Islamic State militants gave the world yet another shocking atrocity this week by executing a 7-year-old Syrian boy in front of his parents because he cursed. ISIS insists that Islamic justice, or Sharia, demanded that the boy be shot.
The boy was accused of “cursing divinity” while playing in the street with his friends. He was taken before an Islamic court which held that “the act was considered an insult to the Caliphate, regardless of the age of the boy.” He was killed in front of a crowd and his sobbing parents made to watch.
Another victory for Sharia “law” and the great Caliphate.
po:
“Project for a new century, everything leading to and during the iraq war makes sense.”
Paul Schulte:
“BTW, Clinton signed on to many of the goals of the PNAC.”
PNAC “makes sense” and Clinton “signed on” because PNAC and the Clinton administration were both reacting to the same “national emergency” (HW Bush, Clinton) with Iraq with the same set of law, policy, and facts.
The context of the February 1998 PNAC letter was the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement that was, at that point, nearing the 7 year mark with Saddam intransigent and escalating confrontations, including the 1996 missile strikes, building towards the peak of Clinton’s ceasefire enforcement with Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.
However, it’s not accurate to say that President Clinton “signed on” to PNAC. Chronologically, it would be more accurate to say PNAC “signed on” to Clinton’s Gulf War ceasefire enforcement, which carried forwarded HW Bush’s ceasefire enforcement.
For context for the February 2008 PNAC letter, see Secretary of State Albright’s March 1997 summation of the US policy on Iraq that was updated for the beginning of Clinton’s 2nd term.
Eric, you keep undermining your own argument by your stubborn attempt to make Iraq both the cause and legacy of the Iraq invasion. According to you, Sadaam is at the core of everything that brought about both the invasion and its legacy. And meanwhile, your sources for the historical view of the Iraqi society go against the historical consensus.
Obviously, Sadaam did not create the centuries long co-existence between sunni and shia, but he was able to maintain it through the Iran war and through the Saudi exporting of salafi/wahabi influence and through the west’s attempt to raise opposition groups to challenge his government.
Whatever made Iraq was a reaction to forces within and without it, some of which we know, most of which we don’t. The bottom line is that despite everything, Sadaam had control of the Iraqi society, and that we can’t take away. We certainly can debate the morality of his methods, but certainly not that they were successful.
The proof, Iraq society disintegrated rapidly along sectarian lines as soon as Sadaam was killed.
It is also disingenuous to attempt to piggy back the PNAC on Iraq, rather, Iraq was a pretext for the PNAC, a project pro- imperialism in nature, pro- zionism in aim, and neo-conservative in ideology.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“I still think that the 2003 invasion destabilized Iraq and the region.”
Excerpt from the answer to “Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory?”:
The developing US-Iraq “strong strategic partnership” was the key, but Obama wrecked it.
Blaming OIF for current events in the Middle East relies on the fallacy of attenuated causation. Operation Iraqi Freedom was not the disease. Until President Obama disengaged the peace operations, Operation Iraqi Freedom was working as the cure. When President Bush left office, the Arab Spring hadn’t happened yet, while Iraq was stabilized and progressing following the Counterinsurgency “Surge” and Anbar Awakening.
The proximate causes of the subsequent crisis in Iraq are, one, the construction of ISIS in Syria in the degeneration of the Arab Spring that combined with, two, the Iran encroachment upon the US-abandoned vulnerability of Iraq. Both conditions arose from post-Bush events that are related to fundamental errors made by President Obama, such as the ‘lead from behind’ approach to the Arab Spring and disengagement from Iraq, that sharply deviated from President Bush’s course.
Regarding “destabilized … the region”, Syrian pro-democracy activist Ammar Abdulhamid describes the profound effect of President Obama’s (in)actions with the Assad regime at Lawfare, Is Syria Obama’s Fault?.
From the same Orton analysis linked upthread, excerpt regarding the Assad regime and ISIS:
Eric…..it looks like the possible link between,and cooperation with, Saddam and Zarqawi is still being debated.
Whatever presence Al Qaeda may have had pre-2003, it was dwarfed by Al Qaeda’s network in Iraq after Saddam was overthrown.
If an objective of the invasion, and a rationale for the invasion, was a possible Saddam-Al Qaeda link, it actually had the effect of greatly increasing Al Qaeda in Iraq.
It had been some time since I’d read about how Saddam was able to maintain control of his Shia-majority military (in a war against a much larger Shia nation)…….I think the article I cited above mentioned Saddam’s tactic of framing the conflict in terms of an Arab-Persian war, while downplaying the Sunni v. Shia divide.
Given the costs of the surge, and its success, I agree that it was a shame to let it all go down the drain.
I think that’s one of the key tragedies of the post-Saddam Iraq.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“I’m not singing Saddam’s praises, but the Sunni-Shia conflict was generally controlled under Saddam, and exploded post-Saddam, post-2003.”
You’ve fundamentally misunderstood Saddam’s role and primary responsibility for the sectarian conflict that we encountered in OIF.
Saddam only “controlled” it in that he weaponized it. (That’s not to say Saddam originated sectarian differences in Iraq; rather that, for the sake of his rule, Saddam exploited inherent differences and enflamed them to create the riven condition of Iraqi society.)
Worse, there’s evidence that, in the Frankenstein sense, Saddam was losing control of his creation.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“Saddam was able to maintain a cohesive, Shia-majority military throughout the 1980-1988 war with Iraq.”
Incorrect. You’ve credited Saddam for the secular Iraqi society that he inherited as president. While Saddam took part in it as a Baathist, he didn’t create it as president.
Rather, Saddam radically altered it as president in reaction to setbacks in the Iran-Iraq War.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“I didn’t see any evidence that he attempted to exploit or exacerbate Sunni-Shia tensions during the 1980s…that would have been counterproductive, and possibly fatal, in the war with Iran.”
I linked the evidence for you – see the Kyle Orton analysis in my comment on May 17, 2016 at 7:37 pm. It’s topical and consistent with UNSCR 688-related fact findings, scholarship on the Saddam regime, and intelligence analysis, including the Iraqi Perspectives Project report on Saddam’s terrorism, based on analysis of captured Iraqi materials, which I also linked upthread.
Excerpt from Orton:
po:
“Under Sadaam, sunni and shia intermarried, and whether one was sunni or shia was never asked. The differences were seen during some religious holidays and some prayer rituals, but practically, daily, it was not a marked divergence between the two groups.
Shia were present in every single country in ME, and they ranked their state national affiliation above their religious sect. otherwise Iran would have swallowed Iraq readily during their war.”
Again, Saddam inherited that social condition as president. He didn’t create it. Meanwhile, Saddam’s sectarian radicalization of Iraqi society began as reaction to setbacks in the Iran-Iraq War.
po:
“I certainly agree we must give Sadaam some credit for that co-existence, for once we came, it became a sectarian conflict in full.”
Some credit as a pre-presidential, pre-Iran-Iraq War Baathist. But starting as a war-time president, Saddam radically corrupted and broke the co-existence of Iraqi society described by Iraqi exiles, which Saddam had inherited as president.
The Iraqi people needed help to cure the Saddam malignancy. With the Gulf War ceasefire, three US presidents promised then provided the needed help to the Iraqi people. But, just as cure was substantially beginning to solidify in the Churchill sense of an ‘end to the beginning’, President Obama chose to renege on the US commitment to Iraq (see the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement), prematurely withdraw the needed help, and submit Iraq to a related sickness, instead.
ISIS was able to overrun much of Iraq not because of superior numbers or tactics, but because the Iraqi military folded like an accordian.
Now that they are (still) entrenched in much of Iraq, it looks like it will take very long time to take back the territory they hold.
There’s some hope that Maliki’s successor can pull Iraq back together, but he’s in such a deep hole now that the de facto partition of Iraq may be permanent.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“in the runup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there was some debate….not enough….about how smooth or rocky the transition to a post-Saddam Iraq would be.”
Actually, that discussion had been ongoing for 12 years by the decision point for OIF, beginning at the latest with UNSCR 688 (1991) and President HW Bush’s enforcement policy and practice with UNSCR 688.
Excerpt from President HW Bush Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference, April 16, 1991:
Again, if Saddam did not comply as mandated, then the US was committed to regime change and peace operations, implicitly and practically under HW Bush, then carried forward to the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, explicitly and practically under Clinton.
Once there was no more room to kick the can, the only ways the US would not eventually go into Iraq was either the US surrendering the ceasefire to noncompliant Saddam or Saddam complying as mandated by his own volition.
The Iraq Survey Group confirmed Saddam “never intended” to comply as mandated, so that only leaves one way that we would not eventually go into Iraq: surrender to noncompliant Saddam like an Obama red line.
If Saddam did not comply, then the Iraqi regime change could have come about by coup (Saddam snuffed it in 1996), revolt (see Gulf War aftermath and Syrian civil war), abdication (not happening), or invasion.
Your contention, then, is that in his son’s shoes, President HW Bush would only undertake peace operations if the regime change came about by another way than invasion, and instead, HW Bush would have surrendered the ceasefire to a Saddam regime that was unreconstructed and evidentially noncompliant across the board – despite that the Gulf War ceasefire was purpose-designed under the HW Bush administration and enforced by him and his successors to cure the multifaceted Iraqi threat that manifested with the Gulf War.
Relatively speaking, the easiest part of OIF was the invasion. Yet keep in mind that the non-invasion ways to regime change and peace operations would not have made the peace operations easier, least of all a revolt, with the exception of an orderly abdication by Saddam.
As difficult as the post-war was in OIF, imagine trying to set up peace operations in a condition that looks like the Syrian civil war. Strategically speaking, the OIF invasion set up an immediate transition to security and stabilization operations (SASO) for the peace operations.
Practically speaking, the Saddam-AQI and Iran-sponsored Sadrist insurgencies overwhelmed our initial SASO. Not the 1st time in military history an enemy upset an opening plan. But critically, the immediate transition to SASO with the OIF invasion erected the infrastructure to adjust with the COIN Surge. The opening plan fell through, but the basic strategy made sense.
That being said, your criticism is fair insofar Iraqi society was not stable due to Saddam’s “all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror” (UN Commission on Human Rights) that, among its malignancy, enflamed radical sectarian conflict in Iraq.
Therefore, it seems likely that Iraqi cultural elements that HW Bush and Clinton officials factored into their peace operations planning, all of which Bush officials inherited with their planning, were reduced or even gone (snuffed by Saddam) by the time of the “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441).
Nevertheless, that likelihood points out that the Saddam problem only worsened while we kicked the can. The longer we waited to resolve the Saddam problem, the harder it became to solve both from a military standpoint with Saddam’s terrorism and rearming in violation of UNSCR 687 and a social (humanitarian) standpoint in violation of UNSCR 688, which also threatened security.
Correction. “1980-1988 war with IRAN”
Eric…..in the runup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there was some debate….not enough….about how smooth or rocky the transition to a post-Saddam Iraq would be.
Saddam was able to maintain a cohesive, Shia-majority military throughout the 1980-1988 war with Iraq.
I didn’t see any evidence that he attempted to exploit or exacerbate Sunni-Shia tensions during the 1980s…that would have been counterproductive, and possibly fatal, in the war with Iran.
I’m not singing Saddam’s praises, but the Sunni-Shia conflict was generally controlled under Saddam, and exploded post-Saddam, post-2003.
“Even in major setbacks for the Iraqi army….such as the al Fawu debacle in 1986….the Shias have continued to staunchly defend their nation and the Baath regime……..of the eight Iraqi leaders who in early 1988 sat on the Revolutinary Command Council -Iraq’s highest governing body- three were Arab Shias, three were Arab Sunnis, one was an Arab Christian, and one a Kurd.
-From “Sunni-Shia Relations in Iraq”, countystudiesU.S.
So we’re left with the area of debate about the level of Shia-Sunni conflict pre and post-Saddam…..I still think that the 2003 invasion destabilized Iraq and the region.
Absent an extraordinary and direct threat to the U.S., I still can’t envision Bush 41 invading Iraq with the objective of ousting Saddam.
Tom, I must point out that the Sunni-shia conflict was no conflict really…it was an ideological debate that concerned state entities more so than individual or religious communities. Under Sadaam, sunni and shia intermarried, and whether one was sunni or shia was never asked. The differences were seen during some religious holidays and some prayer rituals, but practically, daily, it was not a marked divergence between the two groups.
Shia were present in every single country in ME, and they ranked their state national affiliation above their religious sect. otherwise Iran would have swallowed Iraq readily during their war.
I certainly agree we must give Sadaam some credit for that co-existence, for once we came, it became a sectarian conflict in full.
Tom, I agree with your insights about Bush 41, especially in relation to his foreign experience and versus Bush 43. The more I think about it, the more appreciative of him I am.
I second Steve’s points about the value of this exchange, we may not agree about intent and purpose regarding the Iraq invasion, but I do appreciate the various insights from each side.
Paul, one thing that is unavoidable in terms of explaining the disbanding of the Iraqi army, is the statement Wesley Clark made that Iraq was one of those countries on the list of 7 that were to be taken out (Syria being another, along with Libya…).
In light of that and in light of the Neocon’s Project for a new century, everything leading to and during the iraq war makes sense.
po – there are two parts to the Iraq War with a Clinton administration inbetween. BTW, Clinton signed on to many of the goals of the PNAC.
Paul, don’t look for me to defend Clinton…have at him!
po – there is talk that Hillary may select Bill to be her VP. Now think about defending him.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“I think the key phrase…..and consistent theme….of Bush 41 was that “THE IRAQI PEOPLE” should depose Saddam.”
Correct.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“I don’t think he wanted American fingerprints on, and American responsibility/ blame for, the sectarian chaos that might follow Saddam’s overthrow by the U.S.”
You’re correct on what he wanted, but that’s not what President HW Bush understood was needed.
HW Bush understood Iraq’s compliance with the purpose-designed ceasefire was needed.
The question about Iraqi regime change wasn’t primarily about regime change. The question about Iraqi regime change was really whether the needed compliance could be achieved with the Saddam regime.
HW Bush’s answer to the real question is, by May 1991 at the latest, the US had begun outreach and assistance with the Iraqi opposition.
While President HW Bush indeed wanted the Iraqi people to depose Saddam, in the aftermath of Saddam’s suppression of the uprising that compelled UNSCR 688, HW Bush understood that the Iraqi people needed help to do it…and they would need help to manage the aftermath.
HW Bush committed the US to provide that help, both overtly and covertly.
HW Bush’s policy of overt invasive multifaceted enforcement of the UNSCR 688 humanitarian mandates, coupled with covert assistance with the Iraqi opposition, implied the American commitment to post-Saddam Iraq – however that came about – to manage any “sectarian chaos that might follow Saddam’s overthrow”.
President HW Bush’s overt and covert actions were carried forward by President Clinton. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, including section 7, was not a departure from HW Bush. Rather, it codified the executive policy and practice with Iraq initiated by HW Bush in the wake of the Gulf War in the context of the ceasefire enforcement.
President Clinton, signing statement for the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998:
Again, the question about Iraqi regime change was not primarily about regime change, but rather, whether the needed compliance could be achieved with the Saddam regime.
I haven’t seen evidence to support the position that if confronted by his son’s dilemma – no more room to kick the can with the ‘containment’ broken, so allow Saddam to break free of the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) or resolve the Saddam problem with a “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441) – that President HW Bush would have chosen to free noncompliant Saddam and discredit American leadership, like an Obama red line.
Rather, the formulation of the Gulf War ceasefire, HW Bush’s commitment to it, especially UNSCR 688, his overt humanitarian actions, and covert assistance with the Iraqi opposition, suggest that President HW Bush, if fast-forwarded to his son’s options with Saddam, would have followed President Bush’s choices.
If Saddam had been overthrown via coup or revolt during either administration, which both presidents wanted and actively supported, HW Bush and Clinton, same as Bush, would have undertaken peace operations with Iraq to manage any “sectarian chaos that might follow Saddam’s overthrow” and implement the ceasefire compliance process.
It’s also correct to say that Bush undertook peace operations with Iraq the same as HW Bush and Clinton would have.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“There were a number of Iraqis in exile insisting that “Iraqis view themselves as Iraqis first, not Shia or Sunni.”
They insisted that because the Iraqi society they recalled was really like that until Saddam fundamentally altered Iraqi society with his “all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror” (UN Commission on Human Rights).
tnash80hotmailcom:
“Given the aftermath of Gulf War II, which freed the Iraqis if Saddam, and “freed them” to engage in wholesale sectarian slaughter, I still think Bush 41 was correct in not overthrowing Saddam.”
First of all, what happened wasn’t “wholesale sectarian slaughter”. It was exceptionally brutal competing factions exacerbated by foreign influence (AQ, Iran) with a polarized sectarian character, not “wholesale sectarian slaughter” among all Iraqis.
That being said, you’re correct we entered peace operations with a riven Iraqi society. However, you’re incorrect to imply that Saddam was needed to keep a lid on an Iraqi society that was intrinsically riven. In fact, the Saddam regime was the malignant cause that rived Iraqi society, so that the Iraq of 2003 was no longer the Iraq of 1990-1991.
Recall when, in the immediate wake of the Iranian revolution, secular Baathist Iraq was assessed as relatively compatible with American interests by the Carter and Reagan administrations. It wasn’t an illusion. That is the Iraqi society recalled by Iraqi exiles.
However, starting sometime during the Iran-Iraq War, the Saddam regime began a radical sectarian alteration of Iraqi society in the same course of events that led to the Gulf War and the Gulf War ceasefire. For insight on Saddam’s “discrimination” process, see The Islamic State Was Coming Without the Invasion of Iraq (or How Saddam Hussein Gave Us ISIS) by Kyle Orton.
The Bush administration, like its predecessors, recalled Iraqi society before the Saddam regime changed it.
The longer we allowed Saddam to breach the Gulf War ceasefire, including the UNSCR 688 humanitarian mandates, the further removed became Iraqi society from the Iraq recalled by the Iraqi exiles. As is, we allowed the Saddam cancer to metastasize during the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement far longer than we should have. Much of the challenge we faced during the OIF peace operations derived from the underestimated residue of the Saddam regime, such as Saddam’s alliance with jihadists.
With the Surge, we began to cluster signs that with a continued American post-WW2 type commitment, something approaching the pre-Saddam Iraq recalled by Iraqi exiles could be recovered from the corruption of the Saddam regime. Instead, President Obama chose to prematurely disengage the peace operations and gift Iraq to Iran.
Saddam wasn’t the cure. He was the cancer. Curing malignancy usually requires more treatment than excising obvious tumors, while prematurely disengaging cancer treatment invites fatality.
Eric……I previously mentioned the difficulty involved in 1990-1991 for Bush 41 to “sell” an offensive operation to eject Iraq from Kuwait.
I think he was uniquely qualified to get authorization for that mission.
Had he tacked on “then on to Baghdad to remove Saddam”, I don’t think even Bush 41 could have garnered support, domestically or internationally.
The circumstances were, as you said, clearly different in 2003. My feeling was that the COSTS involved in removing Saddam, either in 1991 or in 2003, were similiar…. not worth any likely benefits.
( I actually thought that Sunni-Shia-Kurdish militias would lay low as long as U.S. troops remained, then confront each other in an all-out civil war once we drew down our forces).
I didn’t anticipate that the primary targets of sectarian strife would be civilians buying food at market, or
buying heating oil or fuel.
I didn’t see that Bush 43 made his case re the Saddam/Al Queda connection.
Whatever threat Al Queda in Iraq (under Saddam) MIGHT have posed was minimal compared to the Al Queda in Iraq post-Saddam.
To me, it was the roughly to same “cost/benefit” outcome of removing Saddam…whether in 1991 or in 2003….. that made that action unwise.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“There was an overwhelming consensus that Saddam had been concealing WMDs and WMD programs…..that didn’t seem to be the main point of disagreement.”
There wouldn’t have been a disagreement about “Saddam had been concealing WMDs and WMD programs” because the “overwhelming consensus” was not primarily based on the various intelligence estimates. Rather, the consensus was based on that Saddam’s proscribed WMD was established fact in the UNSCR 687 disarmament process. See IAEA’s “INVO: Iraq Nuclear File: Key Findings” & UNMOVIC’s “A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF IRAQ’S PROSCRIBED WEAPONS PROGRAMMES” linked in my comment to Paul Schulte on May 16, 2016 at 5:57 pm.
Recall, quoting Charles Duelfer of ISG again, “It’s worth recalling that the UN weapons inspectors also found it impossible to give Saddam a clean bill of health [and] … their work formed the basis for many key assessments. And the weapons inspectors were certainly unconvinced that Saddam had come clean. In fact, they delineated the areas where Saddam had not provided verifiable accounts of his WMD activities.”
In other words, the intelligence estimates relied on the UN inspections. As such, the “overwhelming consensus” was primarily due to the established fact of Saddam’s proscribed WMD in the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process and, in that operative context, Saddam’s failure to disarm as mandated.
The argument that the US and UN had a burden prove “Saddam had been concealing WMDs and WMD programs”, which is a foundational premise for many OIF opponents, is simply inapposite of the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process, which operated upon the established fact of Saddam’s proscribed WMD.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“The debate, internationally and domestically, centered around “what do we do about it”.”
To understand the 2002-2003 political conditions and debate around OIF, look at the 1998 political conditions and debate around ODF. In the international context, they’re substantially the same. In other words, the international political conditions and debate around OIF with Bush were carried forward from ODF with Clinton.
Comparing HW Bush’s “skill and judgement” in 1990-1991 to his son’s in 2002-2003 is apples and oranges. They faced substantially different situations with Iraq. The analogous comparison is Clinton with ODF and Bush with OIF.
The main difference between Clinton with ODF and Bush with OIF is domestic politics.
In 1998, Democratic leaders stood with Clinton to support strict enforcement of Iraq’s compliance with the Gulf War ceasefire and refuted opposing arguments proffered by France, Russia, et al.
However, despite that Bush reiterated Clinton’s case against Saddam and carried forward the same ceasefire enforcement, many of the Democratic leaders who had stood with Clinton’s ceasefire enforcement subsequently with Bush adopted the opposing arguments that they had refuted in 1998.
Estimated Iraqi Losses Reported by U.S. Central Command, March 7, 1991
36 fixed-wing aircraft in air-to-air engagements
6 helicopters in air-to-air engagements
68 fixed- and 13 rotary-wing aircraft destroyed on the ground
137 Iraqi aircraft flown to Iran
3,700 of 4,280 battle tanks
2,400 of 2,870 assorted other armored vehicles
2,600 of 3,110 assorted artillery pieces
19 naval ships sunk, 6 damaged
42 divisions made combat-ineffective
Thanks for your input, Eric.
As an aside, it’s interesting to guess how Bush 41 would have dealt with Saddam had he been reelected.
Bush 41 made no secret of his desire to see “The Iraqi people put Saddam aside”….he may have believed that Saddam would be deposed in the wake if his disasterous defeat.
That belief was widely held, but Saddam proved more “resilient” than anticipated.
I think the key phrase…..and consistent theme….of Bush 41 was that “THE IRAQI PEOPLE” should depose Saddam.
I don’t think he wanted American fingerprints on, and American responsibility/ blame for, the sectarian chaos that might follow Saddam’s overthrow by the U.S.
There was a lot of discussion in 2002 and 2003 re whether America would be seen as liberators or invaders/ occuppiers after we went in to dislodge Saddam.
There were a number of Iraqis in exile insisting that “Iraqis view themselves as Iraqis first, not Shia or Sunni.
Given the aftermath of Gulf War II, which freed the Iraqis if Saddam, and “freed them” to engage in wholesale sectarian slaughter, I still think Bush 41 was correct in not overthrowing Saddam.
Even IF Maliki and Obama had not pissed away the largely stabilized Iraq that was achieved via the surge, I don’t think the costs and repercussions of removing Saddam were worth it.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“Much of that criticism evaporated after Saddam was removed in 2003…….Bush 41 understood, and warned against, that kind of “mission creep”.”
See the answers to “Was Operation Iraqi Freedom about WMD or democracy?” & “Was the invasion of Iraq perceived to be a nation-building effort?”.
The peace operations with Iraq weren’t “mission creep”. They were standing law and policy in the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement from before Bush campaigned for President, and based on decisions by President HW Bush.
In the event that Saddam failed to cure Iraq’s breach of ceasefire as mandated and triggered regime change – whether by internal or external agency – US-led peace operations with post-Saddam Iraq were expected, announced, and mandated in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which was carried forward in section 4 of the 2002 AUMF.
In fact, the OIF peace operations stemmed from the invasive multifaceted enforcement of the UNSCR 688 humanitarian mandates that was established by President HW Bush at the outset of the Gulf War ceasefire in 1991.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“To me, these are the key differences between Desert Storm in 1990-1991 and the 2003 invasion. That, and the difference between the skill and judgement of Bush 41 and Buah 43.”
“Between” is the missing key. What happened “between Desert Storm in 1990-1991 and the 2003 invasion” locked in the road to OIF. In fact, what happened “between Desert Storm in 1990-1991” and President Clinton’s inauguration on January 20, 1993 locked in the road to OIF.
Immediately following the Gulf War, on March 1, 1991, President HW Bush understood the Saddam problem was not resolved and viewed regime change as the solution:
Yet despite recognizing immediately that the cause of the Gulf War retained with Saddam in power, rather than act like a leader of “skill and judgement” to resolve the Saddam problem on his watch, HW Bush instead opted for the alternative of a ceasefire with comprehensive requirements to rehabilitate Iraq tantamount to regime change. Then, despite that it was clear before HW Bush left office that Saddam would not comply with the ceasefire mandates, HW Bush opted to kick the can to Clinton.
President Clinton isn’t blameless, either. During his 8-year turn at the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement with Saddam intransigent, Clinton completed the set of law, policy, and precedent for regime change with the determination that “Iraq has abused its final chance” in December 1998. But instead of resolving the Saddam problem on his watch, like HW Bush, Clinton also kicked the can on the Saddam problem as it festered.
The more you fill in the gap of “between”, the more that President Bush looks like a better principled, conscientious, and ethical leader than his father on Iraq.
That being said, Bush did not have the option like his predecessors to kick the can on Iraq. The ‘containment’ that followed “Iraq has abused its final chance” (Clinton) in 1998 was evidently broken by 2001. Bush’s options with Iraq were reduced to either implicitly (like an Obama red line) allow Saddam to break free of the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) or to confront Saddam with a “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441).
Excerpt:
po:
“mainly infantry, no airforce of note, no heavy weaponry of not…”
I agree with tnash80hotmailcom. You should re-check the sources and pick up Iraq’s order of battle for the Gulf War. In fact, Saddam possessed a large modern, mechanized military with air force and armor.
Saddam believed in the power of science and technology, and boosting his military as such was always priority for Saddam, including with his breach of the Gulf War ceasefire.
Iraq Survey Group:
tnash80hotmailcom:
“There were numerous dire warnings about the massive, protracted war the U.S. was about to enter.”
The assessment was Iraq’s order of battle, in terms of size, tactics, and armament, plus real-world experience, was a reasonable version of a Soviet-style military, which fit military theories from the Cold War related to assessments of the Soviets, north Koreans, etc. The Desert Storm outcome turned out differently than many of the expert predictions based on Cold War military theories.
Eric – in the documentary Inside the Killbox, one of the tank commanders comments that he was told they could expect up to 70% casualties and he was introduced to the person who would replace him.
po:
“Iraq invaded Kuwait under the wink wink encouragement of Bush
…Read something about Bush using Kuwait to fight Iraq on the oil and put undue pressure on it… and Sadaam reacted to that”
Actually, in international relations circles, the debate is not over whether Ambassador Glaspie encouraged Saddam to invade Kuwait, but rather over whether she sufficiently acted to discourage Iraq when Iraqi officials raised Saddam’s dispute with Kuwait.
The argument for Glaspie is that she simply gave a conventional diplomatic response to an Iraqi government that was not then evaluated as an enemy of the US, also in the mistaken belief that Saddam and his Arab neighbors shared adequate relations for conflict resolution with issues like debt and border oil rights.
The argument against Glaspie coincides with your suggestion of “Bush using Kuwait to fight Iraq on the oil and put undue pressure on it… and Sadaam reacted to that”. If Glaspie was concerned that an Iraqi misperception of US interest was causing tension by feeding insecurity, then Glaspie’s diplomatic response matched the “spiral model” of defusion (contrast to the deterrence model) by assuring Saddam that no such US interest existed. The notion is that, insecurity mollified, Saddam would then reasonably resolve differences between neighbors with tension eased.
Along those lines, the argument against Glaspie is that she failed as a diplomat by misjudging Saddam to be an insecure actor, rather than an ambitious aggressive actor, and thus, an application of the spiral model unwittingly failed to discourage Saddam from seizing and pillaging Kuwait. An ambitious aggressive actor like Saddam requires a strong deterrence model, which still might not be enough if he believes he holds a trump card with WMD.
Either way, the US learned the lesson in 1990-1991. We were clear-eyed thereafter about the ambitious aggressive, and irrational, nature of Saddam, and we applied the deterrence model to Saddam from then on. Unfortunately, it wasn’t enough.
Iraq Survey Group:
po:
“we knew it because we were the ones who helped him set it up for use against the Iranians”
To be fair, Iraq’s main trading partners in building his WMD program were European and Asian. But you’re correct that among other countries, US firms traded some “dual-use” biological and technical items with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.
The record of Iraq’s extensive and creative utilization of dual-use items – including those of American origin – to build its WMD program informed the comprehensive character of the ceasefire disarmament mandates and our strict enforcement.
In fact, UNMOVIC flagged Iraq’s dual-use items and the Iraq Survey Group confirmed that Iraq possessed a plethora of dual-use items. Unfortunately, countries such as Russia and France had continued to illicitly trade dual-use items with Saddam despite Saddam’s track record and the UNSCR 687 proscriptions.
For example, the Iraq Survey Group reported:
po:
“Not impossible, because the link to AL qaeda and responsibility for 911 had been … sold to the people as sufficient for action.”
That’s a legal question. The condition that qualified for “sufficient for action” was spelled out in the relevant law and policy of the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement. See especially the 2002 AUMF (Public Law 107-243) and the March 18, 2003 President Bush letter to Congress on the legal basis for OIF.
You’re correct that Saddam’s terrorism, including Saddam’s verified “link to AL Qaeda”, was included in the grounds for OIF. However, “responsibility for 911” is not listed in the grounds for OIF.
po:
“it was not for the US to be the “teeth”.”
Incorrect. By design, the UN is structurally dependent on sovereign authority for enforcement “teeth” for tasks that exceed the UN’s limited intrinsic capability and capacity. Not just military enforcement, but also financial, diplomatic, etc. As such, by law, policy, and precedent, with UN authorization, the US acted as the chief enforcer of Iraq’s compliance with the UNSCR 660-series resolutions, including the Gulf War ceasefire and OIF peace operations, from their outset in 1990-1991.
po and Paul Schulte:
“most armies outside of the Me can take Iraq”
“Iraq had a battle harden 1 million man for at the beginning of Desert Storm”
You’re both right, which is what made the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process a policy priority.
Saddam’s priority was always strengthening his ability to project force for security and domination, through both conventional (military) and unconventional (WMD, terrorism) means.
Paul Schulte is correct that in the Gulf War, by dint of battle experience, regime investment, and sheer amount of men and equipment, Iraq possessed a military that was at least formidable if not supreme in the region.
But po is also correct that in the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, Iraq’s conventional military fell short of Saddam’s ambition. WMD was Saddam’s compensation for the shortcomings of his conventional military and security forces.
The difference between Saddam and other countries with WMD is that with his ambition, aggression, and poor judgement, Saddam considered WMD to be part of his regular military and security capabilities rather than a deterrent capability. That difference informed the policy priority of the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process.
From President Clinton’s announcement of Operation Desert Fox:
po:
“There is a reason a great many americans still believe both that Iraq was behind 9/11 and that Iraq had WMD’s.”
Albeit the “overlap…de facto link” (Iraq Perspectives Project) between the Saddam regime and the al Qaeda network is confirmed, “Iraq was behind 9/11” is not part of the grounds for the Iraq intervention.
“That Iraq had WMD’s” is confirmed in the fact record for the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process with Iraq’s burden of proof to disarm as mandated. According to the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441), UNMOVIC confirmed and the Iraq Survey Group corroborated Saddam’s guilt on WMD.
You can now help correct misconceptions about OIF.
If I’ve done my part here, then Karen S, you, Paul Schulte, stevegroen, tnash80hotmailcom, and other JT readers have readily available a virtual reference guide – with our commentary in this thread, the references linked in my comments, the OIF FAQ explanation I provided, and the primary source authorities that are cataloged and linked in the further reading section of the OIF FAQ explanation and the “Perspective” post – to correct misinformation like the Mother Jones article and set the record straight in the public discourse with the law and policy, fact basis – the actual why – of the Iraq intervention.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“Given that Blix’s reports contained grave reservations about Iraqi compliance with the conditions of 1441, Bush and Blair were going to invade “in any case”… I meant with or without an additional U.N. resolution.”
That’s how I interpreted your comment in context when I responded to what you said about “toothlessness”. But I was dissatisfied with my comment responding to your comment, so I amended it.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“But as you said, full Iraqi compliance would have made it far more difficult for Bush/ Blair to justify an invasion of Iraq.”
I haven’t come across a concrete plan for follow-up on Iraq’s other ceasefire obligation if Saddam disarmed as mandated with the UNSCR 1441 inspections.
However, President Bush’s comments leading up to OIF suggest that if Saddam had disarmed as mandated, the US would have viewed Iraq’s compliance as a “signal” (Bush) that Saddam was ready to work with the UN “helping” (Bush) Iraq comply with its Gulf War ceasefire obligations, including UNSCR 688. But that suggestion invites a whole other box of questions.
From the answer to “Was Operation Iraqi Freedom about WMD or democracy?”:
Amending my comment at May 16, 2016 at 4:49 pm:
Actually, not right. Not proceeded in “any” case.
If Saddam had responded to the UNSCR 1441 inspections with “full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations” (UNSCR 1441), instead of “about 100 unresolved disarmament issues” (UNMOVIC), that would have forestalled OIF.
But an either “full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations” (UNSCR 1441) or “100 unresolved disarmament issues” (UNMOVIC) hypothetical is too easy.
What if Saddam had cooperated for real or at least put on a better show of “delay and deception” (Clinton) cooperation, but, some number, say, about 10, relatively less alarming disarmament issues remained unresolved?
Or, what if Saddam had disarmed on WMD as mandated by UNSCRs 687 and 1441, but continued to acquire proscribed conventional items in breach of UNSCR 687? And/or continued his terrorism (including work with the al Qaeda network) in beach of UNSCR 687? And/or continued his “all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror” (UN Commission on Human Rights) in breach of UNSCR 688?
The 2002 AUMF authorized enforcement of all of Iraq’s ceasefire obligations, while UNSCR 1441 recalled all of Iraq’s ceasefire obligations but operatively, was narrowly focused on the UNSCR 687 WMD disarmament mandates.
If Saddam had complied with UNSCR 1441, that would have forestalled OIF. But it’s an open question of what the next step for the US and the UN might have been to enforce Iraq’s other ceasefire obligations, especially the terrorism and humanitarian mandates.
In any case, what actually happened is Saddam failed to take even the 1st step (total verified declaration of Iraq’s entire WMD-related program) of the 1st step (WMD disarmament) towards meeting Iraq’s burden with the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441).
po:
“Interestingly, the only WMD’s we found after the invasion were those obsolete chemical weapons”
In fact, the munitions confiscated in Operation Avarice added to the Iraq Survey Group findings as corroboration of the UN inspectors’ confirmation that Iraq breached the UNSCR 687 disarmament mandates.
Recall that, regarding chemical weapons, UNSCR 687 (1991) mandated:
Plainly, the Gulf War ceasefire did not allow Saddam to retain “obsolete chemical weapons” or any other WMD-related item or activity, no matter the age or provenance.
Besides corroborating that Saddam failed to disarm as mandated, the Operation Avarice munitions were far from “the only WMD’s we found after the invasion”. Again, according to the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441), the Iraq Survey Group findings are rife with WMD-related violations.
po:
“As for nukes, that is silly! We certainly knew Saddam had no nukes.”
Incorrect. Actually, what we didn’t know was how advanced Saddam’s nuclear program was. See the “INVO: Iraq Nuclear File: Key Findings” linked in my comment to Paul Schulte on May 16, 2016 at 5:57 pm.
Your assertion is also incorrect for the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process.
For the UNSCR 1441 inspections, we didn’t know whether Saddam had or did not have nuclear weapons. Saddam was required to answer the question according to the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441). We only knew Saddam’s track record, that we had indicators of proscribed nuclear activity, and Iraq was obligated to prove its compliance with the UNSCR 687 nuclear mandate:
In that light, excerpt:
Paul Schulte:
“po – we were concerned about either a nuclear strike or a gas strike when we invaded Iraq from Saudi Arabia. There was no question that Saddam had WMDs, he had used them on the Kurds before.”
There’s a lot of detailed historical fact record on Saddam and WMD in all of the nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile areas from a variety of official sources, more than “he had used them on the Kurds before”.
I’ll link to the IAEA Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO) for the nuclear piece and the March 6, 2003 UNMOVIC report for the biological, chemical, and missile pieces because of their relevance to the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process.
INVO: Iraq Nuclear File: Key Findings. Excerpt:
UNMOVIC report “Unresolved Disarmament Issues Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes 6 March 2003″, which again, was the principal trigger for OIF. Excerpt:
tnash60hotmailcom:
“In my view, both Hans Blix and Gen. Colin Powell were hedging their bets.”
Your view gets at the heart of the controversy: the irreconcilable disconnect between the operative enforcement procedure for the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) in the decision for OIF and the deviant politics that have surrounded OIF.
Blix and Powell were correct when “they both made statements about the violations by Iraq” in the operative context of the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process. It’s dispositive that Saddam was guilty on the ceasefire WMD issue. Saddam’s breach was decided by the UNSC for Iraq’s “final opportunity to comply”, confirmed by UNMOVIC finding “about 100 unresolved disarmament issues”, and corroborated post hoc by the Iraq Survey Group, “ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs”.
The truth of the matter is Saddam did not disarm as mandated and was in fact rearming in violation of UNSCR 687. On the law and the facts, the decision for OIF was correct.
However, the politics surrounding OIF have deviated from the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” with inapposite standards of criticism, such as whether “large stockpiles of WMDs [have] been discovered”, that practically contradict the operative enforcement procedure for the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance”.
Contrary to the politics, the ceasefire disarmament process was not designed to discover “large stockpiles of WMD”, nor even guard against Iraq destroying evidence.
As is, the ISG findings are rife with disarmament violations. But if hypothetically, ISG had found Iraq totally sanitized of WMD-related items or activities, that wouldn’t have absolved Saddam’s failure to disarm as mandated because the baseline step of the ceasefire disarmament process was the “onus” (Blix) on Iraq to provide a total verified declaration that fully accounted for its entire WMD-related program for “yielding” (UNSCR 687) to the UN inspectors for elimination under “international supervision” (UNSCR 687). Saddam was obligated to provide this declaration within 15 days – in 1991. Yet 12 years later, upon the decision for OIF, Saddam still had failed to provide the requisite total verified declaration of Iraq’s entire WMD-related program that was the baseline step of the ceasefire disarmament process.
In other words, the ceasefire disarmament process was designed for UN inspectors to verify, receive from Iraq, and eliminate under international supervision – not “discover” – Iraq’s WMD. To wit:
Instead of “hedging their bets” by conforming to politics that deviate from the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” with inapposite standards of criticism, Blix and Powell ought to set the record straight on the grounds for the Iraq intervention.
tnash60hotmailcom:
“The position of the U.S. and U.K. was (is) that 1441 was suffient justification for Gulf War II”
That’s because UNSCR 1441 wasn’t the beginning. It was the “final opportunity to comply” for Saddam and, as such, carried forward – “recall[ed] – the standing enforcement authorizations from the decade-plus Gulf War ceasefire enforcement in order to bring it to conclusion with the mandated compliance.
tnash60hotmailcom:
“but they would have proceeded in any case, citing the “toothlessness” of the U.N.””
Right. In that regard, the US-led enforcement was the practical “teeth” of the UN-mandated Gulf War ceasefire. As we learned tragically in the 1990s, eg, Rwanda, UN force can be dangerously inadequate, too often most dangerous for the people who rely on it. So UN-based enforcement above a low level of need is structurally dependent on sovereign authority, often (before Obama, at least) American sovereign authority.
In the first place, when the Gulf War ceasefire enforcement was formulated under HW Bush, the concept was US forces would hand off ASAP to a UN force for the military enforcement. Saddam put paid to that quickly, which compelled US forces back to the chief military enforcer role with Iraq.