Below is my column in USA Today on the striking similarities between Richard Nixon and Hillary Clinton, particularly with regard to the staffers surrounding them. Both tended to blame others about being, to paraphrase Nixon, “kicked around.” However, there are deeper and rather disturbing patterns emerging that are shared by the two leaders in my view.
It has taken almost 50 years, but the Democrats have finally found their inner Nixon. Make no mistake about it: Hillary Clinton is the most Nixonian figure in the post-Watergate period. Indeed, Democrats appear to have reached the type of moral compromise that Nixon waited, unsuccessfully, for Republicans to accept: Some 71% of Democrats want Clinton to run even if indicted.
While Obama could be criticized for embracing Nixon’s imperial presidency model, his personality could not be more different from his predecessor. Clinton however is the whole Nixonian package. On a policy level, her predilection for using executive and military power is even coupled with praise for (and from) Nixon’s secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. However, it is on a personality level that the comparison is so striking and so unnerving. Clinton, like Nixon, is known to be both secretive and evasive. She seems to have a compulsive resistance to simply acknowledging conflicting facts or changes in position. She only makes admissions against interest when there is no alternative to acknowledging the truth in a controversy.
Clinton’s history of changing positions and spinning facts is now legendary. Indeed, a video entitled “Hillary Clinton lying for 13 minutes straight” has become an Internet sensation with millions of viewers. Polls show Clinton with record lows for her perceived honesty and trustworthiness. (In fairness, Trump fares little better). Clinton seems entirely comfortable denying facially true facts. For example, she spent much of a year assuring the public that she was fully cooperating with investigators into her use of an unsecure server for her communications as secretary of State. Indeed, she used her claimed cooperation as the reason that she would not answer more questions. When the State Department Inspector General issued its highly critical report on the scandal, many were shocked to learn that Clinton not only refused to speak at all with investigators but so did her top aides. Where Clinton repeatedly said that her use was allowed by the State Department, the report said that the rule was clearly violated, she never received approval for such a security breach and that a personal server would never have been accepted.
Of course, politicians are not known for their allegiance to the truth, and Clinton may be a standout in that group, but she is hardly unique among her peers. However, that tendency is often checked by a staff that forces politicians to recognize reality and even the truth of controversy.
The problem is that Clinton has surrounded herself with aides who have demonstrated an unflagging loyalty and veneration. Take Huma Abedin, perhaps her most influential aide. Abedin described her first meeting on the “Call Your Girlfriend” podcast: “She walked by and she shook my hand and our eyes connected, and I just remember having this moment where I thought; ‘Wow, this is amazing. And … it just inspired me. You know, I still remember the look on her face. And it’s funny, and she would probably be so annoyed that I say this, but I remember thinking; ‘Oh my God, she’s so beautiful and she’s so little!'”
Adebin’s breathless account is similar to communications of other aides who fawn in emails to Clinton over her speeches, dress and demeanor. In the released emails, former National Security Council adviser Liz Sherwood-Randall asked that an aide pass along her praise of Clinton’s performance at a hearing:
“If you get a chance — please tell HRC that she was a ROCK STAR yesterday. Everything about her ‘performance’ was what makes her unique, beloved, and destined for even more greatness. She sets a standard that lesser mortals can only dream of emulating.”
(In 2014, Sherwood-Randall was made the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy.) Emails from other close aides like Lanny Davis and Sidney Blumenthal show the same level of constant stroking and exaltation.
It is certainly true that Washington’s powerful have always attracted a circle of sycophants. Indeed, the most powerful figures often seem to need continual stroking from underlings and there can be a race to the bottom as aides outdo each other in their adoring rhetoric.
What is so concerning is that Clinton seems to invite such expressions of absolute loyalty and reverence. The question is whether there is a John Dean willing to walk into her office and tell her of a cancer growing within the White House. After years of scandals and investigations, Clinton has distilled a team down to the truest believers who have little difficulty repeating truth-defying spins or refusing to cooperate with investigators.
Indeed, recently, top Clinton aides took the notable step of agreeing to be represented by the same lawyers in both the criminal and civil investigations into the email scandal. That is a move that can greatly assure a more uniform account in the testimony of Clinton aides. It is also a move that rejects potential conflicts between aides in both their recollections and interests. In the most recent depositions, that joint counsel instructed key aide Cheryl Mills to simply refuse to answer most of the questions about the reasons and arrangements made for the use of a personal server at the State Department. So far Clinton’s top aides have remained a uniform front.
It is hard not to think of Nixon aides like John Ehrlichman and H.R. Haldeman in the “palace guard” surrounding Nixon. They should be a cautionary tale for all of these aides. Ehrlichman would later look back and marvel at the loss of his own sense of self and independence: “I, in effect, abdicated my moral judgments and turned them over to somebody else.”
My greatest concern is not that a President Clinton will continue a pattern of false statements but that her aides will gradually forget the difference between what is true and what is not.
Jonathan Turley is the Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George Washington University and a member of USA TODAY’s Board of Contributors.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“What he said was we we all mostly all wrong.
It doesn’t get any clearer than that.”
That’s my point – the issue does get clearer.
When we unpack the issue, we see that the pre-war estimates relied on the established fact (track) record of Iraq’s proscribed armament, indicators that were confirmed by ISG, and the UNSCR 687/1441 disarmament process, which was designed for total account by Iraq with verification by UN inspectors. Thus, Iraq’s failure to disarm as mandated, confirmed by Kay, was itself a key factor in the pre-war estimates.
It’s also worth noting that many of the ISG findings that discredit the pre-war estimates – such as the blockquote in my comment to you on June 7, 2016 at 3:35 pm – are heavily qualified in the ISG Duelfer report. So the post-war criticism of the pre-war estimates relies on qualified conclusions that aren’t on much firmer ground than the pre-war estimates that they’re used to criticize.
Nonetheless, the ISG findings are the basis we have to judge, so “the intel mostly wrong about Iraqi WMDs” is a fair characterization of the pre-war estimates. If the post-war criticism leads to better intelligence tradecraft, then that’s beneficial.
However, knowing what we know now, “the intel mostly wrong about Iraqi WMDs” is not a fair characterization of the pre-war intelligence as a whole. The pre-war intelligence correctly indicated the Saddam regime was engaged in proscribed armament and terrorist activity that breached the Gulf War ceasefire.
The error made by the Bush administration with the pre-war intelligence was emphasizing the intelligence in the public presentation, which deviated from Clinton’s public presentation, and representing the intelligence as “evidence” with the legalistic implications of that term rather than as ‘indicators’, which is the normal role of intelligence.
Excerpt:
Eric.
…I can’t see that you’ve made the issue any clearer.
Nothing you said alters the conclusions by David Kay and Charles Duelfer that the prewar intelligence was mostly incorrect.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“Kay quit after concluding that the intel on WMDs was incorrect”
Actually, this is what Kay concluded in his update to the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004:
Again, the question of the predictive precision of the pre-war intelligence estimates is not the same as the question of whether Iraq complied and disarmed as mandated (which was the principal trigger for OIF) and the question of whether Iraq was rearming in violation of UNSCR 687.
Kay and Duelfer’s ISG findings show the pre-war intelligence estimates were off the mark, but more significant to the operative enforcement procedure for and policy consideration of the Gulf War ceasefire, the ISG findings also show Iraq did not disarm as mandated and was in fact rearming in violation of UNSCR 687.
Eric…….I was familiar with the testimony of David Kay to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Jan. 2004.
That’s the testimony in which he said “we were almost all wrong” and “I include myself here” on the pre-Gulf War WMD assessments.
I have repeatedly agreed with you that Saddam was in violation of U.N. Resolution 1441, irrespective of what was or was not subsequently found.
We are going around in circles here when you keep “reminding me” that Saddam was in violation of Res. 1441.
I also have never said that no WMDs were ever found. What I HAVE said, and what I have quoted from David Kay and Charles Duelfer, is that they both concluded that pre-war estimates of Iraqi WMDs were way off the mark.
Before you remind again the lack of “predictive precision of prewar intelligence”, I will once again state that I realize that Gulf War II was launched based on actual violations of 1441, as well as imprecise (to say the least) prewar estimates of Saddam’s WMD.
While the history of Gulf War II is likely not complete, at the end of the day there are summaries given (subject to future revision or criticism, based on something that might surface at a future date.
David Kay, for example, summarized his conclusions, not by saying “hey, look at all of the WMDs we found” .
I think Kay woukd have had some satisfaction if what he had found in Iraq matched his prewar beliefs on WMDs.
What he said was we we all mostly all wrong.
It doesn’t get any clearer than that.
So I’ll stick by my previous statement that David Kay concluded that there was largely incorrect intel on the issue of Iraqi WMDs.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“I have a bit of a backlog in reading all of the links….will try to catch up on those soon.”
I encourage it. To cut through the conjecture, misinformation, and misleading second-hand commentary in order to understand the actual why of the Iraq intervention, it’s necessary to survey the primary sources and chief corroborative sources for yourself. My OIF FAQ explanation is essentially a cheat sheet synthesized from the primary sources, and enhanced with chief corroborative sources, but like any other cheat sheet, it’s not a substitute for first-hand familiarity.
A reason to survey the primary sources is to recognize the various shortcomings of subject matter experts, such as Dr. Duelfer’s surprisingly shaky grasp of the law and policy grounds that controlled Presidents Clinton and Bush’s decisions for Operations Desert Fox and Iraqi Freedom.
Another reason is that by reviewing the ISG Duelfer report, you’ll recognize that of the 3 WMD-related issues – US pre-war estimates, Iraq’s mandated disarmament, and Iraqi proscribed re-armament – the ISG Duelfer report shows that our pre-war estimates were off the mark and Iraq did not (and would not) disarm as mandated and data indicators of Iraqi proscribed re-armament – eg, Iraq’s “large covert procurement program” and “rebuilding his [Saddam’s] military-industrial complex” – were confirmed by ISG.
In the politics, the focus has been on the US pre-war estimates. But for the Presidential determination obligated by the 2002 AUMF et al and the actual casus belli for OIF, the focus was on Iraq’s mandated compliance and disarmament. Largely overshadowed in the politics by the focus on the US pre-war estimates has been the Iraq Survey Group confirmation of Iraqi proscribed re-armament.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“The Iraqis could not understand why the U.S. didn’t see the value in reconciling with Baghdad after 9-11.
The Iraqis thought that things lined up; they were Western-leaning, they were secular; they were in the heart of the Middle East, they had huge oil reserves.”
In other words, an appeal to the rationale of the US approach to Iraq in the period following the Iran revolution and before UNSCR 660 (1990), the Gulf War, and Gulf War ceasefire.
That’s Saddam’s sociopathic lack of self-awareness. In light of his track record, his overt reaction to the 9/11 attacks has something to do with discrediting Iraq’s latter diplomacy, not to mention Saddam’s own AQ-rivaling, AQ-supporting “regional and global terrorism” that was a “formal instrument of state power” (IPP).
See the answers to “Why not free a noncompliant Saddam?”. Also see the answer to “Did Iraq failing its compliance test justify the regime change?”.
For the US and UN, the Gulf War was a watershed for the international relationship with Iraq. But for Saddam, the Gulf War was business as usual, thus he “could not understand” the altered status of Iraq due to the Gulf War, which speaks to the essential reason that Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, Bush rejected Saddam’s post-Gulf War “entreaties”.
Again, as Secretary of State Albright summarized the updated Clinton 2nd term policy on Iraq on March 26, 1997, “Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions. It can only do that by complying with all of the Security Council resolutions to which it is subject.”
The fundamental issue in the Gulf War ceasefire was the essential character of the Saddam regime. The Gulf War ceasefire disarmament, terrorism, humanitarian, etc, measures weren’t at their heart about disarmament, etc. Rather, they spoke to dangerous symptoms of the cancer that the ceasefire was purposed to cure. The ceasefire measures were designed to rehabilitate the essential character of the “Government of Iraq” so that Iraq could be trusted with the peace. As such, the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) couldn’t be negotiated away like Saddam wanted.
To be fair to Saddam’s poor judgement on the matter, Saddam’s noncompliant negotiation approach did work with Russia, France, China and other nations to break the ‘containment’ without the mandated compliance and disarmament. The “Regime Finance and Procurement” section of the Iraq Survey Group Duelfer report details the Saddam regime’s nearly completed defeat of the sanctions and ‘containment’ that was averted with OIF.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“Iraqis would make quiet entreaties to me [Duelfer] and others to the White House, saying that they would be our best friend if only Washington would talk to them”.
To clarify, the “quiet entreaties” that Duelfer described in 2009 while selling his book, “Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq” (2009), weren’t citing Iraqi overtures during the 2002-2003 lead-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, but rather from Duelfer’s experience as an UNSCOM inspector in the 1998 lead-up to Operation Desert Fox. Though Iraq did try again.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“I don’t know if Duelfer or others responded to the Iraqis’ overtures, but unless Saddam was also willing to fully comply with the U.N. resolutions we have discussed, serious negotiations could not progress.”
Duelfer didn’t have the capacity to respond officially since he was a UN inspector, not a US envoy, but he passed on the news to Clinton officials.
The overtures weren’t a new development in 1998 or 2002-2003. Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush did respond to the overtures – they each expressed a willingness to work with the Saddam regime if, and only if, Saddam complied and disarmed as mandated.
Presidents HW Bush, Clinton, and Bush were consistent and clear that due to Saddam’s track record on critical areas across the board, the rehabilitative purpose of the Gulf War ceasefire, and the “continuing violations of its [Iraq’s] obligations” (UNSCR 1441), Iraq’s mandated compliance and disarmament was the minimum standard for establishing the rational basis for a normal US-Iraq relationship.
Whether “we may have missed an opportunity to negotiate with the Iraqis” is related to a question we discussed before: was the ultimate purpose of the Gulf War ceasefire to avoid further confrontation with Iraq, or was the purpose of the comprehensive character of the ceasefire an effective Iraq regime change with or without Saddam.
Nothing in the legal and presidential record of the US-led Gulf War ceasefire enforcement – including HW Bush’s record – shows less than full commitment to Iraq’s mandated compliance and disarmament.
An “opportunity to negotiate with the Iraqis” assumes Saddam was a usual unsavory but rational actor, dealing with which is normal for US diplomacy and shaped the initial American approach to the Iran-Iraq War.
However, Saddam proved to be an aggressive irrational actor with dangerously poor judgement. Negotiating away the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) to free an unreconstructed ambitious noncompliant Saddam with his dangerously poor judgement would have been a great risk and an abdication of American leadership in the defining US-led international enforcement of the post-Cold War (including 9/11) era.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“My conclusions about the lack of a Saddam-Al Qaeda collaboration are based on the findings of the 9-11 Commission, the DOD/Pentagon report, and the CIA’s findings.
To the best of my knowledge, they all concluded that Saddam had no alliance with Al Qaeda.”
The reports you cite do, in different ways, speak against a “smoking gun-direct connection” partnership between Saddam and bin Laden. However, those reports found (IPP), support (9-11 Commission), or don’t address (2005 CIA update) the Saddam-AQ “considerable overlap” (IPP) alliance.
First, the “DOD/Pentagon report” is the Iraqi Perspectives Project report.
IPP found “Saddam was willing to use, albeit cautiously, operatives affiliated with al Qaeda” – “Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda” – “Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al Qaeda…or that generally shared al Qaeda’s stated goals and objectives”, etc.
You might insist that only a “smoking gun-direct connection” partnership between Saddam and bin Laden is an alliance (although the “considerable overlap” between Saddam’s terrorism and al Qaeda network also meets a dictionary definition of alliance), but the “considerable overlap” between Saddam’s terrorism and the AQ network reported by IPP is certainly collaboration.
Second, here’s the link to the 9-11 Commission Yaphe briefing on the issue.
Keep in mind that the 9-11 Commission Yaphe briefing is based on pre-OIF analysis; as such, it falls noticeably short of the data on Saddam’s terrorism in the IPP analysis of captured regime materials. Even so, while lacking IPP’s data, the Yaphe briefing conceptually supports the IPP findings that Saddam was a prolific terrorist in his own right, Saddam’s record evidenced the will to direct terrorism at the US, and Saddam would collaborate with al Qaeda affiliates, albeit a “smoking gun-direct connection” partnership between Saddam and bin Laden was unlikely.
Third, regarding the 2005 CIA update, I haven’t read that report directly, only accounts of it. But my understanding is that the 2005 CIA update was narrowly focused on the Saddam-Zarqawi link and did not address the issue of a wider Saddam-AQ collaboration like the “considerable overlap” between Saddam’s terrorism and the al Qaeda network that was reported by IPP and conceptually supported by the 9-11 Commission Yaphe briefing.
Again, in terms of casus belli, the IPP finding of Saddam’s “regional and global terrorism”, which included but was not limited to collaboration with the al Qaeda network, breached UNSCR 687, threatened US national security interests in light of Saddam’s track record in combination with Saddam’s other ceasefire violations, substantiated the terrorism basis of the administration case against Saddam (which had cited but was not limited to a Saddam-Zarqawi link), and was well within the Congressional standard to use force in the 2002 AUMF.
Eric………Thanks for your postings, and the links.
I’m travelling now, so I have a bit of a backlog in reading all of the links….will try to catch up on those soon.
You probably read the Feb. 2009 interview Charles Duelfer (head of the ISG) had with U.S. News and World Report.
One comment he made was especially interesting:
“The Iraqis could not understand why the U.S. didn’t see the value in reconciling with Baghdad after 9-11.
The Iraqis thought that things lined up; they were Western-leaning, they were secular; they were in the heart of the Middle East, they had huge oil reserves.
Iraqis would make quiet entreaties to me and others to the White House, saying that they would be our best friend if only Washington would talk to them”.
IF Duelfer’s comments are accurate, and IF the Iraqis were actually sincere about a reconciliation with the U.S., we may have missed an opportunity to negotiate with the Iraqis.
I don’t know if Duelfer or others responded to the Iraqis’ overtures, but unless Saddam was also willing to fully comply with the U.N. resolutions we have discussed, serious negotiations could not progress.
It would be interesting to learn more about the “back-channel” communications between Iraqi and the U.S. after 9-11.
So far she seams to be doing a pretty good job of defeating the right wing nutters
I’d take Nixon any day over Hitler (Trump)
tnash80hotmailcom:
“the pre-war intel on Iraq WMDs was mostly incorrect.”
Again, the question of the predictive precision of the pre-war intelligence estimates is not the same question as whether Saddam disarmed as mandated and whether Saddam was rearming in violation of UNSCR 687.
The ISG Duelfer report shows all three: the pre-war intelligence estimates were off the mark, Saddam did not (and would not) disarm as mandated, and Saddam intended to and was in fact rearming in violation of UNSCR 687.
Despite the political exploitation, the pre-war intelligence estimates were not the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) nor were they a burden of proof for the US that narrowed the scope of enforcement with Iraq.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“The highlighting itself was a firm of “cherry picking”, and the conclusion about the lack of a Saddam-Al Qaeda alliance was relegated to “unhighlighted” status.”
Again, it depends on how narrowly you define “alliance”.
You’re defining alliance as a Saddam-bin Laden “direct connection” ‘treaty’ partnership. IPP reports a Saddam-AQ “considerable overlap” alliance, which IPP analogizes to the relationship between the Cali and Medellin drug cartels.
Whatever you call the relationship between Saddam’s terrorism and the AQ network, that “Saddam was willing to use, albeit cautiously, operatives affiliated with al Qaeda” – “Captured documents reveal that the regime was willing to co-opt or support organizations it knew to be part of al Qaeda” – “Saddam supported groups that either associated directly with al Qaeda … or that generally shared al Qaeda’s stated goals and objectives”, is a substantial and compelling Saddam-AQ relationship.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“I read “beyond the headlines”, from a variety of sources, and have never found any clear evidence of a Saddam-Al Qaeda alliance.”
It appears as though that rather than review the primary and chief corroborative sources for OIF, including the Iraqi Perspectives Project report, directly, you’ve relied on second-hand commentary that often seems to have misrepresented them.
To remedy that, primary, chief corroborative, and various background sources for OIF are cataloged and linked here.
Eric…..when time, bandwith allotment, and battery life allow, I’ll read the material you referenced her.
My conclusions about the lack of a Saddam-Al Qaeda collaberation are based on the findings of the 9-11 Commission, the DOD/Pentagon report, and the CIA’s findings.
To the best of my knowledge, they all concluded that Saddam had no alliance with Al Qaeda.
Eric
…the statements and testimony of David Kay, his successor Charles Duelfer, and others concluded that the pre-war intel on Iraq WMDs was mostly incorrect.
Duelfer’s interview with U.S. news and World Report on the WMD issue made it clear that he concluded, as head of ISG, that the intel mostly wrong about Iraqi WMDs.
The extended piece that supposedly supported the terrorist threat Saddam posed to America(from the IPP, I think) had certain sections highlight in yellow.
The sentence concluding that there was no Saddam-Al Qaeda alliance is in that report, but that sentence was not highlighted.
The highlighting itself was a firm of “cherry picking”, and the conclusion about the lack of a Saddam-Al Qaeda alliance was relegated to “unhighlighted” status.
As of yet, I have seen nothing that points to a direct terrorist threat or alliance by Saddam that warranted an invasion and extended occupation.
Nick and Eric……in my experience, people who are blindly partisan are not likely to be swayed by facts.
We saw earlier statements about Hillary being correct in voting for the Gulf War II Resolution, and Sanders being correct in voting against that resolution.
And Kerry being correct as he attempted to straddle both sides of resolution, being “for and against” it.
A wave of the wand revision of facts will allow some to claim, and believe, that “no WMDs were found”,
and that the inspectors who returned to Iraq in 2002 got full access and cooperation from the Iraqis.
I have previously quoted Hans Blix’s Feb. 2003 report to the U.N., and he expressed strong reservations, even at that late date, that the Iraqis fully appreciated the need for complete cooperation.
While I don’t think Gulf War II was sound foreign policy, the “Bush lied” crowd has largely hammered and distorted and ignored facts.
tnash80hotmailcom:
“I think an area that should have been highlighted was the statement that “This study found no “smoking gun” (i.e. direct connection) between Saddam’s Iraq and Al Qaeda. …In other words, the terrorist “case” made was the supposed Al Qaeda alliance threat”
C’mon – I know what excerpts I pulled from the Iraqi Perspectives Project report. Now you’re obviously cherry-picking.
You’re also circling back to an increasingly narrow terrorism basis for OIF that’s not the terrorism basis that’s spelled out in the law and policy of OIF. You also seem to have summarily dropped the overarching Gulf War ceasefire enforcement basis for OIF, including UNSCR 949, while dismissing that US national security includes our allies and interests, which has included the Reagan Corollary to the Carter Doctrine that led us to intervene with Iraq in the 1st place in 1990-1991. IPP characterizes Saddam’s “regional and global terrorism” as a regional (and global) threat that he employed as a “formal instrument of state power” (IPP).
Like I said to you before, it depends on how narrowly you define “alliance”.
IPP reports that Saddam’s terrorism had “considerable overlap” (IPP) alliance with the AQ network (definition: a merging of efforts or interests, eg, an alliance between church and state) as opposed to a direct per se ‘treaty’ – ie, ““smoking gun” (i.e. direct connection)” – alliance with bin Laden (definition: a formal agreement or treaty between two or more nations to cooperate for specific purposes).
From the perspective of AQ rather than Saddam’s terrorism, Saddam’s “considerable overlap” alliance with the AQ network was plenty dangerous considering, “The nature of al Qaeda and its associated movements makes establishing firm organizational connections difficult. Many terrorism experts have noted al Qaeda’s increasing use of “sympathetic affiliates” to carry out its radical Salafi vision” (IPP).
Sample of US national security and al Qaeda-related excerpts from the IPP report:
Oops. Fix for my comment on June 7, 2016 at 9:06 pm:
The questions of the predictive precision of the pre-war intelligence estimates and whether Iraq proved the ceasefire-mandated compliance and disarmament are related [to], but they’re also not the same question as whether Saddam was rearming in violation of UNSCR 687.
Nick Spinelli:
“Eric, You’re wasting your intellect and time trying to have a discussion w/ the flyboy. Many have learned the hard way.”
I disagree.
My comments aren’t meant only for randyjet to digest. If from my comments, you and other JT regulars gain a better understanding for the actual why of the Iraq intervention and learn to flag the demonstrably false narrative of OIF that has fundamentally misled randyjet, then that’s productive use of my time.
The key for randyjet coming around to the truth of matter is his position, “Clinton was correct [to vote for the 2002 AUMF] in my view because the cease fire agreement had to be enforced.”
Like I said to him upthread, his view on the issue means ipso facto randyjet supports President Bush because the President enforced the Gulf War ceasefire terms in close compliance with the Congressional instruction in the 2002 AUMF.
tnashhotmail80com,
The blockquote in my comment to you on June 7, 2016 at 3:35 pm is taken from the ISG Duelfer report. I’ve been citing and quoting the Gulf War ceasefire UNSCRs, the US law and policy that enforced the UNSCRs, and the UNMOVIC, ISG, IPP, and UNCHR reports.
tnashhotmail80com:
“If there is something buried in the 1200-1500 page ISG report that is at odds with what Duelfer repeatedly stated, please cite it.”
Go here for excerpts from the Iraq Survey Group Duelfer report.
tnashhotmail80com:
“And or the Saddam terrorist link.”
Go here for excerpts from the Iraqi Perspectives Project report.
Keep in mind that after the Gulf War, the intelligence agencies were tasked primarily to aid the UN inspections within the scope of the UNSCR 687 disarmament measures. In the ceasefire enforcement process, the baseline for the post-Gulf War intelligence on Iraq became the fact record developed with the UNSCR 687 inspections, which as we know now, became a problematic dependency for intelligence assessment after 1998. The pre-OIF intelligence estimates then adjusted with the UN inspections once they resumed under UNSCR 1441.
The view that Saddam still possessed stocks was based primarily on the fact that Saddam had not accounted for and disposed of them as mandated. Then add Saddam’s “bluff” and large-scale acquisition of proscribed items, including components that indicated the “mobile production facilities used to make biological agents” that Secretary Powell cited in his 05FEB03 UNSC speech.
If Saddam had disarmed as mandated, then the UNMOVIC verification would have constituted the principal intelligence estimate on Iraq’s WMD. But Saddam did not disarm as mandated with the UNSCR 1441 inspections.
The conclusion of the Silberman-Robb Commission is that within the scope of the post hoc ISG findings, the pre-war intelligence estimates are shown to be off the mark. As you cited, Kay and Duelfer agree with that assessment. But in the ISG Duelfer report, many of the findings are heavily qualified rather than unequivocal – for example, the blockquote in my comment to you on June 7, 2016 at 3:35 pm. However, the ISG report caveats have fallen away in the political discourse.
That being said, the question of whether Saddam was armed matching the pre-war intelligence estimates, which is the question that’s addressed in your references to Kay and Duelfer, is a different question than whether Saddam disarmed as mandated. ISG corroborated UNMOVIC’s findings that Iraq did not disarm as mandated. By procedure, the trigger for enforcement was determined by whether Iraq complied and disarmed as mandated, not the intelligence. The pre-war intelligence estimates were compelling and cited as such by Bush officials, but they were not the casus belli – which Duelfer and other ostensible subject matter experts often get wrong despite the straightforward law, policy, precedent, and fact record that controlled the decision for OIF.
The condition overlooked in the discourse on OIF is the intelligence could be off the mark and Saddam could be guilty of the material breach that triggered enforcement at the same time because the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) was set by the UNSC resolutions, not the intelligence. UNSCOM and UNMOVIC tested Iraq’s compliance according to UNSCR 687, not the intelligence. Iraq failed to prove to the UNSCR 1441 inspections that Saddam was compliant and disarmed to the standard mandated by UNSCR 687 and related resolutions, which meant Iraq’s established and presumed guilt of proscribed armament remained uncured. Then, notwithstanding the shortcomings in the pre-war intelligence, “ISG judge[d] that Iraq failed to comply with UNSCRs”.
The questions of the predictive precision of the pre-war intelligence estimates and whether Iraq proved the ceasefire-mandated compliance and disarmament are related, but they’re also not the same question as whether Saddam was rearming in violation of UNSCR 687.
According to the ISG findings, the answer to the 3rd question is yes – Saddam was in fact rearming in violation of UNSCR 687. The pre-war intelligence estimates were off the mark, but their indication that the Saddam regime was engaged in ceasefire-proscribed armament and terrorist activity was correct.
Eric…..I think an area that should have been highlighted was the statement that “This study found no “smoking gun” (i.e. direct connection) between Saddam’s Iraq and Al Qaeda.
It’s true that Saddam supported, for example, Palestinian suicide bombers by paying bounties to their families.
And that he used terrorist tactics against perceived opposition to his control of Iraq.
The pre-war presentation of the terrorist link of Saddam with al Qaeda, via Zarqawi, was very weak and suspect when it was presented prior to the invasion.
It doesn’t look any stronger subsequent to the invasion.
It was to claimed Al Qaeda link, not the link with Palestinian terrorists, that was said to pose a direct terrorist threat to the U.S.
In other words, the terrorist “case” made was the supposed Al Qaeda alliance threat……we were not going to war to stop Palestinian suicide bombers.
That alleged Saddam- Al Qaeda alliance remains the weakest claim in supporting an elective, pre-emptive war.
As I mentioned earlier, that Al Qaeda link could probably be made with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
If motivated, an administration could present evidence (rather than redacting it) of support for Al Qaeda, then launch an invasion to topple other regimes.
Absent a huge increase in our defense budget and reviving military conscription, these invasions/ occupations are not even feasible.
There needs to be a “high bar” met before ousting a regime and occupying/ pacifying a country.
For the reasons I’ve stated, especially the flimsiness of the evidence linking Saddam to Al Qaeda, that high bar was not met before or after Gulf War II.
Eric, You’re wasting your intellect and time trying to have a discussion w/ the flyboy. Many have learned the hard way.
Clinton tech aide asks court to keep immunity deal secret
http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2016/06/bryan-pagliano-hillary-clinton-emails-immunity-224015
randyjet:
“Given the fact that the US audit of US nuclear material came up short of a couple hundred pounds of plutonium, I think that demanding perfection from a place like Iraq is a bit extreme.”
That contradicts your statement, “Clinton was correct in my view because the cease fire agreement had to be enforced.”
“Demanding perfection from” the Saddam regime in its compliance with the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) responded to the exceptional “need to be assured of Iraq’s peaceful intentions” (UNSCR 687) that was compelled by Saddam’s exceptional track record. Or, as Secretary of State Albright summarized the updated Clinton 2nd term policy on Iraq on March 26, 1997, “Our view, which is unshakable, is that Iraq must prove its peaceful intentions. It can only do that by complying with all of the Security Council resolutions to which it is subject.”
According to UNSCOM/UNMOVIC, the Iraq Survey Group, the Iraqi Perspectives Project, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and other ceasefire-related fact findings, Saddam never came close nor even tried to approach the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441). As ISG reported, “the Iraqis never intended to meet the spirit of the UNSC’s resolutions”.
randyjet:
“the UN inspectors finally got unlimited access to ALL places in Iraq before the invasion.”
That “access”, as you describe it, was insufficient to satisfy the “full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under … the governing standard of Iraqi compliance … and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA” (UNSCR 1441); and the UNMOVIC charge, “UNMOVIC must verify the absence of any new activities or proscribed items, new or retained. The onus is clearly on Iraq to provide the requisite information or devise other ways in which UNMOVIC can gain confidence that Iraq’s declarations are correct and comprehensive.” (UNMOVIC).
In other words, as Hans Blix clarified the mandate for “substantive cooperation” to the UN Security Council on January 27, 2003:
As Blix stated, “It is not enough to open doors.” The “immediat[e], unconditiona[l], activ[e]” burden to prove the mandated compliance with the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) was on Iraq. Your implied assertion that “UN inspectors finally got unlimited access”, even if that were true as you describe it, had satisfied Iraq’s obligations under UNSCRs 687 and 1441 is false.
randyjet:
“Having the inspectors on the ground with access to even Hussein’s palaces,which was one of the points of contention, could and DID produce verification that there were NO WMDs.”
Incorrect. On March 7, 2003, UNMOVIC reported to the UN Security Council:
Here’s how the head of the Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer, characterized the UNMOVIC findings:
Moreover, the post hoc Iraq Survey Group investigation found Iraq rife with UNSCR 687 disarmament violations. The evidence shows Saddam was in fact rearming in violation of UNSCR 687.
randy:
“I recall that Bush mocked Blix and Barradi and called them stupid and stooges at the time when their findings ran counter to what Bush was pushing.”
That’s an odd recollection that would be out of character for Bush if true.
More substantively, opposite of your assertion that “their findings ran counter to what Bush was pushing”, the President’s 18MAR03 report to Congress on his determination and legal authority for OIF – “Report in Connection With Presidential Determination Under Public Law 107-243” – features Iraq’s noncompliance with the UNSCR 1441 inspections, including the UNMOVIC findings:
randyjet
“That is also why the UN refused to sanction the US invasion.”
If by “sanction” you mean legally authorize, then OIF was authorized by UNSCR 678, which was recalled in UNSCRs 687 and 1441, and was the same UN authority for Clinton’s military enforcement of the ceasefire, including the no-fly zones and Operations Desert Strike and Desert Fox.
But if by “sanction” you mean political approval, then the opposition to Bush’s ceasefire enforcement in 2002-2003 was carried forward from the same opposition to Clinton’s ceasefire enforcement in 1998: “Their advocacy for Iraq was motivated by a combination of the desire to avoid brinkmanship with Saddam, dedication to a multi-polar realist rather than US-led liberal world order, separate grievance with US-led international enforcement, and Saddam’s bribery with the Oil for Food scandal.”
The political difference between ODF in 1998 and OIF in 2002-2003 is domestic, not international. Many (not all) of the Democratic leaders who had upheld the ceasefire enforcement under Clinton subsequently used the 1998 opposition arguments against Bush, despite that President Bush dutifully carried forward the standing case against Saddam and the operative enforcement procedure for the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) from President Clinton.
randyjet:
“I also recall that the only things that were at issue were the unaccounted for stocks of chemical used as precursors.”
Incorrect. For the UNSCR 1441 inspections, every part of paragraphs 8 to 13 of UNSCR 687 was at issue.
Your comment on June 7, 2016 at 1:37 pm is confirmation that you’ve been fundamentally misled about the operative enforcement procedure for the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441) and, in the operative context, the determinative fact findings that confirmed Iraq’s material breach for the “serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations” (UNSCR 1441).
The linked OIF FAQ explanation is essentially a cheat sheet that synthesizes the primary sources of the mission. To correct your basic misconceptions about the grounds for the Iraq intervention, I also recommend that you review the basic essential sources for OIF that are compiled and linked here (text sans links):
http://BuenaVistaMall.com/justice.jpg
http://BuenaVistaMall.com/corruption.jpg
The Justice Department is trying to protect Clinton in giving secret information to judge.
http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2016/06/fbi-offers-second-secret-filing-in-clinton-email-suit-223973
tnashhotmail80com:
“on the near-universal belief that there were large stockpiles of WMDs”
First, UNSCR 687-proscribed armament was not limited to WMD stocks. There were many pre-war indicators of Iraq reconstituting its WMD program that were corroborated by UNMOVIC and the Iraq Survey Group. ISG confirmed a proscribed Iraqi WMD program with intent, R&D, procurement, and ready convertible production capability.
Second, the WMD stocks were more than a “belief”. They was established fact for the Gulf War ceasefire disarmament process, based on the UN inspection record compiled since 1991. With the established fact of proscribed armament, the only way to know that Iraq had disarmed its stocks and other proscribed armament – in both the legal and common sense of ‘know’ – was for Iraq to prove with the UNSCR 687/1441 inspections it disarmed as mandated.
The UNSCR 687 disclosure and supervisory mandates were key because any undisclosed or unsupervised method, including the self-reported ridding touted by OIF opponents, could be exploited by Saddam to retain and hide proscribed armament, such as the hidden stocks uncovered in 1995 and the covert IIS program found by ISG. Thus, any less than the mandated compliance kept Iraq at its default of presumed guilt of proscribed armament.
Third, the Iraq Survey Group concluded only “it appears that Iraq, by the mid-1990s, was essentially free of militarily significant WMD stocks” (in other words, before President Clinton’s ceasefire enforcement peaked in 1998). However, the ISG investigation could not establish conclusive ‘knowledge’ on the stocks issue:
The burden was on Iraq to prove the mandated compliance and disarmament, so the ceasefire disarmament procedure was not like a crime-scene forensic investigation that searched for evidence while guarding carefully against the contamination or loss of physical evidence in a controlled area. Much suspicious, noncompliant Iraqi activity was reported during the UNSCR 1441 inspections and ISG confirmed Iraq’s “concealment and deception activities”.
“ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq” – the fact is, to this day, we still don’t know – in either the legal or common sense – what Saddam did with his WMD stocks, which again, were established fact for the ceasefire disarmament process.
tnashhotmail80com:
“In short, having a legal basis for an invasion doesn’t mean that it’s sensible foreign policy.”
The legal basis for the Iraq intervention was the US policy on Iraq, and vice versa – the UN-mandated Gulf War ceasefire measures enforced by the President under US law were purpose-designed to resolve the manifold Iraqi threat, including WMD and terrorism, that manifested with the Gulf War.
tnashhotmail80com:
“With an ongoing war in Afghanistan, and a downsized military, I thought it was a mistake to dislodge Saddam.”
Actually, US military doctrine since WW2 has been the ability to conduct 2 major wars simultaneously while also conducting operations other than war, including peace operations.
Which is to say, did OIF cause US military personnel to bear an increased burden? Yes.
But in terms of needs of the mission, were the OEF peace operations shorted due to OIF? No. The OEF military requirements were met during OIF.
In terms of strategic policy, once the Taliban regime and al Qaeda were displaced from their Afghanistan base by Spring 2002, hunting AQ was no longer primarily a military operation. At that point, the evidently broken ‘containment’ of the evidently WMD-reconstituting and terrorist, AQ-supporting Saddam regime was more dangerous than the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
tnashhotmail80com:
“I think the far weaker basis for war was Saddam’s alleged ties to Al Qaeda.”
The ties aren’t alleged – the Saddam-AQ link is confirmed by the Iraqi Perspectives Project, ie, the 2008 Pentagon report on Saddam’s “regional and global terrorism”.
Nonetheless, there’s no need to speculate on the terrorism basis for OIF. Bush policy statements and the 2002 AUMF spell out the terrorism basis for the Presidential determination to use force. It did not require any Iraqi ties to al Qaeda.
Excerpt from Public Law 107-243:
“Including” is not a term of art that means ‘limited to’. Saddam’s “ongoing support for international terrorist groups” and “development of weapons of mass destruction” are confirmed. OIF was “consistent with … continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations”, eg, Saddam’s “regional and global terrorism” (IPP).
As we discussed before, your view on the issue is based on the flawed premise that the terrorism basis for OIF was primarily based on AQ, when in fact, the terrorism basis for OIF was primarily based on Saddam’s “regional and global terrorism” (IPP). It included a compelling Saddam-AQ link, but Saddam’s terrorism threat was primarily based on Saddam’s terrorism, not the Saddam-AQ link.
tnashhotmail80com:
“My feeling was that there was a need to demonstrate both the WMD non-compliance AND a real link to Al Qaeda.”
You should be satisfied then that both elements are demonstrated in the OIF fact record. See the UNMOVIC Clusters document and the Iraq Survey Group Duelfer report regarding Iraq’s breach of the WMD disarmament mandates of UNSCR 687 and the Iraqi Perspectives Project report regarding Iraq’s breach of the terrorism mandates of UNSCR 687, which addresses the Saddam-AQ link.
Don’t overlook that IPP found Saddam’s “regional and global terrorism” was worse than had been estimated in the pre-war intelligence.
Eric ……..you quoted Charles Deulfer re Iraqi WMD. In Oct. 2004, he testified before Congress that we were mostly wrong about the Saddam-WMD issue.
I think he replaced David Kay as head of the ISG, when Kay quit after concluding that the intel on WMDs was incorrect.
(Kay HAD been convinced that large stockpikes of WMDs were consealed by Saddam, by with the access after Saddam’s ouster, he changed his mind.
So did Deulfer change his view after his testimony to Congress in 2004……and if so, when did he subsequently bolster the Saddam/ WMD link?
And or the Saddam terrorist link.
Eric…..Here are some excerpts from a Feb. 19, 2009 US. News and World Report interview with Mr Duelfer.
As head of the ISG, he was charged with finding and destroyi,g the WMDs Saddam was believed to have had.
“The Bush administration elected to believe and use the intel community’s
assessments on WMDs, where they were largely wrong”.
And “Why were we so far off on the WMD assessment?
These are quotes from the head of the ISG group, which I believe was selected with the approval of the CIA.
They obviously had a mission and incentives to find to expected cache if WMDs.
Duelfer himself said repeatedly, that the intel was wrong…..as did the pprevious ISG head, David Kay.
I don’t know what you are referring to when you state that the Duelfer/ ISG report somehow butresses the WMD beliefs about Saddam pre-invasion.
If there is something buried in the 1200-1500 page ISG report that is at odds with what Duelfer repeatedly stated, please cite it.
Since he likes to read, wonder if the man ever reads the Blog of Jonathon Turley…… who is a Democrat ….. for sure voted twice for Obama.
Some time could you print this blog. Want to send to Mary Anne. Thanks
Eric
……based on the likely ties to Al Qaeda on the part of Packistan and Saudi Arabia, an administration could, if it had that objective, form the basis for “regime change” in those countries via invasion.
I will try to read the 2008 report which you cited as demonstrating the terrorism link with Saddam.
You have stated an Al-Qaeda/ Saddam link….I have yet to see that.
Certainly not to the degree of Saudi and Pakistani connections with AlQaeda.
Repeated tours of duty by an overstrained military can theoretically handle two wars simultaneously.
Draining resourses from Afghanistan to support the Iraq invasion was not a wise move, IMO.
It may be that some subsequent report established a direct terrorist threat by Saddam to to U.S.
There are thousands of pages in these different reports, and if you have found something that supports that link, please quote it for me.
I think you mentioned the 2008 IPP report…..I read “beyond the headlines”, from a variety of sources, and have never found any clear evidence of a Saddam-Al Qaeda alliance.