Hillary Clinton and The New Nixonians

220px-Richard_Nixon225px-Hillary_Clinton_official_Secretary_of_State_portrait_cropBelow is my column in USA Today on the striking similarities between Richard Nixon and Hillary Clinton, particularly with regard to the staffers surrounding them. Both tended to blame others about being, to paraphrase Nixon, “kicked around.” However, there are deeper and rather disturbing patterns emerging that are shared by the two leaders in my view.

It has taken almost 50 years, but the Democrats have finally found their inner Nixon. Make no mistake about it: Hillary Clinton is the most Nixonian figure in the post-Watergate period. Indeed, Democrats appear to have reached the type of moral compromise that Nixon waited, unsuccessfully, for Republicans to accept: Some 71% of Democrats want Clinton to run even if indicted.

While Obama could be criticized for embracing Nixon’s imperial presidency model, his personality could not be more different from his predecessor. Clinton however is the whole Nixonian package. On a policy level, her predilection for using executive and military power is even coupled with praise for (and from) Nixon’s secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. However, it is on a personality level that the comparison is so striking and so unnerving. Clinton, like Nixon, is known to be both secretive and evasive. She seems to have a compulsive resistance to simply acknowledging conflicting facts or changes in position. She only makes admissions against interest when there is no alternative to acknowledging the truth in a controversy.

Clinton’s history of changing positions and spinning facts is now legendary. Indeed, a video entitled “Hillary Clinton lying for 13 minutes straight” has become an Internet sensation with millions of viewers. Polls show Clinton with record lows for her perceived honesty and trustworthiness. (In fairness, Trump fares little better). Clinton seems entirely comfortable denying facially true facts. For example, she spent much of a year assuring the public that she was fully cooperating with investigators into her use of an unsecure server for her communications as secretary of State. Indeed, she used her claimed cooperation as the reason that she would not answer more questions. When the State Department Inspector General issued its highly critical report on the scandal, many were shocked to learn that Clinton not only refused to speak at all with investigators but so did her top aides. Where Clinton repeatedly said that her use was allowed by the State Department, the report said that the rule was clearly violated, she never received approval for such a security breach and that a personal server would never have been accepted.

Of course, politicians are not known for their allegiance to the truth, and Clinton may be a standout in that group, but she is hardly unique among her peers. However, that tendency is often checked by a staff that forces politicians to recognize reality and even the truth of controversy.

The problem is that Clinton has surrounded herself with aides who have demonstrated an unflagging loyalty and veneration. Take Huma Abedin, perhaps her most influential aide. Abedin described her first meeting on the “Call Your Girlfriend” podcast: “She walked by and she shook my hand and our eyes connected, and I just remember having this moment where I thought; ‘Wow, this is amazing. And … it just inspired me. You know, I still remember the look on her face. And it’s funny, and she would probably be so annoyed that I say this, but I remember thinking; ‘Oh my God, she’s so beautiful and she’s so little!'”

Adebin’s breathless account is similar to communications of other aides who fawn in emails to Clinton over her speeches, dress and demeanor. In the released emails, former National Security Council adviser Liz Sherwood-Randall asked that an aide pass along her praise of Clinton’s performance at a hearing:

“If you get a chance — please tell HRC that she was a ROCK STAR yesterday. Everything about her ‘performance’ was what makes her unique, beloved, and destined for even more greatness. She sets a standard that lesser mortals can only dream of emulating.”

(In 2014, Sherwood-Randall was made the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy.) Emails from other close aides like Lanny Davis and Sidney Blumenthal show the same level of constant stroking and exaltation.

It is certainly true that Washington’s powerful have always attracted a circle of sycophants. Indeed, the most powerful figures often seem to need continual stroking from underlings and there can be a race to the bottom as aides outdo each other in their adoring rhetoric.

What is so concerning is that Clinton seems to invite such expressions of absolute loyalty and reverence. The question is whether there is a John Dean willing to walk into her office and tell her of a cancer growing within the White House. After years of scandals and investigations, Clinton has distilled a team down to the truest believers who have little difficulty repeating truth-defying spins or refusing to cooperate with investigators.

Indeed, recently, top Clinton aides took the notable step of agreeing to be represented by the same lawyers in both the criminal and civil investigations into the email scandal. That is a move that can greatly assure a more uniform account in the testimony of Clinton aides. It is also a move that rejects potential conflicts between aides in both their recollections and interests. In the most recent depositions, that joint counsel instructed key aide Cheryl Mills to simply refuse to answer most of the questions about the reasons and arrangements made for the use of a personal server at the State Department. So far Clinton’s top aides have remained a uniform front.

It is hard not to think of Nixon aides like John Ehrlichman and H.R. Haldeman in the “palace guard” surrounding Nixon. They should be a cautionary tale for all of these aides. Ehrlichman would later look back and marvel at the loss of his own sense of self and independence: “I, in effect, abdicated my moral judgments and turned them over to somebody else.”

My greatest concern is not that a President Clinton will continue a pattern of false statements but that her aides will gradually forget the difference between what is true and what is not.

Jonathan Turley is the Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George Washington University and a member of USA TODAY’s Board of Contributors.

127 thoughts on “Hillary Clinton and The New Nixonians”

  1. I had long hoped that the first woman president would be a Cliffie. Looks like I’ll have to settle for a Wellesley girl.

  2. The FACT is that no WMDs were found,and the UN inspectors finally got unlimited access to ALL places in Iraq before the invasion. It is also not contested that Bush and company made up much of their “evidence” that they used with Cheney leading the charge. THAT accomplished the goal that was initially set. I recall that Bush mocked Blix and Barradi and called them stupid and stooges at the time when their findings ran counter to what Bush was pushing. That is also why the UN refused to sanction the US invasion. I also recall that the only things that were at issue were the unaccounted for stocks of chemical used as precursors. Given the fact that the US audit of US nuclear material came up short of a couple hundred pounds of plutonium, I think that demanding perfection from a place like Iraq is a bit extreme. Having the inspectors on the ground with access to even Hussein’s palaces,which was one of the points of contention, could and DID produce verification that there were NO WMDs. So we can discount reports of “missing” material since the inspectors and later US officers could not find any prohibited material.

    Only simple minded folks would make the claim that Kerry was in any contradiction. The legislative process has many times votes in which amendments are tacked onto a bill that are objectionable, and members will vote against the whole bill because of that. Then unscrupulous hacks can claim that the member voted against something, when in FACT they voted against the poison pill. We also have the example of the First Gulf war in which the UN forces did not overthrow Hussein because that would exceed the mandate. If the US had gone ahead and done that, simpletons would claim that those who objected were changing their mind about the war. Try thinking.

  3. randyjet:
    “if Bush had … gone with the Army’s estimate for the numbers needed to invade and occupy, he might have succeeded.”

    Actually, our peace operations with Iraq were evidently succeeding until President Obama chose disastrously to deviate course from President Bush. See the answer to “Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a strategic blunder or a strategic victory?”.

    To wit, President Obama, 19MAY11:

    Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multiethnic, multisectarian democracy. The Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence in favor of a democratic process, even as they’ve taken full responsibility for their own security. Of course, like all new democracies, they will face setbacks. But Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress. And as they do, we will be proud to stand with them as a steadfast partner.

    You’re referring to a pre-war estimate, not “the Army’s estimate”. The estimate you’re referring to was demonstrably incorrect: our post-war troop level in Iraq peaked at 157,800 in FY2008 for the COIN Surge.

    Setting aside credit to the enemy for successfully breaching our initial post-war plan, our main flaw entering post-war Iraq wasn’t the troop numbers nor presidential decision – we entered Iraq ready to conduct state-of-the-art peace operations by the contemporary standard of the Kosovo and Afghanistan interventions.

    Rather, our main problem was insufficient occupation method (strategy, plans, tactics, techniques, procedures, etc.) for the particular non-permissive conditions of post-war Iraq mainly due to an institutional mindset, exemplified by the Powell Doctrine, that was handicapped by the political fall-out of the Vietnam War.

    But generally speaking, that’s not unusual. The military is often compelled to adjust when an initial plan falls through against enemy contact on the ground. In relatively short order in Iraq, we caught up to the situation and the enemy with the Petraeus/Crocker-led counterinsurgency campaign. For historical context, the COIN Surge was roughly at the same point of our OIF peace operations as the 1948-1949 Berlin airlift in our post-WW2 peace operations.

    The standard of perfect preemptive anticipation, preparation, cost accounting, and execution that critics apply to OIF is ahistorical in military history. I agree we should do what we can beforehand to prepare. However, that the learning curve for victory in post-war Iraq was driven by necessity on the ground is consistent with military history. Our military has always undergone steep learning curves in war that have often included devastating setbacks, such as the battles of New York, First Manassas, Kasserine Pass, and Chosin Reservoir. The enemy teaches. OIF just demanded a steeper learning curve for the peace operations of the post-war, due to the kind of enemies that adapted to the institutional Powell Doctrine weakness, than the war that deposed Saddam’s regime.

    randyjet:
    “Instead he went about fabricating a poor excuse to invade”

    That assertion directly contradicts your view, “the cease fire agreement had to be enforced”. The law and policy for OIF plainly show that the casus belli was – as always – Iraq’s evidential material breach of the Gulf War ceasefire.

    UNSCR 1441 was a “final opportunity to comply with its [Iraq’s] disarmament obligations” (UNSCR 1441), or else, “it [Iraq] will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations” (UNSCR 1441). In 2002-2003, Saddam responded to his “final opportunity to comply” per UNSCR 1441 with “about 100 unresolved disarmament issues” (UNMOVIC) that, according to UNMOVIC, “in essence repeated” the unresolved disarmament issues that had triggered Operation Desert Fox in 1998.

    The Congressional instruction for the President’s determination to use force per section 3(b) of the 20002 AUMF was:

    In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a) to use force the President shall…make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that
    (1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq; and
    (2) acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations…

    The decision-point (eg, UNMOVIC) and subsequent (eg, Iraq Survey Group, Iraqi Perspectives Project) fact findings substantiate President Bush’s determination, transmitted to Congress on 18MAR03, “Because of the intransigence and defiance of the Iraqi regime, further continuation of these [diplomatic] efforts will neither adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq nor likely lead to enforcement of all relevant UNSC resolutions regarding Iraq.”

    Again, post hoc, the Iraq Survey Group reported, “the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions…we have clear evidence of his [Saddam’s] intent to resume WMD”.

    randyjet:
    “and refused to get serious about what was needed to occupy Iraq.”

    Incorrect. See Selected documents on post-war planning for Iraq, and related commentary, provided by (2001-2005) under secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith.

    Actually, the pre-war planning and preparation for our peace operations with Iraq were extensive and unprecedented (we usually enter a post-war ad hoc). Keep in mind that the Bush administration’s planning reached back through the HW Bush and Clinton administrations for whom regime change was implicit then explicit policy, then the legal-mandated solution if Saddam continued to breach the Gulf War ceasefire.

    President Bush’s commitment to the peace operations with Iraq was evident throughout his stewardship of OIF, especially with the COIN Surge, which Bush ordered despite intensive opposition, including from within his administration.

  4. We should never expect proper LOYALTY to one’s oath of office from any politician. We should demand that judges, inspectors general, military, police and especially intelligence personnel have supreme loyalty to the U.S. Constitution – which includes our Bill of Rights.

    We shouldn’t be shocked by some (not all) crooked politicians, we should be shocked that there are no real cops on the beat and no real judges enforcing the U.S. Constitution!

    How can you prosecute and imprison legal whistleblowers reporting the felony crime of torture, but not those that ordered torture? The justice system is a joke and most Americans know it that’s why they don’t care about phony indictments.

  5. randyjet:
    “Sanders was correct in voting against the Iraq War because he knew that Bush and company were lying SOBs who would screw things up.”

    Incorrect. See the answer to “Did Bush lie his way to war with Iraq?”.

    On the law and the facts, the decision for OIF was correct. The casus belli was (as always) the Saddam regime’s evidential material breach of the Gulf War ceasefire, including and especially the disarmament mandates of UNSCR 687, terrorism mandates of UNSR 687, and humanitarian mandates of UNSCR 688.

    At the decision point for OIF, UNMOVIC confirmed Iraq had not disarmed as mandated.

    Post hoc, the Iraq Survey Group corroborated the UNMOVIC confirmation – “ISG judges that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs…the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions…we have clear evidence of his [Saddam’s] intent to resume WMD…the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories” – and confirmed Saddam was in fact rearming in violation of UNSCR 687 – “From 1999 until he was deposed in April 2003, Saddam’s conventional weapons and WMD-related procurement programs steadily grew in scale, variety, and efficiency“.

    randyjet:
    “Clinton was correct in my view because the cease fire agreement had to be enforced.”

    That means ipso facto you support President Bush. The President enforced the ceasefire terms in close compliance with the Congressional instruction in the 2002 AUMF.

    The problem is apparent: you’ve been fundamentally misled by Clinton and other Democratic leaders about the operative enforcement procedure for the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) for the Gulf War ceasefire that President Bush carried forward from President Clinton and properly upheld in response to the determinative fact findings that confirmed Iraq’s “continued violations of its obligations” (UNSCR 1441), including and especially the 06MAR03 UNMOVIC report to the UN Security Council.

    randyjet:
    “Powell, later considered his speech at the UN to be the LOW point of his career.”

    That’s unfortunate, because that view is unjustified.

    Although several emphases on the pre-war intelligence in Powell’s 05FEB03 UNSC speech were off the mark and panned in the politics, on the fact record – knowing what we know now – Powell’s presentation actually holds up well. On the main points of his case presentation against Saddam, Powell was correct nearly across the board.

    Of foundational importance, Powell correctly reiterated the burden of proof and standard of compliance with the UNSCR 1441 inspections, and that enforcement would be triggered by Saddam’s failure to comply and disarmed as mandated – which is what happened in response primarily to the 27JAN03 Blix UNSC update and follow-up 06MAR03 UNMOVIC report to the UNSC.

  6. randyjet:
    “Bush was …. wrong to attack after the inspectors had gone in which was the purpose of it.”

    Incorrect. Your misrepresentation is akin to saying the purpose of arranging surgery is for a doctor to go into the operating room. To understand the plainly stated “purpose of [UNSCR 1441]” and the UNSCR 687/1441-mandated role of the UN inspectors, see the answer to “Did Bush allow enough time for the inspections?”.

    While UNSCR 1441 recalled all the Gulf War ceasefire mandates and reiterated the need for Saddam to comply with all of them, the operative scope of UNSCR 1441 was “bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council” (UNSCR 1441) with “full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations” (UNSCR 1441) in a “final opportunity to comply” (UNSCR 1441), or else, “it [Iraq] will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations” (UNSCR 1441).

    Keep in mind – if we set aside the operative scope of UNSCR 1441 and focus on Clinton’s vote for the 2002 AUMF – that the operative scope of the 2002 AUMF was not limited to the ceasefire disarmament process. Congress instructed the President to “ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq” (PL 107-243).

    The 2002 AUMF is clear that Congress expected the President to “promptly and strictly” enforce Iraq’s compliance with the full range of UNSCRs 687, 688, 949, and the rest of the UNSCR 660-series resolutions, with emphasis on the disarmament and terrorism mandates of UNSCR 687. The evidence shows that Iraq was in material breach across the board of the Gulf War ceasefire mandates, including the disarmament and terrorism mandates.

    For example, the Iraqi Perspectives Project (2007) confirmed Saddam’s “regional and global terrorism” that included “considerable overlap” with al Qaeda:

    Captured Iraqi documents have uncovered evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations.
    … When attacking Western interests, the competitive terror cartel came into play, particularly in the late 1990s. Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda-as long as that organization’s near-term goals supported Saddam’s long-term vision.

    tnash80hotmailcom:
    “Hans Blix himself said basically that the Iraqis were sort of cooperating.”

    As you allude to, the “sort of cooperating” that Blix described in his oral response fell short of the cooperation required by the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) and was consistent with the “tactics of delay and deception” (President Clinton, 17FEB98) that had frustrated President Clinton and the UNSCOM inspections.

    More significant to the President’s decision for OIF, here’s what Blix stated in the official UNMOVIC report conveyed to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003:

    As earlier mentioned, after the defection of Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamal in August 1995, Iraq provided new chemical, biological and missile declarations. And on 7 December 2002, Iraq provided a further declaration that in essence repeated the information in the earlier declarations.
    Little of the detail in these declarations, such as production quantities, dates of events and unilateral destruction activities, can be confirmed. Such information is critical to an assessment of the status of disarmament. Furthermore, in some instances, UNMOVIC has information that conflicts with the information in the declaration.

    In other words, instead of “full and immediate compliance by Iraq … bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process” (UNSCR 1441), Iraq’s declarations to UNMOVIC “in essence repeated” (UNMOVIC) the deficiency of “information [that] is critical to an assessment of the status of disarmament” (UNMOVIC) from Iraq’s declarations to UNSCOM. The 06MAR03 UNMOVIC Clusters document triggered Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 in the same way that the 15DEC98 UNSCOM Butler report confirmed Iraq’s material breach and triggered Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.

    The “full and immediate” ceasefire-mandated disarmament was only the 1st step of Saddam’s “final opportunity to comply” in 2002-2003. Yet according to Hans Blix and UNMOVIC, the Saddam regime failed to satisfy even the 1st step of the 1st step of proving the compliance and disarmament mandated by UNSCRs 687 and 1441: a verified total declaration that accounted for Iraq’s entire WMD-related program, which was the baseline-setting step of the declare/yield/eliminate-under-international-supervision disarmament process that Iraq had been obligated to provide within 15 days – in April 1991.

    Mrs. Clinton’s ‘evolved’ spin on her vote for the 2002 AUMF and the President’s decision for OIF has misled randyjet and many others on the why of the Iraq intervention.

    1. Eric ……I think we agree on the U.N./legal basis for Gulf War II, based largely on the near-universal belief that there were large stockpiles of WMDs.
      And the lack of full and immediate cooperation after the inspectors reentered Iraq.
      I think the far weaker basis for war was Saddam’s alleged ties to Al Qaeda. My feeling was that there was a need to demonstrate both the WMD non-compliance AND a real link to Al Qaeda.
      With an ongoing war in Afghanistan, and a downsized military, I thought it was a mistake to dislodge Saddam.
      I suspect that the Bush administration could gave more easily presented evidence of Al Qaeda links to our “allies”, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, than to Saddam’s Iraq.
      Those links might form to legal basis for invading Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, but there are huge burden on, and limits to, what our military can do in occupying/pacifying a country after taking out a regime.
      In short, having a legal basis for an invasion doesn’t mean that it’s sensible foreign policy.

  7. Why are you not also addressing Trump’s position attacking the rule of law and the judiciary?

  8. Randyjet……you said that Bush should not have onvaded Iraq “…..once the goals had been achieved”
    The voal, and the demands, of U.N. Res.1441 was to give Saddam one last chance for full and immediate compliance on the WMD issue.
    Hans Blix himself said basically that the Iraqis were sort of cooperating.
    So if the voal was merely to re-insert WMD inspectors, one COULD argue that “the goals had been acheived”.
    Under 1441, they had not been fulfilled. I think the perception was that the inspectors would once again
    continue to be jerked around, as they had been prior to withdrawing in 1998.

  9. Politicians change their minds on things when it looks like a losing cause. So WHAT and what else is new? Sanders was correct in voting against the Iraq War because he knew that Bush and company were lying SOBs who would screw things up. Clinton was correct in my view because the cease fire agreement had to be enforced. So it is not a black and white situation. Both were right in their votes for different reasons. Had Bush followed the initial reason for the build-up and not invaded once the goals had been achieved, Sanders would have been shown to be wrong. The irony is that if Bush had not spit on the military and gone with the Army’s estimate for the numbers needed to invade and occupy, he might have succeeded. Instead he went about fabricating a poor excuse to invade and refused to get serious about what was needed to occupy Iraq. Powell, later considered his speech at the UN to be the LOW point of his career. At least he had enough honesty to be ashamed for what he did. So I have no problem with Clinton NOW saying her vote was a mistake. At least she admitted to a mistake, which kicks Turley’s slander down the drain about her being unable to admit one and it is another major difference with Tricky Dick.

    1. One of the more damaging statements that John Kerry made in the 2004 campaign was that he was for Gulf War II before he was against it ( or visa-versa).
      That’s the kind of “flexibilty” that tries to simultaneously justify Sanders as correct in voting against the war, and Hillary as correct in voting for the war.

  10. I think history will be more fair to Nixon than the present day media and so called historians. To compare Hillary to Nixon is defamation to Nixon.
    Right now on C-span there is some abrasive female named Eliz Warren giving a speech at some graduation pagent. She is really obnoxious. She and Hillary– birds of a feather flock together. This speech is making me puke. I am changing the channel.

  11. Hillary has a secret teflon shield: Israel. Israel is also a big reason why the Clinton Grift Foundation won’t face any serious charges.

    Nixon was removed in what has been aptly labeled a Silent Coup. Blame goes to Bob Woodward and John Dean.

    The media and the public focus on the popular vote – which is regularly rigged. Smart people focus on the Electoral College – which institution was designed to further serve and protect the interests of the Ruling Class in the unlikely event that people such as Bernie, Dr. Jill Stein, or Gary Johnson become a threat to the established order.

  12. This article should have come with a spoiler alert. Namely my dinner.
    Sorry, but I think the fact that most of her aides are uber achieving uber educated ass rimming sycophants just looking for their next administration job makes the HRC show so pathetic. Thehouse of Windsor and their inbred claim to power comes to mind.It ain’t about us.

  13. Elton

    Ronald Rump wrote the Star Trek episode “The Rouble with Ribbles.”

    1. The Rouble with Ribbles is one of the great episodes of Star Trek. 🙂

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