Islamic State militants gave the world yet another shocking atrocity this week by executing a 7-year-old Syrian boy in front of his parents because he cursed. ISIS insists that Islamic justice, or Sharia, demanded that the boy be shot.
The boy was accused of “cursing divinity” while playing in the street with his friends. He was taken before an Islamic court which held that “the act was considered an insult to the Caliphate, regardless of the age of the boy.” He was killed in front of a crowd and his sobbing parents made to watch.
Another victory for Sharia “law” and the great Caliphate.
stevegroen:
“And remember, France, Germany and Russia were against the war.”
France and more so Russia were deeply complicit with Iraq in the diplomatic-economic Oil For Food scandal that included WMD-related items and activities. Their motive is obvious – Saddam bought them off. I haven’t seen, though, that Germany was complicit alongside France and Russia in the Oil For Food scandal.
stevegroen:
“Assuming arguendo the primary legal bases for the 2003 invasion of Iraq were UN resolutions, why then was the 43 administration strenuously debating before Congress the al-Qaeda nexus, the Niger fuel rod allegation, and ad nauseum the WMD allegation, when 43 already had legal bases to do what he did?”
Those issues, the ceasefire resolutions, and the US law and policy that enforced Iraq’s compliance with the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) go together. The “governing standard of Iraqi compliance”, Iraq’s track record (presumption of guilt) and burden of proof, and the pre-war intelligence related to the “al-Qaeda nexus, the Niger fuel rod allegation, and ad nauseum the WMD allegation” were all within the context of enforcing Iraq’s compliance with its UNSCR 687 ceasefire obligations, which included terrorism and disarmament mandates. Among Iraq’s ceasefire obligations from the outset in 1991, the “ad nauseum” disarmament process was the policy priority and practical centerpiece of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement.
That being said, your question occurred to me, too, because legally speaking, the Operation Desert Fox action in 1998 completed the set of law, policy, and precedent developed by Congress and President Clinton to set the stage for the coda of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement with regime change, ultimately Operation Iraqi Freedom.
In that respect, it stands out that neither UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) nor Public Law 107-243 (2002) was novel. The 2002 documents reiterated the UN-mandated “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” and the US law and policy enforcing the UNSCR 660-series resolutions since 1990-1991. The additions in the 2002 documents were updates and enhancements to standing terms, not novel terms.
The salient legal feature of the 2002 documents is the updated UNSC decision that “Iraq has been and remains in material breach”. But prior enforcement was carried out on the basis that Saddam was never out of breach, with the burden of proof on Iraq. So it’s not apparent that the UNSCR decision of Iraq’s breach was strictly necessary, though it did neaten the legal basis for OIF.
The declaration that “Iraq has abused its final chance” with Operation Desert Fox set the policy baseline, and with Saddam evidently in breach across the board of Iraq’s ceasefire obligations, President Clinton handed his successor the option to go to war with Iraq in the context of the ‘containment’ (status quo), where the intelligence could trigger enforcement. And in fact, notwithstanding the predictive imprecision of the pre-war intelligence estimates, the intelligence correctly indicated Saddam was violating the UNSCR 687 terrorism and disarmament mandates, on top of the Saddam regime’s open gross violation of the UNSCR 688 humanitarian mandates.
Instead of going to war based on the intelligence, President Bush opted to return to the diplomatic route, grant Saddam a 2nd “final opportunity to comply”, and restore the ceasefire disarmament process where the operative procedure was that noncompliance with UN inspections, not the intelligence, triggered enforcement.
The question is, given that Clinton – preoccupied (frustrated) his entire presidency by the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement – had set the stage to “bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations” (P.L. 105-235) with regime change in the ‘containment’ context, then why did Bush opt to reset the stage by restoring the ceasefire disarmament process?
The obvious answer is obvious: Bush wanted to solve the festering Saddam problem with Iraq’s mandated compliance, but he didn’t want to go to war with Iraq.
Answer to “If a new UN authorization was not needed for OIF, then why did Bush go to the UN?”:
Tom, using the fact that the UN is the relevant legal authority and therefore we were justified in trying to enforce its laws, then arguing that because the UN is toothless so therefore we can override its common will to enforce those laws outside of due process smacks of “”we’ll save you even if we have to kill you.””
The bottom line is this: there are some laws that govern military action by the UN, and such military action when taken outside of the structure of the UN, especially in the name of the UN is not only patently illegal but simply deceptive and immoral.
Correction…..I meant “GULF WAR I/ DESERT STORM “in that first sentence.
Tom, that article you mention supports the claim that Iraq invaded Kuwait under the wink wink encouragement of Bush.
Ultimately, that is the ONLY thing that makes sense. Otherwise for Iraq to invade without cause is irrational. And no, Sadaam was not that irrational.
Read something about Bush using Kuwait to fight Iraq on the oil and put undue pressure on it, kinda like we are doing to Russia using the Saudis… and Sadaam reacted to that…but still
There was an interesting interview with CNN’s Wolf Blitzer in early 1991, shortly after the conclusion of Desert Storm.
He mentioned being contacted by tge Bush adminstration regarding a report CNN had done shortly after Iraq invased Kuwait.
A CNN reporter at the State Dept. stated his view that it was very unlikely that the I.S. would take direct military action against the Iraqi military in Kuwait.
The Bush administration told Blitzer that Iraqi leaders were not that familiar with the U.S. media or government……and that thise same leaders could be watching that report, with a CNN reporter and the American flag behind him at the State Dept., and conclude that this CNN repory was official U.S. policy.
He asked CNN to keep that in mind. I think it pointed out that Saddam often seemed to have a poor understanding of where things were heading in 1990, and in 2002-2003.
Tom, both you and Paul are overlooking the fact that CNN was/is the mouthpiece of the administration. The fact that it is reported on Cnn makes me LESS likely to believe it, not more.
If we accept that the administration wanted to invade Iraq, and rather than being forced to, was actively looking for ANY justification to do so, as any honest person can testify, which some within the administration have done, we can then logically accept that they engaged in their own propaganda drive to convince the public of the legality/morality/logic of their aims. And they unavoidably had to do it through the mainstream media, including CNN and the NYT.
Paul, as to fearing gas or nuclear attacks from Sadaam, we knew he had chemicals weapons, as EVERYBODy has, and we knew it because we were the ones who helped him set it up for use against the Iranians. Interestingly, the only WMD’s we found after the invasion were those obsolete chemical weapons that our soldiers were in charge of burning into giant pits, and most of whom developed diseases that the administration subsequently tried to hush down. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/14/world/middleeast/us-casualties-of-iraq-chemical-weapons.html
As for nukes, that is silly! We certainly knew Sadaam had no nukes.
po – CNN and the entire MSM is the mouthpiece of the Democratic administration, not the Bush administration.
Paul, CNN is the mouthpiece of any administration! that’s the nature of that beast, it wants itself non-partisan, which means it it is partial to whomever speaks to it.
You must not have remembered its role in drumming up the push for war…along with MSNBC? And Fox News?
All those outlets, whether paper or hot air, are owned by corporations, themselves owned by other corporations who are related tot he business of war, and there is no profit like the war business profit.
And just we be clear, FOX is MSM.
po – Fox (which I don’t watch) is not considered MSM because Obama keeps throwing them out of press conferences
Yep, that is why he gives them primetime one on one interviews!
Travel across the land, Paul, every screen you see, either Fox or CNN…that’s mainstream to me.
Every person you meet, either Rep watching Fox or Democrat watching CNN or MSNBC, that is mainstream to me.
By the way, do you have a cite for that claim?
po – you were right and I was wrong. Fox is part of the MSM. My bad.
Paul, is this another devilish trick from your contrarian genius to confuse me? It is working! A You were right and I was wrong from Paul would confuse a greater man than I am, fosure!
Eric
….if Hans Blix had given Saddam a”clean bill of health” as far as complying with Res.1441, it IS less likely that Bush and Blair would have pushed for an invasion.
Given that Blix’s reports contained grave reservations about Iraqi compliance with the conditions of 1441, Bush and Blair were going to invade “in any case”… I meant with or without an additional U.N. resolution.
But as you said, full Iraqi compliance would have made it far more difficult for Bush/ Blair to justify an invasion of Iraq.
Agree with that, Tom, yes, the clean bill of health would have made it incredibly more difficult to engage in the full invasion we saw. Not impossible, because the link to AL qaeda and responsibility for 911 had been by then the moral and emotional value sold to the people as sufficient for action.
Then again, a clean bill of health report would have been dismissed by the administration, and Blix’s character, effectiveness, affiliations further attacked.
Eric says:
“”Right. In that regard, the US-led enforcement was the practical “teeth” of the UN-mandated Gulf War ceasefire.””
—————————————-
Eric, as the UN itself said, it was not for the US to be the “teeth”. That simple.
po – there are very few forces that can take on a large army like the Iraqi Army and the US is one of the few. So, yes, they are the “teeth.”
Actually, Paul, most armies outside of the Me can take Iraq…Even in the ME, Iran could. Pakistan and India also. So could Israel.
As the US showed, did not take much to take out the iraqi army.
But… that’s not the point, the point is the US is not the teeth for the UN, especially if it will operate outside the agreement of the UN.
po – Iraq had a battle harden 1 million man for at the beginning of Desert Storm. Now we whittled that down by bombing the crap out of them and they supply lines until they were at half strength. Then we went in with high tech equipment then they had.
Tell me which armies are capable of taking on a million man army?
Paul, a war on Iraq by any outsider would have involved less ground troops and more air force and bombardments, which is what the US did.
1000000 men army is ineffective until it can counter the more damaging aspects of warfare, heavy weaponry/ air war…and that 1000 000 men army you speak about is mainly infantry, no airforce of note, no heavy weaponry of not…
Most of the countries I listed have just as large an army, and/or and most of them are better equipped.
po – Saddam had T-64 and T-74 tanks, plenty of jet aircraft, ground-to-air missiles and 1000000 army. We had less than 500000 men from 31 countries, mostly from the US. The goalposts for Desert Storm were to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait and make them an ineffective force for at least ten years. When Bush called a ceasefire both those objectives had been met.
Not sure why my previous comment failed to post a few minutes ago.
To summarize, I’d recommend that those interested read articles from c.1990, touting Saddam’s “forth largest military” in the world, with an advanced air force and a huge tank corp.
There were numerous dire warnings about the massive, protracted war the U.S. was about to enter.
According to many “experts” at the time.
First, this is truly a fine discussion on the lead up to the Iraq War. I’ve never seen a better one, on a blog no less. I just wish I had the time to fully engage. Even then, it would be presumptuous that I could affect the discussion in any significant way.
I do want to get back to the fact that France, Germany, and Russia were unconvinced that there was a threat worth going to war over. I read, I think from Tom’s comments but correct me if I’m wrong, something to the effect that they may have been quieted by oil-contract bribes from Saddam. The negative inference here is that the US and Britain hadn’t and wouldn’t have negotiating power after Desert Storm. And therefore we were presented with a “coalition of the willing,” as 43 put it, made up of three soldiers from one former Soviet satellite and five from another it seems. Strong westernized allies and transitional post-Soviet Russia didn’t approve so we may have bribed our own new friends.
The inference here is that 43 was not going to get this done without this silly coalition to sedate the US public, including hired-gun David Kay’s equivocal and unconvincing performance before Congress (which I watched and certainly thought lacked conviction even when he tried to describe what was within the realm of possibility), and the allegations related to Niger, al-Qaeda, and WMD (the nearly exclusive emphasis of which was always framed as nuclear capability and proliferation, not chem-bio warfare until there was nothing else palpable to hang Saddam with). Saddam’s capability at that point was firing a SCUD or two at Israel with accuracy enough to actually have it land in Israel but little more.
I still have not read the link Tom or Eric provided regarding a dismissal of the petrocurrency issue (i.e., Saddam was bent on trading in Euros to punish us for the economic sanctions and Desert Storm) as the underlying reason. I still think that’s what broke the bedouin-camel’s back because our oil-based economy and ability to service the national debt is based on printing otherwise valueless paper as money. And there’s support for this US response, as po wrote: there’s evidence that Gaddafi wanted to do the same not long before we directed his overthrow. The only other reasons I can think of are the oil reserves, profiteering in the MIC, an economy strengthened by war, and our de facto 51st state. Are any of these reasons or any combination of them good enough to go to war, knowing the collateral damage which always follows (e.g., two or three million Vietnamese civilians dead for similar reasons)?
So, the underlying reason can’t just be the political maneuvering at the UN which established a mechanism to go to war. There has to be something more to explain why we wanted regime change in Iraq. Why did we want so terribly to go to war with Iraq when other western and transitioning former Soviet states didn’t?
For me, when the layers are peeled off, it appears that our capitalist economy requires expansion to survive, and our only means of expansion when there’s total resistance is by military action. Welcome to the Imperial US, which doesn’t sit well with my conscience because we’re killing people as if they’re chattel.
Steve….as you said, lots of good comments on Saddam, Iraq, Bush 41, Bush 43, etc.
On the alternative currency…..i.e., the possiblity that Gaddafi and/or Saddam were considering an end run around the dollar as the world’s reserve currency….I don’t think either (or both) had the clout to pull that off, if that had that objective.
It didn’t seem to a motivating factor at all for either gulf war.
The issues in 1990-1991 were more clear-cut, with an invasion of a sovereign nation by Iraq.
I think the skill and experience of Bush 41 is often not fully appreciated; I’ve stated here and elsewhere that I think he was the last American resident who really “got” foreign policy, and I wish his successors had demonstrated similiar skills, experience, and judgement.
Eight years as Vice-President, service as Ambassador to the U.N, and to China, as head of the CIA, and as a member of Congress gave Bush 41 a “leg up” on the “outsider” much of the public says it craves.
Bush 41 was known for cultivating personal relationships with fireign leaders, and diplomats at different levels.
The shift from “Desert Shield” to “Desert Storm” was a hard sell……it was not a snap to get Congressional approval, a solid U.N. resolution, and dozens of nations on board.
The defensive characteristics of Desert Shield involved leaving c. 500,000 coalition (mainly U.S. troops) in Saudi Arabia indefinately.
The problems associated with that were not strongly emphasized by Bush 41, nor were they well-understood by the American public at that point.
After all, how could an ally like Saudi Arabia object to American troops shielding them from a superior Iraqi military?
A clearer extend of Saudi appreciation has been better recognized…e.g., the 15 of 19 Saudi 9-11 hijackers, the redacted 9-11 report, apparently blocking out the names of Saudi officials who aided Bin Laden, etc.
Anyway, I think the issues were clearer cut in 1990 and 1991, and we had a president with extraordinary experience and skills in foreign policy.
I cited the March 2001 Newsweek article “Colin Powell, Behind the Myth” as an example of the widespread criticism Bush 41 received for not “finishing the job” and removing Saddam in 1991.
Much of that criticism evaporated after Saddam was removed in 2003…….Bush 41 understood, and warned against, that kind of “mission creep”.
Anyone too young to remember Desert Storm and its aftermath, or the degree of criticism Bush 41 received for not removing Saddam, should read that Newsweek article….there was no shortage of other “experts”, besides “The Newsweek Staff” in the byline of that article, who were piling on Bush 41.
Ultimately, I think the lack of a strong international consensus/ coalition in 2002-2003 stemmed from disagreement about the level of threat Saddam actually presented.
There was an overwhelming consensus that Saddam had been concealing WMDs and WMD programs…..that didn’t seem to be the main point of disagreement.
The debate, internationally and domestically, centered around “what do we do about it”.
To me, these are the key differences between Desert Storm in 1990-1991 and the 2003 invasion.
That, and the difference between the skill and judgement of Bush 41 and Buah 43.
stevegroen – we were at a ceasefire, not an armistice at the end of Desert Storm. That meant war could restart at any time. On the US side, after 10 years, we needed new Congressional authority. Although we had troops in the area overflying Iraq during that whole period. He had rebuilt his armed forced and updated his equipment in his oil for food (France and Russia were selling him military supplies).
The original idea of overthrowing Saddam but keeping his people in place for stability, would have worked IMHO. However, the idiot who changed the game plan decided to get rid of all of Saddam’s people and chaos ensued.
Paul C. Shulte…….maybe keeping Saddam’s people in place would have worked after the overthrow of Saddam in 2003…..but I think that action would have cemented/ fortified the perception by the Shia majority that they now had American occcupiers perpetuating a Bathist regime.
Bremer and others might have kept at least part of the military, police, etc. infrastucture intact, but of they went too far in that direction, I think it would have greatly increased the risks of an all-out Shia uprising/ civil war.
I think the elections would still have produced a Maliki intent on marginalizing and alienating the Sunni minority.
Bush 43 seemed to have some influence in moderating Maliki’s behavior……once American military (and diplomatic) ties were virtually severed in 2011 when Obama “ended the war in Iraq”, Maliki accelerated his suppression of the Sunnis.
tom – at the end of WWII the Japanese were left in place in several areas to maintain order until complete Allied units could take over. It was an effective policy. Bremer was an idiot when he decide not to keep any of them. They were the only people in the country with training.
Paul C. Schulte…..I think in the case of IndoChina, it provided an additional incentive to Ho Cho Mihn and co.
Leaving the Japanese in place there probably intensified their hatred of the French.
tom – IMHO Truman should have back the independence of Indochina (Vietnam) at the end of the war.
Paul C. Schulte……had he lived, FDR may not have backed the French in their effort to retain control over IndoChina.
Tom – the deal had been already been done before FDR died and he did not have the strength to fight anyone, he was dying.
Paul writes, “stevegroen – we were at a ceasefire, not an armistice at the end of Desert Storm. That meant war could restart at any time. On the US side, after 10 years, we needed new Congressional authority.”
Paul, your second sentence contradicts the first, but it makes the point that has been lacking in this entire discussion: Desert Storm was not an action authorized by Congress, and 41 exceeded his authority in invading Iraq because only Constitutional to Congress can declare war.
The reason for all the clamor about WMD, fuel cells, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, inter alia, was that the President needed authority from Congress which he got with the Iraq War Resolution. It wasn’t an illegal war, but it was a war founded on crap evidence brought by sleazeballs in 43’s administration.
steve – Congress authorized the use of force against iraq in 1991 and 2002.
Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein in 1990 my have also assumed that CNN was the mouthpiece for Bush41 when its reporter ( in the very early stages of Desert Shield, and well before Desert Storm) when the CNN reporter opined that U.S. military action was unlikely.
I had some discussion at the time with friends who assumed that Saddam would back off at the last moment and avoid war.
Based on what I was seeing, it looked like Saddam and Tariq Azziz were committed to remaining in Kuwait
….they either doubted a coalition attack, or maybe thought their military could make military action so expensive that the U.S. would back off.
I think Colin Powell may well have preferred the status quo once Iraq had annexed Kuwait….I didn’t see any indication that Bush 41 was going to accept that.
Convincing Congress and the the U.N. and coalition partners to shift from “Desert Shield” to Desert Storm….offensive military action…involved a long,hard struggle on the part of Bush 41.
Po writes to Eric: “It is interesting that you, and only you, are the one defending the US invasion of Iraq using such ‘legal’ sources.” This is really the crux.
Lest we forget, no matter what (crap for fact) Congress’s 2002 Iraq War Resolution was based on, “[t]he then United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in September 2004 that: “From our point of view and the UN Charter point of view, it [the war] was illegal.”[1][2]
The UN is a political organization, let alone its indelible and inequitable Security Council. As such, the UN’s members are subject to great pressure from the US to conform subject to financial duress in other transactions, such as with the World Bank and IMF.
And remember, France, Germany and Russia were against the war. Apparently, politicians there see things a bit differently than the mouthpieces in our Congress.
In my view, both Hans Blix and Gen. Colin Powell were hedging their bets.
I.E., they both made statements about the violations by Iraq….( Colin Powell was farther out on a limb than Blix in this area)….then mixed in cautionary notes about the downside of an invasion of Iraq.
Had large stockpiles of WMDs been discovered, they both had the “coverage” from their previous statements to say “See, I told you so”.
If no substantial WMD stockpiles were found ( Blix and Powell both shared the near-universal belief that these stockpiles existed), and Iraq descended into choas, they had that “I told you so” covered as well.
The fact that the U.N. is a largely toothless organization was mentioned here in an earlier comment.
Ironically, it was also an additional factor in Bush and Blair’s decision to invade Iraq, with or without the cover of an addition U.N. resolution authorizing force.
The legal argument re the authority under Res.#1441 continues to this day….
The position of the U.S. and U.K. was (is) that 1441 was suffient justification for
Gulf War II…… but they would have proceeded in any case, citing the “toothlessness” of the U.N.
tnash – watched a documentary on the Gulf Wars (actually one war with a long ceasefire) and one of the generals was talking about Colin Powell. He did not speak highly of him as a commander.
Paul C. Schulte…..I just re-read some old articles revisiting Gulf War II ( Desert Storm).
The March 4, 2001 Newsweek article “Colin Powell: Behind the Myth” is interesting in a lot of different respects.
It concludes that if Powell had his way, Kuwait would have remained an annexed Iraqi provence after 1990.
I remember a certain level of ambiguity in Powell’s comments pre-Desert Storm, about the wisdom of ejecting Saddam from Kuwait.
The Newsweek article is also pretty critical of the “unfinished business” of Gulf War I. This is consistent with a fairly common theme before 2003/ Gulf War II…..that Bush 41 failed in not proceeding to Baghdad and removing Saddam from power in 1991.
That criticism largely evaporated in the wake of Saddam’s removal in 2003.
tnash – part of the deal with the first coalition was that they would not remove Saddam. So the plan was to defang him for at least 10 years.
steve – you quote Kofi Annan as if he has some moral and ethical authority. He has neither. He was a horrible Secretary General.
po (Powell):
“Had the inspections been allowed to continue, Blix said, there would likely be a very different situation in Iraq today.”
The Powell article exemplifies why a bedrock understanding of the operative enforcement procedure for the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) and the UNMOVIC findings that were the principal trigger for OIF is essential.
Assuming Powell accurately represented Blix, the immediately obvious and disturbing aspects of Blix’s position are, one, Blix’s misrepresented the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” and findings of the UNSCR 1441 inspections; two, Blix would have shifted the burden of proof from Iraq to the UN inspectors and dropped the operative procedure, despite that the burden of proof on Iraq and the reinforced deadline UNSCR 1441 “enhanced inspection regime” were essential versus Saddam’s track record of denial and deception; and three, Blix only raises the WMD stocks (while admitting that Iraq did not account for them as mandated), despite that WMD stocks were only one piece of the diverse spectrum of proscribed items and activities, which implies that Blix would have dropped UNSCR 687 disarmament mandates.
Again, assuming Powell accurately represented Blix, the article paints Blix as recklessly intent on certifying Saddam if Blix had been freed from the parameters of the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441).
Excerpt regarding the Blix alternative:
po:
“I would anticipate the Saddam-Qaeda connection lie as the most important”
Actually, once again, the Saddam regime’s “connection” with the al Qaeda network is confirmed among Saddam’s breach of the terrorism mandates of UNSCR 687.
Excerpt from Iraqi Perspectives Project report, “Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents” (2007):
Jim Lacey, a researcher and author of the 2007 Iraqi Perspectives Project report, also wrote, based on his work with the IPP:
tnash80hotmailcom:
“If the legality of Gulf War II hinged on articles 41 and 42 of the U.N. charter, then the airstrikes against Iraq during the Clinton administration, as well as the bombing of Serbia by Clinton, were also illegal.”
See my comment on May 14, 2016 at 12:29 am. In addition to my answer to the legal question, I suggest the March 18, 2003 President Bush letter to Congress on the legal basis for OIF and the various legal memoranda by Jay Bybee, John Yoo, and Christopher Greenwood linked in the President Bush Perspective section of the “Perspective” post.
You’re correct that OIF shared the same legal character with ODF, the no-fly zones, and the other Clinton military actions that enforced Iraq’s ceasefire obligations.
In international legal circles, the Kosovo intervention is considered technically “illegal but legitimate”. Like I said upthread, while there is a UNSC procedural disagreement over the international legal character of OIF, the Iraq intervention rests on better legal grounds than the Kosovo intervention.
Professor Zunes shows that PhD ≠ JD. Actually, the po (Zunes) criteria referring to Chapter VII (which includes Articles 41 and 42) supports the international legal character of OIF.
po (Zunes):
“the Security Council determines that there has been a material breach of its resolution”
That’s easy.
UNSCR 1441:
po (Zunes):
“authorizes the use of military force”
That’s easy, too. The Gulf War authorization (UNSCR 678) was carried forward – “recall[ed]” – in UNSCRs 687 and 1441 to enforce Iraq’s compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire.
UNSCR 1441:
po (Zunes):
“decides that all non-military means of enforcement have been exhausted”
Actually, the UN Security Council can decide that non-military enforcement measures wouldn’t work. They don’t need to be actually exhausted.
The UNSCR 1441 “final opportunity to comply” implied that the “the non-military means of enforcement” – in other words, the inspections, sanctions, etc, between 1990 and 2003 – “have been exhausted”. That point was reached in 1998-1999 when UNSCOM failed. The UNSCR 1441 inspections that concluded with UNMOVIC finding “about 100 unresolved disarmament issues” was the proof that “all non-military means of enforcement have been exhausted”.
UNSCR 1441:
po (Zunes):
“Legally, the conflict regarding access for UN inspectors and possible Iraqi procurement of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMDs) had always been between Iraq and the United Nations, not between Iraq and the United States.”
Indeed.
Public Law 102-1 (1991): “The President is authorized…to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678”.
Public Law 107-243 (2002): “The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to…enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq”.
po (Zunes):
“The United States therefore had no legal right to act on the dispute unilaterally.”
That depends on the national security threat assessment of the “dispute”.
In any case, OIF wasn’t unilateral in either sense of a practical coalition or legal authorization.
po (Zunes):
“Although UN Security Council Resolution 687, which demands Iraqi disarmament, was the most detailed in the world body’s history, no military enforcement mechanisms were included.”
Incorrect. UNSCR 687 explicitly “recall[ed]” UNSCR 678.
po (Chemerinsky):
“Nothing in international law authorizes a preemptive war to overthrow a government and disarm it.”
That’s an interesting debate, and indeed, the preemptive defense justification was raised in the political discourse related to the counter-terrorism aspect of the Iraq intervention. Counter-terrorism has an intrinsic preemptive defensive character.
Ultimately, the casus belli for OIF was Iraq’s material breach of the Gulf War ceasefire. That being said, the defense justification was baked into the enforcement of the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) with the recognition of the threat of Iraq’s noncompliance, including with the terrorism mandates of UNSCR 687.
UNSCR 1441:
Oops. Take 2.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“As late as Feb. 2003, Blix reported to the U.N. that “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance-not even today- of the disarmament which was demanded of it”.”
As late as the final report of the UNSCR 1441 inspections in March 2003 (linked in my comment on May 15, 2016 at 12:36 pm), Hans Blix reported “about 100 unresolved disarmament issues” to the UNSC, which was the principal trigger for OIF.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“Blix did request more time to continue inspections.”
He did. The Blix alternative is scrutinized here. Note the Iraq Survey Group citations at the end of the section.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“Given the withdrawal of inspectors in 1998 due to harassment and lack of cooperation, and the wording of U.N. Resolution 1441, the request for the additional time Blix wanted was not granted by the Bush or the Blair administrations.”
You’re correct that by the text of UNSCR 1441, the decision for OIF was correct (see my comment on May 14, 2016 at 12:29 am). You’re also correct that Saddam’s 1991-2003 history of noncompliance with the ceasefire disarmament process, including the UNSCR 1441 inspections, argued against the prospect of Blix’s request.
However, the judgement to decline Blix’s request for indefinitely more time was mainly due to its context. The alternative proposals with Blix’s request revolved around tacitly complying with Saddam’s undermining strategy by relaxing the theretofore strict “obligation of Iraq to declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction” (Blix) and shifting the onus onto the UN inspectors to demonstrate Iraqi possession. In effect, after Saddam failed his “final” UNSCR 687 compliance test under UNSCR 1441, Blix and Saddam’s accomplices tried a last-ditch attempt to fundamentally alter the ceasefire disarmament process by replacing the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” and “enhanced inspection regime” mandated by UNSCRs 687 and 1441 with a tacit tolerance for anything Saddam would not account for but could also hide.
To understand the risk invited by the Blix alternative, see the March 6, 2003 UNMOVIC report and Powell’s March 7, 2003 reaction to the UNMOVIC report (linked in my comment on May 15, 2016 at 1:21 pm).
po’s comment citing Blix at May 15, 2016 at 9:23 pm is especially revealing of Blix’s reckless mindset – if Blix had been freed from the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) – to certify Saddam, despite that “the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions. Outward acts of compliance belied a covert desire to resume WMD activities” (Iraq Survey Group).
President Bush’s March 18, 2003 letter to Congress on the legal basis for OIF, linked in the further reading section of the explanation I provided, also lends insight on the UNSC debate that followed the March 6, 2003 UNMOVIC report.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“The general perception in the U.S. and U.K. was that the old cycle of “cheat and retreat” was restarted when the inspectors returned in 2002.”
“Cheat and retreat” – I hadn’t heard that term before. President Clinton called Saddam’s recidivist pattern of signaling cooperation in the face of American force and then subverting the inspections, “tactics of delay and deception” – which evidently recycled with the UNSCR 1441 inspections.
When Saddam was debriefed after his capture, he expressed that he rationalized he was playing the same old “cheat and retreat”/”delay and deception” game with us, where at worst, he risked an absorbable bombing like Operation Desert Fox. His poor judgement is part of what made him dangerous, so Saddam chose to call our bluff with “about 100 unresolved disarmament issues” (UNMOVIC) in his “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441).
tnash80hotmailcom:
“As late as Feb. 2003, Blix reported to the U.N. that “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance-not even today- of the disarmament which was demanded of it”.”
As late as the final report of the UNSCR 1441 inspections in March 2003 (linked in my comment on May 15, 2016 at 12:36 pm), Hans Blix reported “about 100 unresolved disarmament issues” to the UNSC, which was the principal trigger for OIF.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“Blix did request more time to continue inspections.”
He did. The Blix alternative is scrutinized here. Note the Iraq Survey Group citations at the end of the section.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“Given the withdrawal of inspectors in 1998 due to harassment and lack of cooperation, and the wording of U.N. Resolution 1441, the request for the additional time Blix wanted was not granted by the Bush or the Blair administrations.”
You’re correct that by the text of UNSCR 1441, the decision for OIF was correct (see my comment on May 14, 2016 at 12:29 am). You’re also correct that Saddam’s 1991-2003 history of noncompliance with the ceasefire disarmament process, including the UNSCR 1441 inspections, argued against the prospect of Blix’s request.
However, the judgement to decline Blix’s request for indefinitely more time was mainly due to its context. The alternative proposals with Blix’s request revolved around tacitly complying with Saddam’s undermining strategy by relaxing the theretofore strict “obligation of Iraq to declare all programmes of weapons of mass destruction” (Blix) and shifting the onus onto the UN inspectors to demonstrate Iraqi possession. In effect, after Saddam failed his “final” UNSCR 687 compliance test under UNSCR 1441, Blix and Saddam’s accomplices tried a last-ditch attempt to fundamentally alter the ceasefire disarmament process by replacing the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” and “enhanced inspection regime” mandated by UNSCRs 687 and 1441 with a tacit tolerance for anything Saddam would not account for but could also hide.
To understand the risk invited by the Blix alternative, see the March 6, 2003 UNMOVIC report and Powell’s March 7, 2003 reaction to the UNMOVIC report (linked in my comment on May 15, 2016 at 1:21 pm).
po’s comment citing Blix at May 15, 2016 at 9:23 pm is especially revealing of Blix’s reckless mindset – if Blix had been freed from the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) – to certify Saddam, despite that “the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions. Outward acts of compliance belied a covert desire to resume WMD activities” (Iraq Survey Group).
President Bush’s March 18, 2003 letter to Congress on the legal basis for OIF, linked in the further reading section of the explanation I provided, also lends insight on the UNSC debate that followed the March 6, 2003 UNMOVIC report.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“The general perception in the U.S. and U.K. was that the old cycle of “cheat and retreat” was restarted when the inspectors returned in 2002.”
“Cheat and retreat” – I hadn’t heard that term before. President Clinton called Saddam’s recidivist pattern of signaling cooperation in the face of American force and then subverting the inspections, “tactics of delay and deception” – which evidently recycled with the UNSCR 1441 inspections.
When Saddam was debriefed after his capture, he expressed that he rationalized he was playing the same old “cheat and retreat”/”delay and deception” game with us, where at worst, he risked an absorbable bombing like Operation Desert Fox. His poor judgement is part of what made him dangerous, so Saddam chose to call our bluff with “about 100 unresolved disarmament issues” (UNMOVIC) in his “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441).
Paul, when where did I say that?
stevegroen:
“the truth of the matter is the war was about oil and control of the oil fields, not humanitarian mandates”
It wasn’t binary. The US-led peace operations with Iraq were explicitly mandated to “take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including … key humanitarian and economic infrastructure” (UNSCR 1511).
Obviously, “oil and control of the oil fields” are vital to Iraq’s economic nation-building, and therefore were a prime target for the anti-Iraq insurgents. As such, securing Iraq’s “key…economic infrastructure” was hand-in-hand with the humanitarian nation-building mandated with UNSCRs, section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, and section 4 of the 2002 AUMF.
And some legal perspectives:
“…[I]n articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, the nations of the world agreed that no member state has the right to enforce any resolution militarily unless the Security Council determines that there has been a material breach of its resolution, decides that all non-military means of enforcement have been exhausted, and specifically authorizes the use of military force…
Legally, the conflict regarding access for UN inspectors and possible Iraqi procurement of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMDs) had always been between Iraq and the United Nations, not between Iraq and the United States. The United States therefore had no legal right to act on the dispute unilaterally. Although UN Security Council Resolution 687, which demands Iraqi disarmament, was the most detailed in the world body’s history, no military enforcement mechanisms were included.”
— Stephen Zunes, PhD
Chair of the Middle Eastern Studies Program, University of San Francisco
“Why Hillary Clinton’s Iraq Vote Does Matter,” CommonDreams.org
—————————–
“Nothing in international law authorizes a preemptive war to overthrow a government and disarm it. Our war in Iraq fits in none of the prescribed situations where it is lawfully permissible.”
— Erwin Chemerinsky, JD
Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at Duke University
“By Flouting War Laws, U.S. Invites Tragedy,” Los Angeles Times
Mar. 25, 2003
If the legality of Gulf War II hinged on articles 41 and 42 of the U.N. charter, then the airstrikes against Iraq during the Clinton administration, as well as the bombing of Serbia by Clinton, were also illegal.
It doesn’t appear that most of those weighing in on the “illegality” of Gulf War II are willing to apply the same standards to all administrations.
Actually, Tom, I don’t believe any of those bombings you mentioned were legal. It matters little to me who was president then, most of the bombing runs we made short of the ones in WW2, were illegal in my view.
I actually view desert storm under Bush senior, on the surface, as the closest one to legality.
Po….I think the U.N. itself has the authority to issue resolutions against nations initiating illegal wars or military action.
As far as I know, they’ve never taken that action re Gulf War II, the bombing of Serbia, the bombing of Gaddafi’s military,etc.
Tom, I agree, and considering the structure of the UN, which is dominated by the US, we can’t be surprised. Just take a look at how Israel keeps breaking UN resolutions re Palestine with the almost lone support of the US and you have your answer. And this reflects why the UN is so toothless. Just ask Boutros Boutros Ghali.
Paul, am sure you can. I’d say Hiroshima and Nagazaki is case enough… but forgetting the past is what enables it to return with a vengeance.
po – Nagasaki and Hiroshima were military targets. They are fair game.
po – if you really want to get into it, I can build a case for war crimes against the US during WWII using the same criteria as used against the Nazis. However, the long past is the long past.
This article does a good job summarizing my points:
————————————–
“”The Bush administration’s primary justification for launching the Iraq War is thought, probably correctly, to be an alleged WMD program that did not exist. The coterie of delusional neoconservatives surrounding Bush and Cheney contributed to a systematic process of cherry-picking dubious intelligence and outright manipulation of evidence in order to satisfy a political decision that had already been made to change the regime in Iraq through a war of aggression.
The historical record pretty clearly demonstrates the distortions the administration employed to make the case that Saddam Hussein had WMDs. Inspectors who said they didn’t exist were ignored, false stories about aluminum tubes and yellowcake from Africa were peddled assertively, Iraqi defectors that were known liars were used as anonymous sources alleging Saddam’s WMD development, etc.
The plan eventually worked. The administration’s expressed certainty was persuasive to Americans. “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction,” Dick Cheney said in a 2002 speech. “There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.” No doubt.
But as central as these false claims about Saddam’s WMDs were to the propaganda campaign for war, I believe what will be most remembered is the claim of an operational connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.
Significant portions of Americans still believe that Saddam and al-Qaeda were in cahoots and cooperated in the 9/11 attacks. The reason is simple: the administration told them this lie.
An investigation by a committee in the House of Representatives in 2004 identified “237 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq that were made by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice. These statements were made in 125 separate appearances, consisting of 40 speeches, 26 press conferences and briefings, 53 interviews, 4 written statements, and 2 congressional testimonies.” According to the committee, at least 61 separate statements “misrepresented Iraq’s ties to al-Qaeda.” A Senate investigation in 2006 also covered these lies.
Keeping this lie afloat took some work. The Bush administration, primarily Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld, “applied relentless pressure on interrogators to use harsh methods on detainees in part to find evidence of cooperation between al Qaida and the late Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s regime,” McClatchy reported in 2009.
According to Lawrence Wilkerson, chief of staff to Bush’s Secretary of State Powell, “the administration authorized harsh interrogation” in 2002, and “its principal priority for intelligence was not aimed at pre-empting another terrorist attack on the U.S. but discovering a smoking gun linking Iraq and al-Qa’ida.”
Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, the detainee captured in Afghanistan in November 2001, eventually provided that smoking gun. He claimed knowledge of an Iraq-Qaeda connection because it was tortured out of him. The Bush administration cited it as evidence for the Iraq War’s greatest lie.
Other lies were told to this effect. Two months after the 9/11 attacks, on December 9, 2001, Dick Cheney went on Meet the Press and, when asked by Tim Russert whether “Iraq was involved in September 11,” mentioned a “report that’s been pretty well confirmed, that [9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the attack.”
In fact, the CIA had told Cheney this report was false a day before his Meet the Press appearance. In a briefing that was sent to the White House Situation Room, the CIA concluded that “11 September 2001 hijacker Mohamed Atta did not travel to the Czech Republic on 31 May 2000.” Cheney cited it anyways.
Two years later, on September 14, 2003, Cheney appeared once again on Meet the Press. Russert asked him if he was “surprised” by the fact that “69 percent” of Americans believe Saddam “was involved in the September 11 attacks.”
“I think it’s not surprising that people make that connection,” Cheney said. “With respect to 9/11, of course, we’ve had the story that’s been public out there. The Czechs alleged that Mohamed Atta, the lead attacker, met in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the attack, but we’ve never been able to develop anymore of that yet either in terms of confirming it or discrediting it.” In reality, it had been conclusively discredited years earlier.
As Paul Pillar, former CIA analyst and National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, wrote in his recent book: “The supposed alliance between Saddam’s regime and al-Qa’ida clearly did not drive the Bush administration’s decision to launch the war [in Iraq] because the administration was receiving no indications that any such alliance existed,” adding that “this fact did not stop the administration from nonetheless promoting publicly the notion of such an alliance.”
By August 2003, after another year that included the most intensive selling of the war, more than two-thirds of Americans thought Saddam had been involved in 9/11. Some of this belief was due to innuendo such as the vice president’s repeated references to a phantom meeting in Prague between an Iraqi and 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta. It was due mostly to the administration’s rhetorical drumbeat that repeatedly mentioned Iraq, 9/11, and “war on terror” in the same breath.
Pillar is right: the Saddam-Qaeda connection did not drive the Bush administration’s decision to go to war with Iraq. But it did drive the administration’s propaganda campaign to generate public support for the war.
This was absolutely critical to the blank check that the vast majority of Americans gave to Bush and Cheney to go to war. Alleged WMDs, I think, could never have achieved the level of popular support for war crimes against Iraq on its own. The pain and indignation Americans felt after being attacked on 9/11 needed to be exploited for a war of choice as brazen as Iraq to gain support. And the record is clear that the Bush administration fostered this deception, employing torture and citing false intelligence to do so.
The record is clear, but the CIA is still trying to cover it up, as Marcy Wheeler has recently noted.
Many lies were told to justify the Iraq War. But none were as baseless and vital as this one. At the risk of joining the parade of idiots predicting “the judgement of history” on Iraq, I would anticipate the Saddam-Qaeda connection lie as the most important, far surpassing the more popularized WMD claims.””
http://antiwar.com/blog/2013/03/18/911-and-iraq-the-wars-greatest-lie/
po – so you are saying that Iraq did not invade Kuwait?
tnash80hotmailcom:
“Those 2002 and early 2003 references to those resolutions were pretty hard to miss for anybody who paid attention to the legal groundwork being laid by the Bush administration.”
To be fair, the intensive propaganda by Saddam and his allies made it difficult to pay attention to the material law and facts of the decision for OIF. Unfortunately, even with Saddam dead, his propaganda lives on, perpetuated by actors, such as Donald Trump, who consider the (demonstrably) false narrative of OIF to be politically more expedient than the truth of the matter.
Excerpt from “A problem of definition in the Iraq controversy: Was the issue Saddam’s regime or Iraq’s demonstrable WMD?”:
Eric…….I reviewed some of the statements and reports of chief weapons inspector Hans Blix in the runup to Gulf War II.
As late as Feb. 2003, Blix reported to the U.N. that “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance-not even today- of the disarmament which was demanded of it”.
Blix did request more time to continue inspections. Given the withdrawal of inspectors in 1998 due to harassment and lack of cooperation, and the wording of U.N. Resolution 1441, the request for the additional time Blix wanted was not granted by the Bush or the Blair administrations.
The general perception in the U.S. and U.K. was that the old cycle of “cheat and retreat” was restarted when the inspectors returned in 2002.
The interesting thing is that I am not sure whether we are saying the same thing or the opposite thing.
I do not disagree that the US used a legal framework to invade Iraq, what I am saying is that it was mere justification to do something that was already decided on based on different factors.
Yes, the Bush administration used the meme that Iraq had WMD’s to invade Iraq, but that was lost in the fervor of a propaganda that tied it both to Al qaeda and to 9/11.
Meanwhile the only case you guys are making is that the US were legally justified in attacking Iraq, meanwhile wanting to limit this to the realm of international law solely. Meanwhile, as I said previously, Koffi Annan, the UN chief clearly call the invasion illegal, and obviously he concluded that according to the same tools you and the Bush administration used to justified.
Additionally, we do have other factors, such as the relentless leis the Bush administration offer to shore up the idea that Iraq was indeed a danger, and this included the imaginary ties to Al Qaeda and the responsibility to 911.
Speaking about Hand Blix:
————————-
“”UC Berkeley News
U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix faults Bush administration for lack of “critical thinking” in Iraq
By Bonnie Azab Powell, NewsCenter | 18 March 2004
BERKELEY – Speaking on the anniversary of the United States’ invasion of Iraq, originally declared as a pre-emptive strike against a madman ready to deploy weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the man first charged with finding those weapons said that the U.S. government has “the same mind frame as the witch hunters of the past” — looking for evidence to support a foregone conclusion.
“There were about 700 inspections, and in no case did we find weapons of mass destruction,” said Hans Blix, the Swedish diplomat called out of retirement to serve as the United Nations’ chief weapons inspector from 2000 to 2003; from 1981 to 1997 he headed the International Atomic Energy Agency. “We went to sites [in Iraq] given to us by intelligence, and only in three cases did we find something” – a stash of nuclear documents, some Vulcan boosters, and several empty warheads for chemical weapons. More inspections were required to determine whether these findings were the “tip of the iceberg” or simply fragments remaining from that deadly iceberg’s past destruction, Blix said he told the United Nations Security Council. However, his work in Iraq was cut short when the United States and the United Kingdom took disarmament into their own hands in March of last year.
Blix accused U.S. President George W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair of acting not in bad faith, but with a severe lack of “critical thinking.” The United States and Britain failed to examine the sources of their primary intelligence – Iraqi defectors with their own agendas for encouraging regime change – with a skeptical eye, he alleged. In the buildup to the war, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis were cooperating with U.N. inspections, and in February 2003 had provided Blix’s team with the names of hundreds of scientists to interview, individuals Saddam claimed had been involved in the destruction of banned weapons. Had the inspections been allowed to continue, Blix said, there would likely be a very different situation in Iraq today. As it was, America’s pre-emptive, unilateral actions “have bred more terrorism there and elsewhere.”……The important thing to remember, Blix said repeatedly, was that Saddam was cooperating with the inspections, despite the difficulties they create for a leader.””
po:
“It is interesting that you, and only you, are the one defending the US invasion of Iraq using such “legal”sources.”
Hopefully, the next times the issue is raised, but I haven’t just happened to stop by to catch the thread, then Karen S, Paul Schulte, and other JT regulars will set the record straight with the explanation and ready catalog of primary source authorities that I’ve provided here.
po:
“Sadaam could not disarm that which he did not arm!”
Actually, Saddam’s guilt of proscribed armament was established and presumed (and confirmed) in the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process.
In the mandated disarmament process, the issue for the UN inspectors was not to “ascertain” whether Saddam was armed like “they said Iraq had”. The issue for the UN inspections was whether Iraq disarmed as mandated by the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441).
Either the March 2003 UNMOVIC report (which was not “ignored”, but rather the principal trigger for OIF) or the September 2004 Iraq Survey Group report can provide you background on the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament issue. I linked the UNMOVIC report upthread. Both fact findings are linked in the further reading section of the explanation I provided and the “Perspective” post.
po:
“a legal structure that could be used retroactively to justify the invasion”
Again, ipso facto, hewing to the primary sources of the mission cannot, by definition, be retroactive.
po:
“what was the then present justification, as claimed by the main actors for engaging in such action?”
See the topical laws and policy statements regarding the compliance enforcement compiled and linked in the US Congress Perspective and President Bush Perspective sections of the afore-linked “Perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom” post.
I recommend also reviewing the President Clinton, President HW Bush, and United Nations Perspective sections of the “Perspective” post.
Excerpt (text sans links):
Po wrote at 12:45 PM that
“The issue is not whether there was a legal structure that could be used retroactively to justify the invasion, the issue is thethen present justification , as claimed by the main actors engaging in such action.”
Bush 43 and othet members of his administration repeatedly referred to U.N. Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441…..all resolutions STILL IN EFFECT at the time of the Iraqi invasion…..as the primary legal basis for Gulf War II.
There are numerous, contemporaneous statements referring to these resolutions……not “retroactively” used after the invasion to justify it.
Those 2002 and early 2003 references to those resolutions were pretty hard to miss for anybody who paid attention to the legal groundwork being laid by the Bush administration.
Assuming arguendo the primary legal bases for the 2003 invasion of Iraq were UN resolutions, why then was the 43 administration strenuously debating before Congress the al-Qaeda nexus, the Niger fuel rod allegation, and ad nauseum the WMD allegation, when 43 already had legal bases to do what he did?
He didn’t need to sell the public on BS when he had treaty authority, did he?
Exactly! The legal argument was overwhelmingly dwarfed by the emotional, (im)moral one.
There is a reason a great many americans still believe both that Iraq was behind 9/11 and that Iraq had WMD’s.
Everyone who was cautious was cautious for good reason, there was no proof of the so called WMD’s. Meanwhile the Bush administration spoke with certainty on the existence of such WMD’s, in the meantime throwing ambassador Wilson, Valerie Plame and anyone else they could find under the bus who would challenge the narrative.
po – we were concerned about either a nuclear strike or a gas strike when we invaded Iraq from Saudi Arabia. There was no question that Saddam had WMDs, he had used them on the Kurds before.
Paul Schulte:
“Eric – additionally Saddam refused to admit disarming weapons because he did not want Iran to know how weak he was. So, he kept lying to the inspectors.”
Right, that and Saddam was in fact rearming in violation of UNSCR 687.
Iraq Survey Group:
Excerpt from the answer to “Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq?”:
stevegroen,
Whatever misgivings Mr. Wilkerson speculates he may have had or Secretary of State Powell actually had about the pre-war intelligence estimates, Secretary Powell was correct and clear that the presumption of guilt on Iraq and, required to cure its guilt, Iraq’s burden to prove compliance with the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441). The trigger for enforcement was not, and by procedure could not be, the pre-war intelligence estimates. As Secretary Powell reiterated, Iraq’s breach of ceasefire would trigger enforcement.
To wit, Secretary of State Powell speech to the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003:
In that light, see Secretary Powell’s reaction to the UNMOVIC findings presented to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003.
BTW, FYI, the Saddam regime was confirmed in breach of the UNSCR 687 nuclear disarmament mandates, as well as the UNSCR 687 chemical, biological, and missile disarmament mandates. Excerpt:
The best way to understand the Saddam regime’s failure to disarm as mandated under the UNSCR 1441 “final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under…an enhanced inspection regime ” – the principal trigger for Operation Iraqi Freedom – is to cut through misinformation like po’s Mother Jones article by going directly to the definitional source of the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) for disarmament, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), and the determinative fact finding, UNMOVIC report “Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes 6 March 2003”, that confirmed Iraq remained in breach of the Gulf War ceasefire (WMD) disarmament mandates at the decision point for OIF.
Additional primary sources are necessary to properly understand the over-all operative enforcement procedure for the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441), but to properly understand the (WMD) disarmament issue in the decision for OIF this, simply, is bedrock:
UNSCR 687 (1991) & UNMOVIC report, “Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes 6 March 2003“.
Eric, Sadaam could not disarm that which he did not arm!
It is interesting that you, and only you, are the one defending the US invasion of Iraq using such “legal”sources. Even the Bush administration, Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney and Powell, used other standards for justification.
The issue is not whether there was a legal structure that could be used retroactively to justify the invasion, the issue is what was the then present justification, as claimed by the main actors for engaging in such action?
Eric – additionally Saddam refused to admit disarming weapons because he did not want Iran to know how weak he was. So, he kept lying to the inspectors.
Po,
I released your comment. It is above.