently domiciled” is unnecessary). The disagreement here seems to be regarding the meaning of “as much a citizen as”. You asked about women and men–I’ll assume you meant at the time of Wong Kim Ark–so, under the law women were as much citizens as men even though they weren’t entitled to vote because voting isn’t a prerogative of citizenship**. Eligibility for the presidency, however, is very much a prerogative of citizenship and thus two distinct classes are not “as much a citizen” as each other if they disagree on this privilege of citizenship.
What do you think the relation “as much a citizen” does and does not include?
* by which I mean that it accurately reflects my opinion, not that my opinion is correct (which I also believe).
** Minor v. Happersett
“If I say that a turkey sandwich is as much a sandwich as a ham sandwich, I clearly mean that they share the characteristics which make them sandwiches–not that they are identical.”
It’s a good thing we’re talking about sandwiches, because you said a mouthful.
If I say that a [U.S. born child of permanently domiciled aliens] is as much a [citizen] as a [natural-born citizen], I clearly mean that they share the characteristics which make them [citizens]–not that they are identical.
Those are your words with the relevant portions of WKA exchanged.
slartibartfast,
“Are you being intentionally dishonest or willfully ignorant or are you just not smart enough to understand how blatantly obvious your error is?”
If you’re in search of a well-deserved FUCK YOU, I’ll be happy to oblige. If you want a respectful exchange of ideas, you’re going about it in the wrong way.
Maybe this will help to explain what I am talking about.
Automobiles in the United States can be added to by domestic or imports. Of the domestic models, we have those manufactured by U.S. auto makers (GM, Ford, Chrysler…), and we have those manufactured domestically by foreign-owned corporations (Honda, Toyota, …).
Some of those domestic automobiles would be considered to be “All American”. Others (Honda, Toyota, …) would not. Yet they are all domestic automobiles.
When we talk “Buy American”, we generally are referring to those vehicles manufactured by U.S. corporations.
Here’s a Car & Driver article that drives home my point.
http://www.caranddriver.com/features/the-best-reasons-to-buy-american
Are natural-born citizen women as much a citizen as natural-born citizen men?