There is a new, troubling study on the financial status of most American workers. The National Institute on Retirement Security (NIRS) found that the median American worker has just $955 saved for retirement through defined-contribution plans such as 401(k) accounts. Given the expected job losses from robotics and AI, the study only deepens concerns about the economic and political pressures facing this country in the years to come.
In my new book, “Rage and the Republic: The Unfinished Story of the American Revolution,” I discuss those impacts from robotics and AI on our democracy. Using the most conservative estimates of job losses, the book explores how a large population of unemployed citizens will affect their relationship with the state.
We cannot maintain a “kept citizenship” while preserving the essential elements of the American republic. A large population of static, unemployed citizens poses challenges for what I call a “liberty-enhancing economy,” an economy that affords citizens independence from the state.
This study magnifies those concerns. If accurate, it suggests that even a short displacement in employment will return state support. Many jurisdictions are already launching Universal Basic Income (UBI) pilot programs. If this republic is to survive in the 21st Century, it will require developing new areas of “homocentric” jobs while avoiding predictable measures to subsidize positions that will inevitably be lost to robotics.
Notably, the study found that among those with positive retirement plans, median savings were much higher at $40,000.
Those with a defined contribution (DC) plan are far better off with an average savings of $179,082.
The takeaway from the report, for me, is the need to instill greater private savings. Some workers are barely paid above subsistence. However, we also need to educate citizens about the importance of setting aside retirement funds to the extent possible.
As I previously wrote, I am a great fan of the Trump Accounts. The $6.25 billion gift of Michael and Susan Dell (now augmented by dozens of corporations) could offer the single best hope for the survival of our system. Millions of young people will be able to experience the benefits of investments, savings and, most importantly, economic independence.
The study also shows the growing dangers of the collapse of the social security accounts. Despite assurances made when Congress established the system, Congress has continued to draw on Social Security funds to avoid reducing spending levels. The system could fail for these workers, who will not be able to draw upon money taken from their paychecks for the purpose of retirement. It is one of the most outrageous betrayals in United States history.
To this day, Democrats are opposing efforts to make major changes to guarantee the viability of the system for future generations, including the use of private investment accounts that could no longer be raided by Congress for easy money.
All politicians express alarm at the potential failure, but they attack any efforts to address the underlying problems as an attack on social security. As a result, we just drift toward this cliff knowing that most citizens have practically no other source of retirement support.
When I was young, I was constantly told “you better save for retirement, Social Security won’t be there for you”. I can’t say that I did a very good job at this, especially at first, but eventually through the incentivization of company-matching 401K programs, I somehow ended up with enough retirement savings that I can live comfortably without social security.
The maddening aspect of all this is that over my lifetime, I have dumped around three times as much money into social security as I have into my individual retirement accounts (don’t let anyone tell you that the “company match” doesn’t come directly out of your pocket, it’s all rolled into the cost of hiring you). But my individual retirement accounts are worth at least three times the annuity-value of social security. And with my retirement accounts, I can choose how I withdraw the money, and even choose to leave an inheritance. Try that with Social Security.
When people try to defend Social Security to me, I just point out that if a private company were to sell a retirement savings program with the same structure and accountability as Social Security, the people involved would be arrested, tried and convicted of a number of financial crimes, under laws designed to protect people from scams.
Up until a decade before I retired, I would have agreed to give up all my “earned Social Security benefits” in exchange for dropping out of the program. Yes, the financials for Social Security really are that bad.
OT – ICYMI
NOT A “BLACK PERSON”
NOT A “BILLIONAIRE PERSON”
NOT A “TAXPAYER PERSON”
A STATE MAY NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST “ANY PERSON” REGARDLESS OF CRITERIA
______________________________________________________________________________________________
14th Amendment
“[N]or shall any State…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Here is a brief summary of how the 14th and 5th Amendments prohibit states from taxing Black persons and billionaire persons differently:
1. Equal Protection: The mandate applies to “any person.” Since a Black person and a billionaire are both persons, the law must protect their property equally. Different tax rates based on wealth or race create unequal protection by definition.
2. Due Process: No state can deprive “any person” of “property” without due process of law. A tax that changes based on who the person is (their wealth or race) is an arbitrary seizure rather than a uniform, “due” process of law.
3. Privileges or Immunities: This clause states, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens.” A core privilege of citizenship is the right to be treated as a peer under the law; creating “classes” of citizens based on wealth or race violates this uniform status.
4. The 5th Amendment (Taking Property): The Constitution forbids taking “private property” for public use without just compensation. If the state takes a higher percentage of property from a billionaire than from a Black person, it is “taking” wealth based on status rather than applying a neutral, constitutional rule to “any person.”
The Textual Conclusion:
The Constitution recognizes only “persons” and “citizens,” not “groups” or “wealth brackets.”
Therefore, any law that differentiates between a Black person and a billionaire regarding their property is a facial violation of the requirement for uniform, equal treatment.
Starting out, my parents were on the lower end of socio-economic scale. Dad worked two jobs while mom stayed home with us kids till we started school.
Growing up, our parents taught us there were no free rides or free lunch. Everything comes with a price even if it seems free, someone is paying. If you want something, you have to work to earn it. I got my first job at a local grocery store at the age of fourteen. And I made the decision to get that job on my own. Once I got my diver license, I worked in fast food through the rest of high school.
Saved money, dont use credit cards. Understand that corporations have marketing departments with the intent of separating you from your money. But I have free will. I can walk into a Wal-Mart, walk around for an hour and walk out without buying anything. This idea that greedy corporations are forcing people to buy their things or “consumerism” is a load of crap. What it is, is weak will Americans whom have been programed to consume as their parents did not tech them any better or they were not paying attention in Home Economics. I remember watching John Carpenter’s movie, “They Live.” I own the DVD as it was a great commentary on consumerism back in the 80s. Billionaires or millionaires do not own me, or have made me their “minion.” The wife and I have a real hard time coming up with Christmas or birthday presents ideas as we are not materialistic. Are there things that I would like to have? Sure. Do I really need it? Nope. The fridge broke, compressor issue. Did we run out and buy a new fridge? Nope. We put all the freezer stuff in a cooler outside, below freezing and the rest in the pantry, less than thirty-eight degrees. Everything was fine till we got it fixed a week later. I have only bought two TVs in my entire life and the first one was only because after over a decade of use, finally blinked out. The second one, the one we have now, was just over $100.
The wife and I have known that SS was screwed and plan our retirement accordingly, as if it is NOT going to be there when we retire or be a small amount of what we paid into it. Like, just enough to pay the phone bill. Had I be able to take that money from when I first started working and put it into a market index fund, it would of had better returns than anything the government could of done. My 401k picks average about 16%. Even in the Biden years, I averaged 9%, my lowest.
Trump accounts are a good way to invest into our future generations. The parents control the investments, giving them the power, and taking the government out of the equation. I am all for it.
Please cite the Constitution for any legal basis for Social Security.
Of course, Social Security is unconstitutional communism.
Article 1, Section 8: Congress has no power to tax for, fund, provide, or regulate retirement income or the related financial/insurance industry.
Home economics? W T F are you talking about? H_ o_ m_ e economics is your plan to prosperity?
16%, prove it. Seriously, put it on line so it can be verified. You won’t, because you are a liar.
Lastly, you think, based on your obviously questionable success, that all parents know anything about “home economics”?
Lying is easy, the truth isn’t.
Liar.
A new national survey conducted by the Manhattan Institute examines today’s Republican Party and the coalition assembled by Donald Trump in 2024. It is one of the most exhaustive studies to date of the emerging multi-ethnic, working-class GOP: nearly 3,000 voters—including large oversamples of black and Hispanic Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters—were asked about a wide range of policy issues, as well as identity politics, populism, conspiracy theories, antisemitism, and other forms of racial bias.
This study will help to shed light on the central question confronting the modern Republican Party: can President Trump’s coalition remain cohesive once he exits the stage? Or is it inherently unstable? The GOP is navigating generational and ideological tensions that cut across old factional lines—differences in leadership style, cultural priorities, institutional trust, and the worldview of younger, more disaffected, and increasingly diverse new entrants.
The findings point to a coalition that is divided into two broad segments. The majority segment—longstanding Republicans who have backed the party for many years—are consistently conservative on economic, foreign policy, and social issues. They favor lower taxes, take a hawkish view of China, remain firmly pro-Israel, and are highly skeptical of progressive agendas on transgender and DEI issues.
But a sizeable minority—new entrants to the GOP coalition over the past two presidential cycles—look markedly different. Younger, more racially diverse, and more likely to have voted for Democratic candidates in the recent past, this group diverges sharply from the party’s core. They are more likely, often substantially more likely, to hold progressive views across nearly every major policy domain. They are more supportive of left-leaning economic policies, more favorable toward China, more critical of Israel, and more liberal on issues ranging from migration to DEI initiatives. A significant share also report openly racist or antisemitic views and express potential support for political violence. Yet they overwhelmingly identify as Republicans today and voted for Donald Trump in 2024.
For this analysis, Current GOP refers to (1) all 2024 Trump voters, regardless of party registration, and (2) all registered Republicans, including those who did not vote for Trump. To understand the structure of this coalition more precisely, the Trump/GOP electorate is divided into two analytically distinct blocs:
Core Republicans (65%)—longstanding GOP voters who have consistently backed Republican presidential nominees since 2016 or earlier; and
New Entrant Republicans (29%)—recent first-time GOP presidential voters, including those who supported Democrats in 2016 or 2020 or were too young to vote in cycles before 2020.
The survey’s first major finding is that the overwhelming majority of the Current GOP reject racism, antisemitism, and conspiratorial thinking in politics. But a meaningful minority—17%—meets our definition of Anti-Jewish Republicans. A respondent falls into this category if they (1) self-identify as both racist and antisemitic and express Holocaust denial or describe Israel as a colonial state, or (2) do not self-identify that way but nevertheless hold both of those extreme positions. Anti-Jewish Republicans are typically younger, disproportionately male, more likely to be college-educated, and significantly more likely to be New Entrant Republicans. They are also more racially diverse. Consistent church attendance is one of the strongest predictors of rejecting these attitudes; infrequent church attendance is, all else equal, one of the strongest predictors of falling into this segment.
Crucially, these views are not unique to Republicans. The survey finds slightly higher levels of Anti-Jewish sentiment among Democrats—20%, compared to 17% among Republicans. And despite these internal differences, both Core Republicans and New Entrants remain overwhelmingly favorable toward Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance. This is not a coalition in revolt against its leadership.
Where the divide becomes electorally significant is in partisan stability. Only 56% of New Entrant Republicans say they would “definitely” support a Republican in the 2026 congressional elections, compared with 70% of Core Republicans. The same New Entrant bloc is more likely to express tolerance for racist or antisemitic speech, more likely to support political violence, more conspiratorial, and—on core policy questions—considerably more liberal than the party’s traditional base. These voters are drawn to Trump but are not reliably attached to the Republican Party.
The picture that emerges is one of a GOP with a solid, cohesive core and a younger, ideologically unstable outer ring—a coalition that is broader than any Republican coalition in recent memory, but also more internally contradictory and harder to manage. Understanding which voters are likely to stay, which can be integrated into a durable conservative coalition, and which may drift away, will be central to the GOP’s strategic future. This report provides the empirical grounding for that conversation.
Full Results Available: Toplines, Crosstabs
Methodology
Between October 15 and 26, 2025, the Manhattan Institute surveyed four separate national audiences: 1,493 Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, 301 black Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, 501 Hispanic Republicans and/or 2024 Trump voters, and 500 additional registered voters overall. The sample was reached primarily via online panels (2,172 interviews) with an SMS-to-web component (623 respondents).
While also reported separately, the black, Hispanic, and general GOP voters were merged into one national GOP sample and weighted to reflect Republicans nationwide on gender, age, ethnicity, density (i.e. suburban, urban, rural), and region. When referred to specifically, black and Hispanic voters are treated as separate, unweighted samples. U.S. voters overall were weighted to be representative of registered voters nationwide, using the voter file.
The margin of error is ±2.0% for the general GOP sample, ±5.6% for the black GOP sample, ±4.4% for the Hispanic GOP sample, and ±4.4% for the registered voter sample.
Favorability
Figure 1: Favorability Toward Figures on the American Right
Less than one year into his second term, President Trump continues to hold very high favorability ratings among the Current GOP. Nine-in-ten nationwide say they have a favorable view of the president. Vice President JD Vance receives similarly strong marks. Hispanic GOP voters show no signs of fading support for the president: 89% view Trump favorably, with only 12% viewing him unfavorably.
New Entrant Republicans view both Trump and Vance less positively, but this reflects a broader pattern. They rate every figure tested more negatively. As later sections show, they are more skeptical and, in several policy areas, more progressive than the rest of the GOP coalition.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio is highly popular among Hispanic Republicans (83% favorable, 11% unfavorable) and performs slightly less well with the Current GOP overall (75% favorable, 14% unfavorable).
We also tested several right-of-center media figures. Tucker Carlson is viewed favorably by 63% of the Current GOP (38% somewhat favorable, 25% very favorable), with 21% viewing him unfavorably. Gender is one of the clearest divides on Carlson: he is much more popular among Current GOP men (68% favorable) than Current GOP women (57%), and especially among Current GOP men under 50 (70%), compared with 56% of Current GOP women under 50.
Among the Current GOP, Candace Owens is the most divisive figure tested. Half view her favorably (31% somewhat favorable, 19% very favorable), while 23% view her unfavorably. Age and gender strongly shape views of Owens: voters under 50 are significantly more favorable (62%) than those over 50 (42%), and men (56%) are more positive than women (42%). Owens also generates the most support among New Entrant Republicans (58%) and black Republicans (62%).
Notably, there is little to no relationship between being an Anti-Jewish Republican and holding a favorable view of either Carlson or Owens. While both figures loom large in online discourse, their followings do not map cleanly onto attitudinal divisions inside the GOP electorate.
With a net favorability among all U.S. voters of +14%, Ben Shapiro is a significantly more popular figure nationally than Carlson, Owens, Trump, or Vance.
Leadership and Masculinity
Figure 2: Preferred Leadership Style and Views on Societal Femininity
Overall, the Current GOP prefers “a bold, attention-grabbing leader who often makes headlines and isn’t afraid of conflict or drama” over “a steady, low-profile leader who focuses on results without being constantly in the spotlight.” The largest divides on this question are across education and race: college graduates slightly prefer a steady leader (52% steady to 45% bold), while non-graduates prefer bold leadership (53% to 39%). Hispanic Republicans express a particularly strong preference for a bold leader (56% to 35%).
The Current GOP overwhelmingly—69% to 24%—believes that American society is “too feminine” and that more masculine thinking is needed. Men are the most likely to hold this view (78% to 17%), but women also agree by a substantial margin (58% to 31%). Support is especially high among black Republicans (77% to 19%) and Hispanic Republicans (75% to 21%).
The data also provide evidence for a broader generational and educational backlash among younger conservatives, particularly men. Although college graduates in the general population are less likely to support Trump, college-educated Republicans are more likely than their non-college counterparts to endorse the view that society has become too feminine. Younger Republican men, who have experienced these dynamics most directly, express the strongest support: 83% of Current GOP men under 50 agree, and nearly half (46%) strongly agree.
Views on “The System”
Figure 3: Views on the American System, Rules, and Health
Despite strong support for a more masculine cultural posture, very few within the Current GOP believe that America’s economic and social system is so rigged that it should be “burned down.” Only 7% endorse that view. A majority (52%) say the system is not perfect but should be reformed—fixing what is broken while protecting what works. Just under four in ten (37%) take the more cautious view that the system should be preserved, with changes made carefully and gradually.
Support for “burn it down” remains a marginal position—generally below 12%—across nearly every GOP subgroup: white, black, Hispanic, younger voters, older voters, college-educated, non-college, New Entrant Republicans, and Core Republicans.
The coalition is similarly united on the importance of following rules. 84% percent say society should enforce rules and punish those who break them, compared with only 11% who say it is fair to bend rules to keep up with others who break them. Support for rule-breaking, as well as other anti-social attitudes, is more common among younger and New Entrant Republicans. 22% percent of the Current GOP coalition that is under 50, and 22% of New Entrants, endorse rule-breaking, compared with only 3% of Current GOP over 50 and 6% of Core Republicans.
Views on health are more divided. Four in ten within the Current GOP (41%) endorse the view that modern medicine often does more harm than good—a sentiment associated with HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s Make America Healthy Again (MAHA) movement—while 49% agree with the more establishment view that modern medicine, including vaccines, is essential to public health. Black and Hispanic Republicans are more likely to endorse the MAHA position (50% vs. 41% among black Republicans; 54% vs. 36% among Hispanic Republicans). Gender also plays a role, with women—especially women under 50—more likely than men to support the MAHA perspective.
Conspiracism
The survey also examined how respondents react to, and whether they personally endorse, statements that are often labeled as conspiracy theories. The conspiratorial views tested varied in plausibility and in the alleged perpetrator. From these data, we also report a combined metric identifying those who believe all or almost all of the six theories tested.
Overall, one in five in the Current GOP (18%) believe five or six of the theories. Levels are higher among black Republican voters (25%) and lower among Hispanic Republican voters (13%). Members of the Current GOP are also more likely to endorse these theories than the general population (13%).
Figure 4: Belief in Oft-Labeled Conspiracies
A stark divide emerges between newer and long-standing Republicans: 34% of New Entrant Republican voters believe most or all of the theories, compared with 11% of Core Republicans. Put another way: 63% of the highest-conspiracy believers previously voted for Obama, Clinton, or Biden at least once since 2008.
This dynamic does not reflect a traditional conservative vs. MAGA split. Self-identified “traditional conservatives” are actually more likely than MAGA identifiers to believe most or all theories (24% vs. 15%). The divide instead reflects the contrast between newer entrants to the GOP and those who have been consistent Republican voters for years.
On specific theories:
The 2020 election: Just over half of the Current GOP (51%) believes that the 2020 U.S. presidential election was fraudulent, while 41% say that view is probably or definitely false. Among New Entrant Republicans, support for this belief rises to 60%.
Vaccines and autism: One in three in the Current GOP (33%) believe that childhood vaccines cause autism. This view is more common among college graduates (42%) than non-graduates (29%), and among New Entrant Republicans (47%).
9/11 conspiracies: Four in ten in the Current GOP (41%) believe that the 9/11 attacks were likely orchestrated or permitted by U.S. government actors. Belief is highest among men (48%), college graduates (51%), Republicans under 50 (53%, compared with 34% of those over 50), and New Entrant Republicans (53%). Among black GOP voters the figure is 58%, and among Hispanic GOP voters, 56%.
Holocaust denial or minimization: Nearly four in ten in the Current GOP (37%) believe the Holocaust was greatly exaggerated or did not happen as historians describe. Younger men are especially likely to hold this view (54% of men under 50 vs. 39% of women under 50). Among men over 50, 41% agree, compared with 18% of women over 50. Racial divides are particularly striking:
77% of Hispanic GOP voters
30% of white GOP voters
66% of black GOP voters
Moon landing: A similarly sized chunk of the Current GOP (36%) believes that the Apollo 11 moon landing was faked by NASA. Again, younger men are more likely to hold this view (51% of men under 50 vs. 38% of women under 50). There are stark racial divides: while only 31% of white GOP voters believe the conspiracy, this rises to 59% among Hispanic Republicans and 63% among black Republicans.
Racism and Antisemitism
Figure 5: Tolerance for Prejudice in Coalition
A majority of the Current GOP rejects openly racist or openly antisemitic individuals as part of their political coalition. For racism, the margin is 52%–37%: 36% say such individuals are not welcome at all, and another 16% say they may be voters but should not hold positions of leadership. Views are even stronger regarding antisemitism, with the Current GOP rejecting openly antisemitic individuals by nearly 2 to 1 (60%–31%), including almost half (48%) who say they should not be welcomed in the coalition under any circumstances.
Age divides are substantial. Among the Current GOP under 50, a notable minority report that they themselves openly express racist (31%) or antisemitic (25%) views. Among those over 50 in the Current GOP, these figures drop to just 4% for each.
New Entrant Republicans are far more likely to fall into the “tolerator” category. One in three New Entrants (32%) say they openly express racist views, compared with just 8% of Core Republicans. These tolerators are also significantly more likely to believe multiple conspiracy theories and to support political violence. Consistent with their higher likelihood of falling into the Anti-Jewish Republican category, roughly one in three self-identify as either racist or antisemitic.
Tolerators also stand out ideologically. They are more liberal than non-tolerators on a wide range of issues—DEI, taxes, traditional values, and transgender surgeries. Among New Entrant Republicans who tolerate racism or antisemitism, 78% hold liberal policy positions on at least one of these major topics.
These findings underscore a recurring pattern: younger and newer members of the GOP coalition contain a frustrated, alienated subset that is often hostile toward institutions and norms—but not reliably conservative. Some are far-right or otherwise ideological, but many are not conservative at all.
Political Violence
Figure 6: Support for the Justification of Political Violence
The vast majority of the Current GOP (70%) reject the idea that political violence is sometimes justified, while only 30% say that violence can be justified. But the overall number masks a sharp divide between Core Republicans and New Entrant Republicans.
Among Core Republicans, 80% oppose political violence. Among New Entrants, by contrast, 54% say political violence can be justified. Support for political violence is also high among those who believe many conspiracy theories and among those who tolerate openly racist or antisemitic individuals. Age is one of the strongest predictors: just 13% of those over 50 in the Current GOP justify political violence, compared with 57% of those under 50.
Partisan history is another major fault line. One in three in the Current GOP who believe that political violence can be justified are 2020 Biden voters (34%). And six in ten (60%) supporters of political violence previously voted for Obama, Clinton, or Biden, compared with 32% who have never voted for a Democrat.
Perceived Social Standing of Different Groups
The Republican coalition’s perceptions of how various groups are treated in American society reveal a mix of consensus and generational divergence. On the whole, Current GOP voters say that society shows about the right amount of concern or favorable treatment for most groups—including men and boys (53%), women and girls (52%), whites (55%), blacks (48%), Asians (61%), Hispanics (56%), Indians (53%), Jews (47%), and legal immigrants (57%).
Two groups stand out as receiving “too much” support:
Illegal immigrants, where 63% say society is overly favorable; and
Transgender people, where 55% say the same—along with 49% who believe lesbians and gay men receive too much favorable treatment.
Views toward Muslims are more mixed: 40% believe they receive too much support, 38% believe they receive about the right amount of support, and only 10% say they receive too little.
Christians are the group most widely seen as receiving too little societal support. A plurality (43%) say that Christians receive the right amount of support, but 37% say they receive too little—driven primarily by older Republican voters. Only 22% of those in the Current GOP under 50 believe that Christians receive too little favorable treatment, compared with 47% of those over 50.
Generational divides are similarly sharp on perceptions of Jews. While just 16% of the Current GOP believe that Jews receive too much favorable treatment, fully 26% of those under 50 hold this view—compared with only 8% of those over 50. This pattern aligns with the broader generational cleavage identified throughout the survey: younger and newer members of the coalition are more likely to express skepticism toward many traditional Republican concerns and priorities.
Overall Policy Disposition
While this survey includes extensive measurement of identity and social attitudes, it also captures a broad policy profile. The battery covers taxation and spending, foreign policy, social issues, illegal and legal immigration, tariffs, DEI policies, and transgender issues.
It is well established that younger and newer Republicans are less pro-Israel than older Republicans. The earlier sections show that they are also more likely to justify political violence, deny the Holocaust, and openly express racist views. Less widely recognized, however, is that these same voters hold less conservative views across a broad range of policy areas—including transgender issues, DEI, and taxation. Given that many of these voters are younger and former Democrats, more progressive policy tendencies are unsurprising.
To further examine this pattern, we looked specifically at New Entrants who exhibit characteristics strongly associated with alienation or far-right politics—such as tolerance for racism or antisemitism and belief in multiple conspiracy theories. Even within these subsets, the result is broadly the same: these voters are not nearly as conservative on major policy questions as the party’s traditional base.
Taxes and Spending
Figure 7: Preferences on Taxes vs. Spending Cuts
By a two-to-one margin, the Current GOP favors cutting government spending (63%) over raising taxes on middle- to upper-income earners (30%). But the overall number masks sharp internal divides. Among those over 50 in the Current GOP, support for spending cuts rises to 73%, while those under 50 in the Current GOP are almost perfectly split. Core Republicans back spending cuts by a margin of 71% to 26%, yet among New Entrant Republicans, the pattern reverses slightly, with a one-point edge for higher taxes (48% to 47%).
These attitudes appear more closely tied to openness to voting Democratic than to affiliation with the MAGA movement. Self-identified MAGA Republicans overwhelmingly support cutting spending (73%), while one of the groups that is most likely to favor higher taxes is of Republicans who currently hold an unfavorable view of Donald Trump.
America’s Role in the World
Figure 8: Preferred Approach to U.S. Foreign Policy
More than two in three members of the Current GOP (67%) support the U.S. taking a proactive role on the world stage—backing peace through strength and maintaining a strong, lethal military. Only 29% prefer a diplomacy-first approach that avoids military intervention unless the U.S. is directly threatened.
Core Republicans support peace through strength at even higher levels (70%). New Entrants, despite their differences from the rest of the coalition, also favor this approach by a margin of 63% to 33%. Hispanic Republicans are especially supportive, with 75% agreeing.
Despite Tucker Carlson’s criticism of U.S. military engagement abroad, his admirers do not share his foreign-policy instincts. Fully 72% of Republicans with a favorable view of Carlson support a proactive, military-forward approach.
This reinforces a pattern seen in earlier sections: views on Tucker Carlson are not strongly tied to tolerance for racism or antisemitism—or foreign-policy attitudes. Peace-through-strength is one of the least polarized issues tested, with strong support across nearly every subgroup. The findings also align with earlier research showing broad Republican backing for President Trump’s strikes against Iran.
Social Issues
Figure 9: Attitudes Toward Traditional, Moderate, and Progressive Social Positions
The Current GOP coalition is split in its posture toward social issues. A plurality (42%) say that the party should fight for traditional values across the board—on gender, sexuality, abortion, and marriage. One in four (24%) believe that the party should push back on “super woke stuff” but accept that some debates, particularly total abortion bans or reversing same-sex marriage, are no longer on the table. One in five (18%) take a “live and let live” position and think social issues should not be a political focus. And one in ten (11%) say the party should support progressive social positions.
Age is the strongest dividing line. Only 25% of the Current GOP under 50 believe that the party should fight for traditional values across the board, compared with 52% of those over 50. Under-50 voters are split almost evenly among opposing super-woke ideas (30%), avoiding social issues entirely (20%), or supporting progressive positions (19%).
These divides track closely with the shift from the pre-2016 GOP to the post-2016 coalition. Nearly half of Core Republicans (49%) support fighting for traditional values, while New Entrant Republicans are split evenly across all four positions. The younger segment of the coalition is not only moving away from an across-the-board traditional-values stance; it is also not united around opposing super-woke social change.
Deportations
Figure 10: Attitudes Toward Deporting Illegal Immigrants
On illegal migration, the Current GOP coalition is at its most unified. Only 3% say illegal immigrants should not be deported at all. The division comes not over whether to deport, but how it should be done and how aggressively to proceed. Almost four in ten of the Current GOP (37%) favor deporting as many illegal migrants as possible, by whatever methods are necessary. One in three (34%) support deportations but insist that they must be carried out carefully and with due process to avoid wrongful detention or removal. Another 22% believe that deportations should focus primarily on serious criminals rather than families or otherwise law-abiding residents.
Age differences are substantial. Current GOP under 50 are more likely to prioritize due process (36%) rather than adopt an any-means-necessary approach (25%). Among Current GOP over 50, the pattern reverses: 45% back the most aggressive option, while 32% emphasize due process.
Claims that Hispanic Republicans are drifting away from the Trump administration on deportations are not supported by the data. Only 3% oppose deportations outright, and Hispanic Republicans are more likely than the GOP as a whole to support maximum enforcement. Fully 44% back deporting as many illegal migrants as possible.
Legal Migration
Figure 11: Attitudes Toward High-Skilled Legal Immigration
Only one in ten of the Current GOP (9%) believe that high-skilled legal immigration should be decreased. Nearly half (47%) say it should be kept at its current level, while 35% say it should be increased. Men are more likely than women to support increasing high-skilled immigration.
Education divides are notable. A majority of college graduates (52%) want high-skilled immigration increased, compared with just 28% of non-graduates; half of non-graduates (50%) prefer keeping levels where they are. The divide between the old and new GOP coalition is similarly stark: 47% of New Entrant Republicans support increasing high-skilled immigration, versus just 31% of Core Republicans.
This is one of several areas where New Entrant Republicans are more progressive. The findings suggest that competition from H-1B visa holders and other skilled immigrants is not driving college-educated New Entrants toward restrictionism. Instead, skepticism toward legal immigration is more concentrated among non-college Republicans, some of whom may be responding to messaging about labor-market competition and wage pressures.
Tariffs
Figure 12: Support for Tariffs
A slim majority of the Current GOP (54%) support President Trump’s tariffs. Support is notably higher among college graduates (59%), Current GOP over 50 (60%), Core Republicans (62%), Hispanic Republicans (68%), and self-identified MAGA conservatives (73%). Support is lower among Republicans under 50 (45%) and New Entrant Republican voters (45%).
Despite majority support, fully one in four of the Current GOP believe “tariffs are essentially taxes on the American people, raising prices, and failing to help American manufacturing.” Most respondents do express a definitive position on tariffs: only 13% selected the option indicating that they did not care about the policy details and simply wanted lower prices.
DEI
Figure 13: Attitudes Toward DEI and Affirmative Action Programs
Six in ten of the Current GOP (59%) believe that Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) and affirmative action programs require racial discrimination and should be illegal. 28% percent say these policies are necessary to remedy past injustice.
Strikingly, support for banning DEI is even higher among black Republicans (65%) and especially high among Hispanic Republicans (70%). New Entrant Republicans are far more divided: 45% say DEI should be illegal, while 46% say these programs are necessary remedies.
Age sharpens the divide. Current GOP under 50 are split—44% say DEI should be illegal and 48% say it is necessary—while Current GOP over 50 overwhelmingly favor making DEI illegal (68% to 16%). The generational divide cuts across gender lines: GOP men and women under 50 are about equally likely to support DEI as to oppose it.
Transgenderism
Figure 14: Views on Medical and Surgical Interventions for Transgender Minors
Almost three in four of the Current GOP (72%) believe that children under 18 should not be allowed to receive medical or surgical interventions to move toward gender transition. Only 22% believe they should. Female members of the Current GOP are the most united on the issue: 80% oppose such interventions for minors, compared with 65% of men.
New Entrant Republicans are significantly more liberal. By a narrow 49% to 45% margin, they oppose making transgender procedures for minors illegal—far less conservative than the party’s longstanding voters.
This completes a consistent pattern throughout the survey: New Entrant Republicans are markedly less conservative than Core Republicans across nearly every major policy area tested—transgender issues, DEI, tariffs, high-skilled immigration, deportations, social issues, foreign policy, and taxes.
Figure 15: Comparison of Conservative Positions Across Policy Areas (Core vs. New Entrant GOP)
Allies and Adversaries
Figure 16: Views of Israel, Qatar, and China
A majority of the Current GOP (55%) say that Israel is an important and effective U.S. ally. Nearly one in four (23%) say Israel is a country like any other, with which the U.S. sometimes shares interests and sometimes does not. Only 12% say Israel is a settler–colonial state and a liability. Among New Entrant Republicans, negative views on Israel are notably more common (24%), albeit still less prevalent than the belief that Israel is an ally (39%).
Views of Qatar are far more fragmented. The coalition is essentially split four ways, with no clear majority position. New Entrant Republicans are notably more Qatar-friendly (41%) than Core Republicans (23%).
Attitudes toward China reveal another sharp generational and coalition divide. Overall, 28% say that China is a major global power with whom the U.S. must engage, while 17% see China as a country like any other, and 47% view it as a hostile rival that must be treated primarily as an adversary. Under-50 Current GOP are significantly more dovish: 45% see China as a country to cooperate with, compared with just 17% among those over 50.
The gulf between Core and New Entrant Republicans is similarly wide. Core Republicans see China as a country to be opposed rather than engaged by a margin of 60% to 18%. New Entrants reverse that pattern: they see China as a country to cooperate with rather than oppose by 48% to 23%.
Indians, Arabs, and Muslims
Figure 17: Views on Immigrants from India vs. Arab/Muslim-Majority Countries
There is a clear distinction between how the Current GOP views migrants from India and how they view migrants from Arab or Muslim-majority countries. Indian migrants are broadly seen as having embraced American culture and contributed positively to society—by a margin of 52% to 29%. Migrants from Arab and Muslim-majority countries, by contrast, are viewed as having benefited from coming to the U.S. without doing enough to assimilate, by 57% to 26%.
Hispanic Republicans are even more negative toward Muslim immigrants than the coalition overall (68% negative to 19% positive). Current GOP members over 50 are somewhat more favorable toward Indian migrants than under-50’s (54% vs. 48%), but also more skeptical of migrants from Arab countries (61% negative vs. 50%).
Still, demographic variation in perceptions of Indian Americans is relatively modest, and Republicans across the coalition generally see them as a positive force.
Dual Loyalty
Current GOP voters generally do not see elevated dual loyalty among Jewish or Indian Americans. Instead, concerns are more concentrated around Arab or Muslim Americans, Hispanics, and Chinese Americans.
Figure 18: Perceived Foreign Loyalty Among Various Groups
Four in ten members of the Current GOP believe that most or all Arab or Muslim Americans have greater loyalty to a foreign country than to the United States. For every other group, no more than three in ten believe that most or all members are more loyal elsewhere. The same is true of views on Jewish Americans: despite online discourse, only 11% of GOP voters say that nearly all Jewish Americans owe loyalty to a foreign country—essentially identical to perceptions of Italian Americans and Evangelical Christian Americans.
Coalition-wide, differences are modest. Hispanic Republicans are slightly less trusting of Hispanic Americans’ loyalty than others are, but racial and demographic divides are generally weak.
Where distinctions do emerge is between Core Republicans and New Entrant Republicans. In line with their more ambivalent views of Israel, New Entrant Republicans are more likely to see Jewish Americans as having loyalty elsewhere: 38% say most or all do, compared with 24% of Core Republicans. But this skepticism is not confined to Jews—it applies across nearly all groups except Arab or Muslim Americans. The pattern suggests that New Entrants to the GOP coalition are broadly less trusting and more negative about many groups, rather than harboring group-specific concerns.
The Future of MAGA
Looking ahead to 2026, 2028, and beyond, the durability of the expanded Republican coalition is uncertain—especially when it comes to its newest members. When asked how they would vote if a congressional election were held today, only 56% of New Entrant Republicans said they would definitely vote Republican again, and 28% said they probably would. Under-50 Republicans show similar softness: just 59% say they would definitely vote GOP in a House race, and one in ten say they would vote for a Democrat.
The more established bloc of Republican voters remains far more reliable. In the 2022 midterms, 70% of Republican primary voters were 50 or older. Even in the higher-turnout 2024 presidential year, they still made up 60% of the GOP primary electorate. And while Core Republicans constitute 65% of all Republicans in this survey, they are likely to be even more overrepresented in future primary electorates—both because they tend to be older and because they possess more stable partisan ties, even if they are less visible on social media.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Sam Kay for his contributions to the analysis.
Darren,
BAN FOR LIFE!
Professor Turley – when it comes to AI and robotics, I am sensing a disconnect from your typical views on the American political system and capitalism. Surely you are aware that every profound technological change that swept over society in the last few hundred years was accompanied by dire predictions of unemployed people and idle hands, with the inevitable misery and mischief to follow. Some of these concerns seem so silly in hindsight that we tend to dismiss any possible lessons learned as irrelevant to our current situation. The printing press would be used to spread dangerous ideas and flood people with low-quality texts, resulting in social instability and corrupted morals. The telegraph would overload people with too much information and cause panics. Railroads would wreak havoc by swamping cities with outsiders. The telephone was going to weaken social norms. Radio was going to rot attention spans. Cinema would corrupt youth morals. Electric lighting was going to destroy sleep and encourage immoral night life. The bicycle was going to cause infertility. Comic books were going to cause delinquency. Television was going to destroy the family. Video games were going to produce violent criminals. Farm tractors would displace huge numbers of farm workers and destroy the family farm. Electric motors and hydraulic machines were going to destroy the steam power industry. ATMs would cause unemployment of bank tellers. Containerized cargo would cause unemployment of longshoreman. Automatic elevators would eliminate the whole profession of elevator operators. Dial telephones would result in mass unemployment of switchboard operators.
The constant refrain is “yes, but AI is truly different”. I’m sure that was also said of many of the past disruptions at the time. Maybe AI truly is different. If you’ve read this far, you probably have already ascertained that an AI chatbot created this list for me. I was aware of all of these past disruptive technologies, but AI slapped (slopped?) it all together in a flash, with only minimal direction and prompting from me. If I were writing a feature article and not just a random comment, I would have to verify all the sourcing for accuracy, dig out old quotes and attributions, find interesting relevant case studies of what was predicted versus what happened, etc. In other words, I would still have to do a whole lot of work to create something interesting that people would want to read.
For further reading, prompt your favorite AI chatbot with “Show me a list of books/articles concerning technology-driven doom predictions”.
Pam Bondi is starting to look a lot like former Attorney General John N. Mitchell, the first and only Attorney General to go to prison. He found himself in a similar position to Bondi when backing the Nixon administration to the hilt. Mitchell had close ties with at-the-time president Richard Nixon, but mistook his close proximity to the president as protection. The same may happen to Bondi.
John Mitchell went to prison for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and perjury. Now we find ourselves staring at the slow, methodical choreography around the Epstein files, and at the center of that macabre dance stands Pam Bondi, offering the country a familiar tune: refusal, delay, denial, defiance, and lies.
It’s a masterclass in Trumpian evil, the dialect spoken by people who believe the Department of Justice is nothing but an instrument of protection and revenge for Donald Trump, just as Mitchell believed the DOJ role was to protect Nixon and seek revenge.
Mitchell didn’t go to prison for breaking into the Watergate complex. He went for conspiracy. For perjury. For obstruction. For believing that process crimes were technicalities rather than felonies. The same kind of crimes Bondi, Blanche, and Patel are committing today. He was convicted because he mistook loyalty for legality.
The question is no longer whether the Attorney General of the United States believes that shielding her Master is a defensible exercise of executive authority. She quite evidently does.
The first Attorney General to go to prison did so because he convinced himself that the ends justified the means and that the law was pliable in his hands.
Pam Bondi should take that to heart, if she has a heart.
24% of the people who drank the Kool Aid in Jonestown were white.
“24% of the people who drank the Kool Aid in Jonestown were white.”
In the US, 56 – 64% of the people drinking the Kool-Aid are white (AI estimate of the % of Democrats who are Caucasian)
Now you know why vote restrictions were placed in the Constitution and why the Founders, generally by state, restricted the vote to male, European, 21, with 50 lbs. Sterling/50 acres.
The new American republic was impossible without vote restrictions; it is still impossible; look around you at the “greed of the poor” amongst the maelstrom of decompensation.
Of interest, the government of China most resembles the government of the American Founders, with exponentially severe limited public voting for a Congress that elects a president and passes laws.
The overriding compelling difference is the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
_________________________________________________________________________________
“Constitutional Allocation of Authority and Limitations on the Right to Vote”
“Under the original United States Constitution, voter qualifications for federal offices were largely determined by the states (Article I, §§2 and 4; Article II, §1), subject to Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections….”
– ChatGPT
Great
Great
The unusually loyal supporters of Donald Trump are often described as a cult. How can we understand this extreme phenomenon in U.S. politics? We develop theoretical expectations and use the Big Five personality dimensions to investigate whether Trump’s most loyal supporters share personality characteristics that might make them inclined to cult-like support. We find that (1) Trump’s supporters share high levels of Conscientiousness; (2) this is substantively and statistically distinguishable from the commonly identified association between Conscientiousness and Conservatism; and (3) the association is highly robust to a range of sensitivity tests. Our main findings are robust across two surveys. Study 1 is an online survey conducted in 2021 designed specifically for this project. Study 2 is the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES).
INTRODUCTION
How can we understand the strong loyalty shown to Donald Trump by a large section of the United States electorate? This loyalty has persisted after his 2020 election loss, and the most devoted supporters are often characterized as a “cult.” These loyalists have been an enabling force for Trump’s reshaping of the Republican Party (GOP) and U.S. politics more broadly. Arguably, no other U.S. politician in the post-World War II era has received such strong and consistent devotion, even after being voted out of office. Bender and Goodman (2023) claim “[i]t is Mr. Trump’s base of hard-core followers, who show up to his rallies in force, that has allowed him to maintain his grip on the party despite a pattern of dangerous, discordant behavior that would have sunk most traditional politicians.” This support appears detached from ideology or policy success. At least in part due to this core of personally loyal supporters, Trump has been able to turn the GOP into a party of what some term “explicit” White nationalism (Massey, 2021, p. 5), while the United States has shifted onto the list of potentially backsliding democracies (e.g., International IDEA, 2021).
While the concept of a personality cult is rarely discussed in the political science literature on U.S. politics, it has been frequently referenced in the news media to characterize Trump’s appeal. For example, in June 2018, the Editorial Board of The New York Times noted “the striking degree to which President Trump has transformed the Republican Party from a political organization into a cult of personality.” Figure 1 shows a considerable increase in the monthly rate of articles in The New York Times with at least one mention of the phrase “personality cult” or “cult of personality” (blue squares) and in the 6-monthly right-aligned moving average (blue line) from June 2015, when Trump formally announced his candidacy, reaching a peak in late 2020 and early 2021. A similar pattern emerges for articles mentioning “Trump” and “cult” in the same paragraph (red dots/line).1
Details are in the caption following the image
FIGURE 1
Open in figure viewer
PowerPoint
Monthly articles, January 2010 – October 2022.
In this article, we use two studies to investigate whether individual personality characteristics can help us understand the extreme loyalty of Trump’s “base” of supporters. Study 1 is an online survey of U.S. adults designed for this project. Study 2 is the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES). We employ the Big Five personality dimensions (Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Openness), which have been consistently associated with political attitudes (Carney et al., 2008; Fortunato et al., 2018; Gerber et al., 2010, 2012, 2013; Mondak, 2010; Mondak & Halperin, 2008). Gerber et al. (2010) show that personality traits rival factors such as income and education as correlates of political behavior.
A striking finding across these two studies conducted more than 4 years apart (September 2016 – January 2017 and April 2021) is that the most loyal Trump supporters have high scores on Conscientiousness, and particularly its Self-Discipline facet, even controlling for Republican identification, Conservatism, and several other variables.
CULTS, PERSONALITY, AND POLITICAL LOYALTY
Cults and cult members
Although the sociological literature on new religious movements (“cults”) is large (Dawson, 2006; Hammer & Rothstein 2012; Robbins, 1988), relatively few studies focus specifically on the common traits of cult followers (Lewis, 2014). Dawson’s (1996, 2006) influential reviews distill competing psychological and rationalist arguments. Dawson finds psychological arguments better supported but judges the evidence thin and conclusions speculative. These arguments, drawing especially on Lofland and Stark (1965), focus on vulnerable individuals turning to cults for self-reaffirmation. “Joiners” suffer low self-esteem due to disillusioning experiences and look to belief and ideology to bolster a positive self-image (Levine, 1984). The rationalist stream of research focuses on ideas of relative deprivation (e.g., Glock, 1964), with cult members seeking to compensate for social inequities through affirmation and status.
Lewis (2014) notes that the literature on cult membership suffers from a “significantly inadequate quantitative empirical base” (pp. 2, 7). He also finds a case-selection bias toward the most controversial cults. To help correct this, Lewis uses cross-national census and survey data to provide evidence he claims undermines the “unexamined assumptions” and “conventional wisdom” that cult members have similar demographic characteristics.
We get some relevant insights from this literature. First, despite much theorizing, there is no consensus around a single theory of the personal characteristics of cult followers. Second, existing studies are mainly based on small samples, potentially subject to selection bias, and overwhelmingly use qualitative evidence. Third, fundamental personality characteristics in general, and the Big Five in particular, are rarely discussed. Studies mentioning personality tend not to use standard or well-elaborated concepts or measures, such that their contributions are hard to characterize (e.g., Elegbeleye, 2005; Walsh et al., 1995).
In what follows, we draw on the existing literature on cult members where possible, but also turn to cognate research and our own arguments. Specifically, we draw on studies of dogmatism and obedience, as well as Sundahl’s (2023) recent theoretical discussion of the nature of political personality cults.
The Big Five
In this section, we develop theoretical expectations for each of the Big Five personality dimensions and extreme political followership. We expect that cult members’ extreme followership is characterized by unwavering loyalty to, and persistent agreement with, a leader. Cult members do not simply share the leader’s policy positions or believe the leader can effectively achieve specific ends. They adopt the leader’s direction and positions unreservedly and unquestioningly. We argue that adopting, practicing, and displaying such loyalty can be psychologically fulfilling in itself. Individuals feeling anxious and vulnerable, and seeking disciplined obedience and unquestioned leadership, are drawn to personality cults. As Walsh et al. (1995) suggest, people seeking others’ acceptance, guidance, and support are more likely to join cults. A personality cult, Pittman (2017, pp. 540–42) writes, may provide a sense of belonging to an imagined extended family led by a supreme patriarch.
Cult members’ view of their leader, Sundahl (2023) writes, is characterized by resilience of authority, as the leader’s status is not contingent on political success; symbolic elevation of the leader above others in society; and religious parallels in the representations of the leader and associated practices. We discuss how we operationalize these three aspects of cult followership in the Research Design section.
In this section, we offer conjectures about how each of the Big Five might incline individuals to strong loyalty to a political leader. The Big Five are “big” as each summarizes several more specific personality characteristics. We therefore follow Soto and John (2009) in breaking down each dimension into two facets. While we discuss some facet-level expectations, our theorizing is mainly at the higher level of the Big Five because of limited literature on the facets and political behavior.
Agreeableness is associated with being affectionate, appreciative, kind, soft-hearted, and warm. Its facets are Altruism and Compliance.2 We expect the most loyal Trump supporters to score low on this dimension. High Agreeableness has been connected to being less persuaded by weak arguments and more persuaded by strong arguments (Xia & Habashi, 2015). Agreeableness appears connected to critical attention rather than the dogmatic acceptance associated with cult followership. Cult members are ready to dogmatically defend the views of the cult and its leader against political opponents.
Gerber et al. (2011) find an association between Agreeableness and aversion to political conflict. Trump loyalists are often presented as open to conflict and confrontation. Other studies find Agreeableness is negatively associated with political interest and knowledge (Gerber et al., 2011a; Mondak, 2010; Mondak & Halperin, 2008). Low Agreeableness could therefore be connected to the firm political engagement of cult members (although dogmatic followership might be incompatible with political knowledge).
Conscientiousness is associated with being efficient, organized, reliable, responsible, and thorough. Its facets are Order and Self-Discipline. We expect the most loyal Trump supporters to get high scores on Conscientiousness, as extreme political followership might be based on an appreciation for the self-discipline required by a leader who demands unwavering loyalty. Conscientiousness is associated with obedience to others’ demands (Mashiko, 2008), as well as intolerance for uncertainty (Zmigrod et al., 2018), which might explain the view of a leader as infallible.
Conscientiousness is further tied to inflexibility, consistent with dogmatic followership, and to a desire for achievement through conformance (McCrae et al., 1993). The strong extreme conformity of converts to cults is found to give a sense of independence, especially from parental control (Levine, 1984; Walsh et al., 1995) and “individual accomplishment” (Straus, 1979). This connection is also found in studies on dogmatism (Duckitt, 2009). Committed obedience requires Self-Discipline, but may also bring desired Order to an individual’s life.
Fortunato et al. (2018) found a high level of Conscientiousness among Trump voters during the 2016 primaries. They consider this a function of supporters’ perceptions of Trump himself as Conscientious, but add that Trump’s behavior after taking office cannot be perceived as Conscientious. At least one systematic study of expert perceptions of Trump’s personality found he was low in Conscientiousness (Nai & Maier, 2018). Thus, our expectations are not based on this homophily proposition.
Extraversion is associated with being active, assertive, energetic, outgoing, and outspoken. Its facets are Assertiveness and Activity. There is no obvious connection between Extraversion and cult followership. Obedience to authority, for example, is neither positively nor negatively associated with Extraversion (Mashiko, 2008). We discuss Extraversion in more detail below when considering potential confounding factors.
Neuroticism is associated with being anxious, moody, nervous, tense, touchy, and worried. Its facets are Anxiety and Depression. We expect high levels of Neuroticism among loyal Trump supporters, since anxiety and a tendency to worry could explain a desire for purpose and stability provided by a strong leader. Emotional vulnerability is connected to recruitment to cults (Curtis & Curtis, 1993). Lofland and Stark (1965) find dissatisfaction with current life situation and conflicting motivations to make individuals predisposed to join cults. They feel vulnerable and seek approval and security in the cult. We therefore expect Trump loyalists to score highly especially on the Anxiety facet.
Psychologists have found a high prevalence of neurotic personality characteristics in adherents of religious cults, although these studies are few and based on convenience samples (Levine & Salter, 1976; Rousselet et al., 2017). Some find a connection between Neuroticism and obedience (Zeigler-Hill et al., 2013), while others do not (Mashiko, 2008; Rim, 1984).
Finally, Openness is associated with being curious, imaginative, insightful, intellectual, original, and widely interested. Its facets are Openness to Ideas and Openness to Artistic Expression, or “Aesthetics.” We expect to find low levels of Openness, and especially of Openness to Ideas, among loyal Trump supporters, as extreme followership is contradictory to being reflective, imaginative, and receptive to new ideas and information. It conflicts with dogmatism (Costa & McCrae, 1992a). Mashiko (2008), however, finds no association between Openness and obedience to authority.
Social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism
In addition to these personality dimensions, we measure social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). These are commonly categorized as values3 or social attitudes (Duckitt, 2001; Pratto et al., 2006), since they are more context-dependent and affected by social and political influences than the personality dimensions (Caspi et al., 2005; Costa & McCrae, 1992b; Gosling et al., 2003). RWA is an intragroup phenomenon concerning relationships between individuals of the same group. Duckitt et al. (2010) convincingly identify three elements of RWA: obedience (Conservatism), moral conformity (Traditionalism), and strict social control (Authoritarianism). SDO, on the other hand, is an intergroup phenomenon concerning relationships between ingroups and outgroups. It expresses a desire for one group’s superiority over another.
We expect loyal Trump supporters to score highly on both SDO and RWA, as others have found (Dean & Altemeyer, 2019; we discuss related literature in Section 7 of the online supporting information). A key concern for our study is that RWA and SDO are related to the Big Five. Openness is negatively associated with RWA, and both Openness and Agreeableness are negatively associated with SDO (Akrami & Ekehammar, 2006). Perceived threat, which can be tied to Neuroticism, is related to authoritarianism (Feldmann & Stenner, 1997). Extraversion has been associated with both RWA (Ekehammar et al., 2004; Huddy & Del Ponte, 2020) and SDO (Caprara & Vecchione, 2013; Hofstetter, 2023).
We therefore include both RWA (all three elements) and SDO as controls in our analysis to distinguish the association of these social attitudes from more fundamental personality characteristics.
Ideology and populism
We also control for the Big Five’s association with political ideology and populism. The most robust findings are that Conscientiousness is associated with Conservatism (Carney et al., 2008; Gerber et al., 2010; Gosling et al., 2003; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Sibley et al., 2012) and Openness with Liberal ideology (Carney et al., 2008; Gerber et al., 2010; Gosling et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2003; McCrae, 1996; Mondak & Halperin, 2008; Sibley et al., 2012; Van Hiel et al., 2000; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2004; Xu et al., 2021). Trump supporters are characterized by Conservatism and a corresponding aversion to Liberalism (see Section 7 of the online supporting information for further related literature).
Trump is often portrayed as a populist politician. However, not all populist leaders receive such personal loyalty from their voters (Fierman, 2021). There is evidence for some association between the Big Five and populism. Agreeableness is negatively associated with support for populist parties (Ackermann et al., 2018; Bakker et al., 2016, 2021), while Conscientiousness may be positively related to such support (Ackermann et al., 2018; Aichholzer et al., 2018). Extraversion may also be related to support for populists (Ackermann et al., 2018) or simply strong partisanship (Gerber et al., 2010).
It will therefore be important for us to show that any association between loyalty to Trump and the Big Five is not confounded by either Conservative or Liberal ideology, including ideological self-identification or identification with a political party, or with factors common among supporters of populist leaders in general.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Data5
We designed a survey specifically for this study and fielded it online using Lucid Marketplace among 1038 U.S. residents in April 2021 (Study 1). We used quotas for age, sex, race, region, and education based on the U.S. census (full details in the online supporting information). We subsequently became aware of a short-form measure of the Big Five in the 2016 ANES (Study 2), enabling us to make reasonable, although not exact, comparisons for many of our analyses.
The timing of Study 1 allows us to assess the loyalty of Trump supporters following his election loss in November 2020 and the end of his presidency in January 2021. The survey has three sections, containing items for measuring, first, the Big Five, second, SDO and RWA, and third, Trump’s presidency and the 2020 election and its aftermath. We thus follow Gerber et al.’s (2011b, p. 283) recommendation to place the personality section before the politics section to reduce the potential for biased estimates of personality and outcomes.
Positions along the personality dimensions are indicated by respondents’ attitudes toward a list of statements, presented in randomized order, using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” In the political science literature, short 10-item personality batteries, and especially Gosling et al.’s (2003) Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI), are standardly used. However, these have disadvantages in terms of reliability and validity (John et al., 2008, pp. 137–38) and may underestimate the relation between personality and political ideology (Bakker & Lelkes, 2018). Longer inventories also allow for assessment of the facets of each personality dimension.4
We therefore use John et al.’s (1991) 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI), with nine items for Agreeableness, nine for Conscientiousness, eight for Extraversion, eight for Neuroticism, and 10 for Openness. The BFI has higher internal consistency, convergence, and discriminant validity than other long-form Big Five measurements (John et al., 2008, pp. 131–38). We follow Soto and John’s (2009, p. 89) advice and adjust the BFI using an “acquiescence scale” to correct for potential bias introduced by pro- and con-trait items. We also follow their procedure for coding the two facets of each Big Five dimension.
Study 2 uses the TIPI but reveals a similar connection between the Big Five and loyal followers of Trump to that found in Study 1. Study 2 places the TIPI battery after most of the politics-related questions in the survey, but this would not make it more likely to yield results consistent with Study 1. The TIPI is also asked in the postelection survey, so questions from the preelection portion of the ANES are unlikely to affect it.
In Study 1, to measure RWA, we employ Duckitt et al.’s (2010) battery, which includes six items for each RWA dimension. For SDO, we use Pratto et al.’s (1994) 16-item battery on attitudes toward (in)equality between groups and social dominance. These employ the same 5-point Likert scales.
In Study 2, we construct measures for the three elements of RWA and for SDO based on the available questions, attempting to reflect the measures used in Study 1 as closely as possible. We give these variables slightly different names from those in Study 1 to indicate they are not based on identical survey items (see Table S1 in the online supporting information for details). We use eight items to construct an Authoritarian index, five items for a Tradition index, and self-placement on a 7-point Liberal–Conservative scale to measure Conservative ideology. We use three items to construct a Dominance index.
The political part of the Study 1 survey consists of 18 items about Trump during and after his presidency, the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election and Trump’s claim that it was stolen, as well as the storming of the Capitol and Trump’s role in this event. The items are largely adopted from surveys conducted by Axios–Ipsos (2021) and Washington Post–ABC (2021).
To measure loyalty to Trump, we seek indicators of broad and dogmatic loyalty, as discussed above. These identify individuals who tend to strongly support Trump based on who he is, rather than those who have high, but not perfect, levels of agreement based on Trump’s policies or specific achievements.
In Study 1, we selected seven items to measure extreme loyalty to Trump, our main dependent variable, which we label “Trump Followers.” Strong Trump followers (1) voted for Trump in 2020, (2) “strongly approve” of Trump’s performance as president, (3) “strongly approve” of his handling of the coronavirus, (4) believe Trump will go down in history as an “above average” or “outstanding” president,6 (5) believe Trump acted “responsibly” after the 2020 election, (6) believe Republican leaders “should follow Trump’s leadership,” and (7) “strongly agree” with the view that mainstream media has treated Trump unfairly.
We consider these responses consistent with Sundahl’s (2023) three parameters of political personality cults. Elevation is apparent in strong approval of Trump’s performance while in office, and in historical legacy better than most or outstanding; resilience is seen in continued faith in Trump’s leadership after his election loss; and religious parallels appear in the view of Trump’s infallibility and persecution suggested by belief in his responsible behavior after the 2020 election and unfair treatment by the news media.
To measure loyalty to Trump in Study 2, which obviously occurred in a different context, we use five items. We code respondents as Trump Followers if they (1) voted for or intended to vote for Trump in 2016, (2) had a Strong Preference for Trump tied to their vote or intended vote, (3) found Nothing to Dislike about Trump, (4) rated Trump at 90 or above on a 0–100 feeling thermometer, and (5) responded that Trump makes them feel Hopeful “most of the time” or “always.” Coding this variable based on evidence collected in the preelection wave of the survey where possible (items 3–5) helps it conform to Sundahl’s resilience element: These are not influenced by knowledge of Trump’s success in the election.
While we consider these “all-in” indicators of extreme followership theoretically appropriate for identifying cult-like followers of Trump, we also examine the robustness of our results using different indicators which allow more equivocal views of Trump.
In addition, to identify the broader pool of individuals at least moderately positively disposed toward Trump, we created a Trump Index based on the seven (Study 1) or five (Study 2) variables. This is a continuous 0–1 index of support for Trump in each study, which gives equal weight to pro-Trump responses to each item. For our main analysis, we focus on the subset of respondents who score above the mean on each index (.39 in Study 1 and .32 in Study 2; see the online supporting information for details and further descriptive statistics). This reflects the assumption that only respondents positively disposed toward Trump are likely to become very loyal followers. However, our results are very similar if we use the full sample for each study (see the online supporting information).
All items used in the analysis for Study 1 and Study 2 are standardized on a 0–1 scale for ease of comparison. Summary statistics, including for several control variables, are presented in Table 1. These include the population-weighted means for Study 2, which we use in the analyses. Weighting the Study 1 data based on age and gender categories from the U.S. Census leads to some changes in average values, including bringing the percentage of older respondents closer to that of Study 2. However, we present unweighted results for Study 1 because it was not designed to be a probability sample (Till & Matei, 2017).7 Results change little with the weighted sample. We focus on results robust across both the unweighted Study 1 and the weighted Study 2 samples.
TABLE 1. Survey data, Studies 1 and 2.
Study 1 (2021) Study 2 (2016)
Unweighted Mean Weighted Mean Unweighted Mean (above average on Trump index) Unweighted Mean Weighted Mean Weighted Mean (above average on Trump index)
Trump Follower 0.10 0.11 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.14
Trump Index 0.39 0.40 0.71 0.32 0.32 0.71
Agreeableness 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.71 0.70 0.69
Conscientiousness 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.79 0.78 0.80
Extraversion 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.54
Neuroticism (1)/Stability (2) 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.67 0.66 0.67
Openness 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.68 0.68 0.64
Conservatism (1)/Conservative (2) 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.71
Traditionalism (1)/Tradition (2) 0.52 0.52 0.57 0.26 0.25 0.41
Authoritarianism (1)/Authoritarian (2) 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.36 0.36 0.47
Social Dominance Orientation (1)/Dominance (2) 0.40 0.40 0.47 0.29 0.29 0.44
White 0.79 0.78 0.84 0.77 0.75 0.87
Female 0.56 0.52 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.52
GOP 0.25 0.27 0.47 0.32 0.32 0.63
Age 45 or older 0.47 0.54 0.48 0.60 0.58 0.67
High School or less 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.19 0.30 0.34
Religious (1)/Church (2) 0.59 0.58 0.69 0.38 0.37 0.49
Left–Right Ideology 0.58 0.58 0.69 0.56 0.57 0.73
Note: Sample sizes for Trump Follower, Big Five, GOP and Conservative/Conservatism: Study 1: 1038 (Unweighted), 1033 (Weighted), 475 (Unweighted, Above Average on Trump Index); Study 2: 2823 (Unweighted), 3445 (Weighted), 1378 (Weighted, Above Average on Trump Index). Study 1 samples are slightly lower for some other variables due to missing responses (1015 or higher). Study 2 samples vary based on ANES response rates and pre- and/or postelection variable inclusion.
For Study 1, just under 10% (9.8%) of our respondents in the full sample were strong Trump Followers, comprising 33% of Republicans, 5% of Independents, and 0.6% of Democrats. For Study 2, they are just under 6% (5.8%), consisting of 13% of Republicans, 3% of Independents, and 0.8% of Democrats. There are many reasons to expect some differences in the proportion of respondents exhibiting extreme loyalty to Trump, including the 4-year period between the studies and differences in sampling. However, our Trump Index yields proportions more similar (12% and 11%, respectively for Studies 1 and 2) to strong Trump supporters at or above a threshold of 0.9 on the index.
There are other notable differences across the datasets (Table 1). Our online-only sample for Study 1 skews younger and less Republican. Among the Big Five, the Study 1 sample is less Conscientious and less Open. It also has higher scores on Authoritarianism, Traditionalism, and Social Dominance.
Methods
To assess how personality and social attitudes are associated with Trump Followers, we use logistic regression models for our main dependent variable, which is coded “1” when all seven (Study 1) or five (Study 2) responses indicate loyalty to Trump, and “0” otherwise. For the main independent variables, the Big Five, we use the standard indices described above. The full results are provided in Tables S3a–S6 in the online supporting information. We present marginal-effect graphs in the main analysis, showing change in probabilities for each variable moving from the 5th to 95th percentile value, when all other covariates are held at their means.8 Our references to statistical significance also relate to these marginal effects, unless otherwise noted.
While personality is the most fundamental characteristic we measure, we include controls for Conservatism, GOP identification, RWA and SDO, as well as other potential confounders. Gerber et al. (2012), similarly, use a series of attitudinal and demographic controls to assess potential relationships between political attitudes, political partisanship, and the Big Five. The measurement of each variable is described in Table S1 in the online supporting information. Table S2 provides descriptive statistics for the unweighted full samples.
Among our controls are five demographic characteristics. Support for Trump is often shown to be higher among voters who are White, male, older, religious, and less educated (e.g., Morgan & Lee, 2018; Tyson & Maniam, 2016). Race and gender are potentially as fundamental to shaping world view as personality. Personality may also change with the experience and self-awareness that comes with age or education. Religiosity9 may be a fundamental factor shaping world view if produced by childhood socialization. Further, since White Republican men are typically seen as among the largest and most consistent group of Trump supporters (Igielnik et al., 2021), we include an interaction of these categories (Table S6 in the online supporting information). Important studies explaining Trump’s 2016 election victory have pointed to the key role of voters adhering to White identity (Grimmer et al., 2023; Sides et al., 2018). We therefore check the robustness of our findings to a control for this available in Study 2 (Table S9). We discuss controls for characteristics of populist voters below (see also Tables S10 and S11).
RESULTS
Trump Followers and the Big Five
Our initial models show the association between strong loyalty to Trump and the Big Five and the effect of controlling for GOP identification and Conservatism (Figure 2 and Tables S3a–S4b in the online supporting information10). The models in Figure 2 are restricted to the subset of respondents who score above the mean on the Trump Index (n = 475 in Study 1 and n = 1378 in Study 2). This analysis can thus establish whether, among all Trump supporters, there is a subset distinct in terms of degree of support and personality characteristics. Figure S3 (see the online supporting information) presents very similar results for the full samples.
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FIGURE 2
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Studies 1 and 2: Personality, party, and conservatism. Marginal Effect plots for logistic regression models. The sample is all respondents scoring above the mean value on the Trump Index (Study 1: mean = 0.39, n = 475; Study 2: mean = 0.32, n = 1378 (with GOP and Conservative controls)). Marginal effects are calculated for movement from the 5th to 95th percentile values for each variable (within this sample), while holding all other variables at their means.
Without controls, Studies 1 and 2 show a positive association between Conscientiousness and Trump Followers and a negative association between Openness and Trump Followers (left panels, Figure 2). There is also a significant positive association with Extraversion in Study 2 (bottom-left panel). But when the controls for GOP identification and Conservatism are introduced (right panels), the relationship between Openness and Trump Followers shrinks in magnitude and becomes statistically insignificant in both datasets. GOP identification in both studies, unsurprisingly, is strongly associated with followership of Trump, as is Conservative ideology in Study 2. But Conscientiousness remains positively related to Trump Followers in both studies. Extraversion is no longer significantly associated with Trump Followers in Study 2 (p = .198) with these controls.11
These results are robust to two basic choices about the relevant sets of respondents for our concept: who we consider a strong Trump follower and how wide we cast the net for a sample of possible Trump loyalists. Figure 3 (left panels) shows our analysis for a different coding of the outcome variable. For each study, we categorize strong Trump support as a score greater than 0.9 on the Trump Index. This yields roughly equal proportions in each study (12% in Study 1 and 11% in Study 2; in the online supporting information (Figures S7 and S8, Table S8), we show multinomial logit results on the full sample using four categories: Strong Opposition, Moderate Opposition, Moderate Support, and Strong Support). Conscientiousness remains statistically significant in both studies and has the largest magnitude of the Big Five, although Extraversion is also significantly associated with this less stringent measure of strong Trump support in Study 2 (Tables S7a–S7b in the online supporting information).
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FIGURE 3
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Studies 1 and 2: Alternative dependent variable and GOP/primary respondents only. Marginal Effect plots for logistic regression models. The sample for the left panels is all respondents scoring above the mean on the Trump Index (Study 1: mean = 0.39, n = 475; Study 2: mean = 0.32, n = 1378). The sample for the right panels is all self-identified Republicans (Study 1, n = 264) or all Republican Primary voters (Study 2, n = 670), and the dependent variable is Trump Follower. Marginal effects are calculated for movement from the 5th to 95th percentile values for each variable (within the sample), while holding all other variables at their means.
Analysis based on the sample of only Republican respondents (Study 1) and Republican Primary Voters (Study 2) is also shown in Figure 3 (right panels). Conscientiousness is the only personality dimension showing a significant association with Trump Followers, consistent with our results in Figure 2. In Table S16 in the online supporting information, we show similar patterns in Study 1 among self-identified “Trump Republicans,” those who strongly support Trump in 2024, and in Study 2 for Trump voters in 2016. However, among self-identified 2020 Trump voters in Study 1, Conscientiousness does not produce a significant coefficient associated with being a strong Trump Follower, although it remains positive and of the greatest magnitude among the Big Five (Marginal effect = 0.27, p = .22).
We prefer to use the sample of U.S. adults above average on our Trump Index because, as an unconventional Republican leader, Trump appears to attract strong support from non-Republicans, and these “swing voters” can be an important factor in elections. For similar reasons, we believe results on the full sample are also relevant. These are also highly consistent with our main findings (see Table S7b in the online supporting information).
When we examine a wide range of potential confounding factors including interaction terms for gender, race, and party identification, for RWA and SDO (Study 1), and for the corresponding three “Right” variables and Dominance (Study 2) (Figure S4 and Tables S5 and S6 in the online supporting information), this relationship between Conscientiousness and Trump Followers remains significant and of roughly stable magnitude in each study, increasing the chance of showing strong loyalty to Trump by about 10 to 15% in Study 1 and about 22 to 29% in Study 2, for a movement from the 5th to the 95th percentile values on the Conscientiousness index. In Study 1, this is somewhat lower than the impact of GOP identification or Conservatism. In Study 2, it is somewhat higher than the impact of GOP identification but substantially lower than that of Conservative ideology.
In the online supporting information, we also show that our findings are robust to inclusion of variables for White identity (e.g., Grimmer et al., 2023; Sides et al., 2018), populism-related controls for gender, income, education, and their interaction in Study 1 and a Populist Voter variable in Study 2 (Spruyt et al., 2016), an alternative Left–Right ideology variable, using a Generalized Structural Equation Modeling (GSEM), and using multiple imputation for missing data on the full sample in Study 2 (p = .082 for Conscientiousness) (Figures S9–S16 and Tables S9–S14 in the online supporting information).
Facets of conscientiousness
In this section, we contrast how the Self-Discipline and Order facets of Conscientiousness are associated with Trump Followers and Conservatism and further examine the nature of the relationship between the facets and Trump Followers. Using Study 1, we code a binary variable for Conservatism to allow comparison across logit models, taking values of 1 if a respondent is in the top 10% on the Conservatism scale, otherwise 0.12 We do not use Study 2 for this analysis because the TIPI has only one survey item corresponding to each facet and is not recommended for such use (Gosling et al., 2003, pp. 523–24).
Self-Discipline is significantly related to Trump Followers, while Order is associated with Conservatism (Figure 4, Table S15a in the online supporting information), consistent with Xu et al. (2021). Altruism is positively and significantly associated with Conservatism, while Openness to Ideas is negatively associated and significant. Contrary to our conjecture regarding Neuroticism, counter-vailing tendencies of its facets do not emerge in association with strong Trump Followers. Across the Big Five, Self-Discipline is significantly associated with Trump Followers at p < .05, as is Active (Extraversion). Assertive (Extraversion) (p = .07) and Aesthetics (Openness) (p = .09) also approach standard significance. We show this model without a control for Conservatism to provide a direct comparison to the model using Conservative as a dependent variable. However, when the control for Conservatism is reintroduced, only Self-Discipline remains statistically significant (see Table S15a). These results indicate substantive differences, increasing our confidence that our results regarding Conscientiousness and Trump Followers are not an artifact of Conservatives' support for Trump.
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FIGURE 4
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Trump followers, conservatism, and facets of the Big Five. Marginal Effect plots for logistic regression models. The sample is all respondents scoring above the mean value on the Trump Index (Study 1: mean = 0.39, n = 475). Marginal effects are calculated for movement from the 5th to 95th percentile values for each variable (within the sample), while holding all other variables at their means.
When we assess the two-way interactions of several facets based on our theoretical discussion, few clear conditional relationships emerge with Trump Followers. For example, we find no statistically significant interaction effects between Anxiety (Neuroticism) and Compliance (Agreeableness), nor between Assertiveness (Agreeableness) and Compliance. We do find some evidence of an interaction between Self-Discipline and Compliance, at the highest values of Self-Discipline.13
The distribution of Conscientiousness, Order, and Self-Discipline scores for Trump loyalists and other groups of respondents further illustrates the distinctiveness of Trump loyalists. Specifically, Figure 5 presents kernel density plots for All respondents, those Above the Mean on the Trump Index, Conservatives, GOP identifiers, and non-GOP identifiers (Democrats or Independents) using Study 1. In all instances, Trump Loyalists show substantially greater density for high values of Conscientiousness and Self-Discipline than others in each category. The differences are least pronounced, but still apparent, when the comparison is among Conservatives. The pattern is less pronounced for the Order facet.
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FIGURE 5
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Kernel density plots (Study 1): Trump followers compared with all other respondents in each group (All Respondents, Above the Mean on the Trump Index, Conservatives, Republicans, and Non-Republicans).
We can analyze the facets of Conscientiousness further to provide greater precision in the evidence supporting the association between Self-Discipline and cult-like followership. Specifically, only Self-Discipline is associated with all three alternative multi-item measures (described in Section 9 of the online supporting information) of strongest belief in Trump's Leadership, Trump's Status, and belief that Trump won the 2020 election (Figure 6). On the other hand, Self-Discipline is not associated with strongest Job Approval for Trump while president. We interpret this as consistent with the concept of a personality cult in that the leader is in a position of elevation and resilience. Resilience means followership does not depend on specific accomplishments (Job Approval), while elevation is reflected in exceptionally high belief in Status and Leadership. A religious element might be seen in belief in the 2020 Election Win, reflecting faith in Trump as both truthful and infallible.
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FIGURE 6
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Aspects of Trump followers and facets of the Big Five (Study 1). The sample is those scoring Above Average on the Trump Index (mean = 0.39, n = 475). Each dependent variable is an index as described in Section 9 of the online supporting information.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The American Psychological Association (2022) defines the phenomenon of a personality cult as “exaggerated devotion to a charismatic political, religious, or other leader, often fomented by authoritarian figures or regimes as a means of maintaining their power.” This reflects the concept's historical association with authoritarian regimes using state-controlled media and education for mythmaking around a leader, while stifling criticism (Plamper, 2012: p. xvii). It is therefore surprising to see it frequently used about supporters of a recent U.S. president (Figure 1).
There has been little analysis of whether certain types of voters in democracies might be inclined to such extreme loyalty to a political leader. Research in political science has been limited to a focus on elite motivations for, and political uses of, political personality cults (Crabtree et al., 2020; Gill, 1984). Most major works on the topic have been produced by historians, focusing on specific cases and leaders (Kershaw, 1987; Plamper, 2012). To the best of our knowledge, no study to date focuses on the characteristics of individual citizens associated with political personality cults. The topic is important in any context to better understand the nature, extent, and limits of mass engagement, and especially important in democracies, where citizens are free to choose whether to “buy into” or reject the cult. Other democratic leaders, including India's Narendra Modi, have also recently been described as leading political personality cults (e.g., Guha, 2022).
Our analysis suggests some U.S. voters show an extreme, cult-like loyalty to Trump rather than to a party or policies. Why might citizens in a democratic system show such unquestioning loyalty to an individual leader?
During the 2016 election, Ekins (2017) found that among Trump voters, 31% were “staunch conservatives,” 25% “free marketeers,” 20% “American preservationist,” 19% “antielite,” and 5% “disengaged.” However, we contend that, for the most loyal supporters, Trump's appeal is based more on psychological needs met by his leadership style than on policy preferences or ideology. During the 2016 Republican convention, Trump famously claimed “I am your voice” and “I alone can fix it.” Such claims indicate the sort of leader–follower relationship typical of personality cults.
Sundahl's (2023) qualitative description of Trump's self-presentation and imagery conforms to her categories of elevation, resilience, and religious parallels. To assess whether such idealizing and loyalty to a leader might be connected to personality, we proposed five conjectures, expecting a positive association between two of the Big Five (Conscientiousness and Neuroticism) and the strongest levels of Trump support, a negative association for two (Agreeableness and Openness), and no association for one (Extraversion). Of these, only our expectations regarding Conscientiousness and Extraversion found empirical support. Thus, we do not claim to have fully confirmed our personality-based theory of extreme political followership. But the article provides a solid foundation for future theorizing and empirical work in a new but potentially crucial area of research, and we encourage further tests in new data and for different cases.
We provide robust evidence that Conscientiousness in particular distinguishes Trump's most loyal followers from broader groups of his supporters, including those with an overall above-average inclination toward him, other Republicans, and Conservatives. We also provide evidence that the cult-like aspects of Trump's Leadership are core elements perceived by followers sharing the characteristics of a Conscientious personality, and the Self-Discipline facet specifically. These relate most directly to elevation and resilience.
Trump's call for loyalty and claim that he “alone can fix it,” we argue, appeal to a desire for discipline by giving a cause individuals can (and must) fully commit to. Trump demands commitment well beyond that implied by typical politicians in democratic systems. He denigrates not only ideological and electoral opponents but also those who might share power or authority within his ideological and political cohort. He is a jealous political leader and does not brook divided or shared loyalty. Citizens who sense this and are inclined to high levels of Self-Discipline, we argue, find the allure of Trump's leadership appealing because it meets a basic need making them susceptible to personalistic, loyalty-demanding leaders.
While our survey did not directly probe the religious-parallels aspect of extreme followership (Sundahl's study was published after we fielded the survey), we identify elements of infallibility, such as belief in Trump's so-called “big lie” of the stolen 2020 election. This aspect of extreme followership in politics should be explored in future research, but it seems plausible that Trump's most loyal supporters perceive his leadership with religious parallels. For example, Onishi (2021) writes that “MAGAism [Make-America-Great-Again-ism] is buttressed by religious narratives and imagery, and its gospel is spread through houses of worship every Sunday. For some evangelicals, Mr. Trump is a divinely ordained savior uniquely ordained to save the nation from ruin.” Sundahl (2023, pp. 448–49) notes prominent figures in Trump's circle reference him in religious terms, including a Cabinet Secretary (“the chosen one”), a former campaign manager (“only God could deliver such a savior to our nation”), and a former Congresswoman (“a … godly, biblical president”).
To help understand U.S. politics from 2016 onwards, and particularly the unusual and disruptive role of Donald Trump, we point to Trump's self-presentation as a savior. In 2023, after declaring his presidential candidacy, he said: “In 2016, I declared, ‘I am your voice…’. Today, I add: I am your warrior. I am your justice. And for those who have been wronged and betrayed, I am your retribution” (Haberman & Goldmacher, 2023). Our results suggest that Trump's attraction extends beyond policy and the politics of Conservatism or Populism. While the results across our five conjectures were mixed, the robust findings across two studies for Conscientiousness, and for the Self-Discipline facet in Study 1, are not easily dismissed and worth further investigation. We contend that, for his most committed followers, the attraction is personality-based — both in terms of Trump's self-presentation to citizens and in terms of the personality characteristics making some citizens attracted to such leadership. Trump's appeal appears to fit Sundahl's (2023) three characteristics of a personality cult. The phenomenon of a political personality cult may have arrived in full force in U.S. democracy — and could potentially be its undoing.
Let me fix this bizarre, intensely-one-sided, self-serving, and extreme-diatribe [as evidence of the unhinged, personality cults of the left, in self-fulfillment; as they speak, so they reveal themselves:
We contend that [Biden, made a hero despite dementia, and Harris, made a hero despite word-salad-emptiness, and even Don Lemon, made a hero despite being removed from mainstream media for biased inanity] for their most committed followers, the attraction is personality-based — both in terms of their self-presentation to citizens and in terms of the personality characteristics making some citizens attracted to such leadership….
THEIR appeal appears to fit Sundahl’s (2023) three characteristics of a personality cult.
“Let me fix this bizarre, intensely-one-sided, self-serving, and extreme-diatribe”
Please tell me that you didn’t read that entire interminable load of h0rs3sh1t. I skimmed the first line and my response was going to restricted to:
And after Joe Kennedy bought the Oval Office for his son, the Cult of Camelot was inflicted upon us. So f*cking what?
Anybody read that? NOPE, and no one will.
And, as fopr Don, only a crazy (yes you, Don) would waste time and bother and pretend he’s smarter.
The stupid stuff and time wasting stuff you do to prove you’re smarter.
Spending 10 hours a day here is insanity. And ole don is insane.
No MAGA is not a cult.
No amount of psychobabble that accomplishes nothing except increasing distrust of left wing nut academia will change the fact that Cults are not made of near majorities of people.
Nor does it change that Cults require near perfect unity on everything not just the political
Cults tend to be the same race, the same religion – usually their own fringe religion.
BTW conservatives are more agreeable than liberals.
Darren,
BAN FOR LIFE!
This extremely long pseudo-scientific smear of Republicans should remind of how the leaders of the Soviet Union, the purest expression of the left-wing mind, dealt with dissidents — they put them in mental institutions.
Very early in 2024 the bald black female chief of the DNC guaranteed positively the DNC would prohibit any primary Challenger for their brain dead Biden.
6 months later after the first debate, when it was clear to the universe bit Biden was indeed brain dead, the same DNC anointed Harris as the new candidate replacing Brain Dead Biden.
When Harris dropped out of the 2020 race she had amassed a whopping 2% approval rating among Democrats, and lost every single primary in which she participated.
I don’t see why the DNC doesn’t just permanently eliminate primary voting. The leaders of the DNC obviously hate voting and hate allowing choice.
If I were most of the readers today I would go to the website of the NIRS and look at who founded it (in 2007), who they are (basically a nonpartisan NGO) with special emphasis on Defined Benefit Plans. So I would interpret this as an organization that is not necessarily in favor of defined contribution plans such as 401K’s.
I do remember that a common tactic of taking over businesses in the past was to buy them, pay off the defined benefits owed to employees in the pension plan, and keep the rest of the money for the company that did they buying. You really can’t do that with a 401K. It was one of the reasons we abandoned the defined benefit pension plan and went to a 401 K in the 1980’s. It was a top heavy plan so the employees got 2 dollars from the company for every dollar they contributed and was a strong selling point to keep employees involved and our employees loved it.
When we were acquired years later we were able to keep our 401 K separate from the larger group that acquired us until they brought there 401 K up to snuff with better funding given to the lower paid employees and expanded offerings of choices to invest in.
The employees of the company that acquired us gave us KUDOS for improving their retirement.
401K plans are not a panacea but when managed right and are fair for both higher and lower paid employees it can be a tremendous asset to your company and you also have happy employees.
Thank you trump, thank you JT for making America weaker than we have been in 20+ years.
“Despite all the hype, China is on track to register its lowest share of U.S. soybean exports since 2002.”
Wait, weren’t tariffs supposed to make us great? What a farce.
“Thank you trump, thank you JT for making America weaker than we have been in 20+ years.”
How so ?
“Despite all the hype, China is on track to register its lowest share of U.S. soybean exports since 2002.”
Soybeen futures are up for the year.
US Soy priced are double that of 2002
“Wait, weren’t tariffs supposed to make us great? What a farce.”
Tarriff revenue is 384B/yr, US real inflation was 2.1% lower than at anytime under Biden.
One factor, often ignored, is the deprivation of generational financial support related to one-parent families. Children and grandchildren from broken homes, and especially those raised by single moms, are far more likely to confront adulthood without the support so often needed to negotiate our economy. Lacking a parent or grandparent possessing the financial and tactical assets necessary to help them over hurdles both obvious (immature spending) and unforeseeable (illness, spiking inflation, job loss, etc.) can seriously impair the economic survival/standing/future of even the most responsible young adult.
Old school fool,
China’s national savings rate is significantly higher than the U.S., with gross savings at approximately 44-45% of GDP in 2023–2024, compared to roughly 17-18% in the U.S.. Chinese households save a much higher percentage of their income—often over 30%—driven by cultural factors, limited social safety nets, and precautionary savings, while U.S. consumers prioritize higher spending.
“China’s national savings rate is significantly higher than the U.S., with gross savings at approximately 44-45% of GDP in 2023–2024, compared to roughly 17-18% in the U.S.. Chinese households save a much higher percentage of their income—often over 30%—driven by cultural factors, limited social safety nets, and precautionary savings, while U.S. consumers prioritize higher spending.”
all data on China is always suspect – but the Chinese likely do save more than americans.
They also have far less private investment. Most chinese have few places to spend, and few choices for savings – this has resulted in a 16T housing bubble of housing units that will never be completed and wont have anyone to fill them if they do.
We know China is lying about its population. About its growth, about its GDP, about its Debt,
But we do not know how big those lies are.
One demographer beleives there are only 600M people in China – that is 1B missing people – that is problem wrong.
But china’s population could easily be hundreds of millions less than claimed.
Its GDP could easily be half of what is claimed.
China is in deflation right now – mild deflation is good, but steep deflation is really bad,
It is also likley that China is actually in recession – or near recession right now.
There was an attempted Coup against Xi by a loyal follower a week ago.
That does not happen in stable regime.
As a result the top 4000 members of the PLA have been purged.
It appears Xi has held his grip on power.
But the problems that resulted in the attempted coup remain
The chinese people are a great people and they will be a welcome addition to the world when they get rid of the Fascist CCP.
You are failing to keep your “multiple personality posts” sorted correctly according to the nominal poster’s adopted style.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director Todd Lyons said Friday that his agency opened a joint probe with the Justice Department after video evidence revealed that “sworn testimony provided by two separate officers appears to have included untruthful statements” about the shooting of a Venezuelan man during the Trump administration’s immigration crackdown across the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.
“Lying under oath is a serious federal offense,” said Lyons, adding that the U.S. attorney’s office is actively investigating.
U.S. District Court Judge Paul A. Magnuson dismissed felony assault charges against Alfredo Alejandro Aljorna and Julio Cesar Sosa-Celis, who were accused of beating an ICE officer with a broom handle and a snow shovel during a Jan. 14 fracas. The officer fired a single shot from his handgun, striking Sosa-Celis in his right thigh.
The cases were dropped after a highly unusual motion to dismiss from U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota Daniel N. Rosen, who said “newly discovered evidence” was “materially inconsistent with the allegations” made against the two men in a criminal complaint and at a hearing last month.
Court filings show state authorities have opened their own criminal investigation into the shooting, though the FBI has refused to share evidence, provide the name of the ICE officer or make him available for an interview.
So in other words, two ICE agents lied about an interaction with two individuals, and may be guilty of attempted murder. And the FBI is refusing to cooperate with the state investigation of this attempted murder.
I look forward to Turley’s comprehensive analysis of this criminal activity by ICE agents.
But I am not holding my breath.
So in other words DOJ ICE under Trump do their investigations and ultimately get it right.
No. In this case DOJ absolutely is not getting it right.
In this case ICE agents made false statements that they were attacked by two men and were forced to shoot one of them in self defense.
We now know that they lied about this incident and that the two men did NOT attack them.
This raises the possibility of charges against the ICE agent for assault with a deadly weapon, or even attempted murder. These are state charges that must be investigated and prosecuted by the State of Minnesota, NOT the Federal government.
The State of Minnesota has opened an investigation, but the FBI is refusing to cooperate. They refuse to share evidence and even refuse to provide the identity of the shooter.
This is gross misconduct by the FBI and DOJ and appears to be taking the form of a coverup to protect the shooter, and to avoid revealing the poor training of ICE agents.
“No. In this case DOJ absolutely is not getting it right.”
How not ?They dropped charges and are now investigating and probably prosecuting the agents.
“We now know that they lied about this incident”
But we do not know about what.
“that the two men did NOT attack them.”
Probably as DOJ dropped the charges.
“This raises the possibility of charges against the ICE agent”
Absolutely starting with 18 USC 1001
“for assault with a deadly weapon, or even attempted murder.”
Possibly.
“These are state charges that must be investigated and prosecuted by the State of Minnesota, NOT the Federal government.”
Nope – that ship sailed long long long ago.
No state is ever going to investigate the conduct of a federal officer in the coure of their duties.
Nor should they.
We do not need more george Floyd kangaroo courts.
“The State of Minnesota has opened an investigation, but the FBI is refusing to cooperate. ”
Yup – The State of MN has no jursidiction over federal law enforcment
“They refuse to share evidence and even refuse to provide the identity of the shooter.”
Yup, that is what happens when you try to stick your now where it does not beleing.
“This is gross misconduct by the FBI and DOJ and appears to be taking the form of a coverup to protect the shooter, and to avoid revealing the poor training of ICE agents.”
Maybe, maybe not.
All we know is that video does not match the officers testimony, and DOJ dropped the charges and is now incestigating the officers.
EVerything else you have said is uninformed speculation.
What we DO know is that DOJ is following the law.
John Say, it’s evidence that DHS has been lying and continues to do so.
This also speaks of their lawlessness.
“Hundreds of judges around the country have ruled more than 4,400 times since October that President Donald Trump’s administration is detaining immigrants unlawfully, a Reuters review of court records found. ”
Courts have ruled 4,400 times that ICE jailed people illegally. It hasn’t stopped
You have absolutely no credibility in “judging” liars and “lawlessness” when you stood idly-by as the borders were thrown wide open against our laws and logic, when you stood silently-by, against ALL U.S. rules and regs for COVID “safety” and Immunization standards were violated.
Your hundreds of “judges” are partisan hacks, spoiling for political supremacy through civil mayhem. They are nothing more than agitators!!!
If you could hold your breath for 3 years you would be waiting in vain for JT to admit trump is a fiasco.
If you think the DOJ will investigate? This will not happen.
If Minnesota investigates I expect a similar result to the investigation of all the pedophiles trump is protecting and also any kind of investigation of how the DOJ has become a trump harassment bureau.
I do hope we survive 10 more months, let alone 3 more years.
Inflation down and dropping, gdp up and rising, wages up and rising,
Iran, Russia and China on their back foot.
We could have an end to 3 despotic regimes soon – Cuba, Venezeualla, Iran
And the disempowerment of Russia and China.
What is not to like ?
Infinitesimal, irrelevant, and immaterial.
You’re talking about an administrative issue compared to the existential threat of insurrection and the complete destruction of a once-great nation.
Let’s talk about the ineligible son of a foreigner, Obongo, committing an ongoing coup d’etat in America for a decade now through abject corruption-cum-treason, by his own admission, “fundamentally transforming the United States of America” into MexAfricAsiArabia through “Population Replacement.”
Marco Rubio just delivered the most courageous, most inspiring, greatest North Atlantic speech in decades. The speech by JD Vance in 2025 was also great but Rubio’s was better. The Left will hate it but especially the likes of Barack and Michelle Obama with their grievances against America, a grievance industry that made them multimillionaires. The Obamas made Americans into subservient slaves while JD Vance and Marco Rubio remind Europe that our shared history is a glorious one.
Americans need to reclaim their rightful place in the great history of America, get on board, and get to work, for themselves and for those whom they will leave behind to take their place. Bravo Marco for proposing solutions, instead of the despair of Democrats that have paralyzed Americans.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference
MUNICH, GERMANY
FEBRUARY 14, 2026
the United Nations still has tremendous potential to be a tool for good in the world. But we cannot ignore that today, on the most pressing matters before us, it has no answers and has played virtually no role. It could not solve the war in Gaza. Instead, it was American leadership that freed captives from barbarians and brought about a fragile truce. It had not solved the war in Ukraine. It took American leadership and partnership with many of the countries here today just to bring the two sides to the table in search of a still-elusive peace.
It was powerless to constrain the nuclear program of radical Shia clerics in Tehran. That required 14 bombs dropped with precision from American B-2 bombers. And it was unable to address the threat to our security from a narcoterrorist dictator in Venezuela. Instead, it took American Special Forces to bring this fugitive to justice.
In a perfect world, all of these problems and more would be solved by diplomats and strongly worded resolutions. But we do not live in a perfect world, and we cannot continue to allow those who blatantly and openly threaten our citizens and endanger our global stability to shield themselves behind abstractions of international law which they themselves routinely violate.
This is the path that President Trump and the United States has embarked upon. It is the path we ask you here in Europe to join us on. It is a path we have walked together before and hope to walk together again. For five centuries, before the end of the Second World War, the West had been expanding – its missionaries, its pilgrims, its soldiers, its explorers pouring out from its shores to cross oceans, settle new continents, build vast empires extending out across the globe.
But in 1945, for the first time since the age of Columbus, it was contracting. Europe was in ruins. Half of it lived behind an Iron Curtain and the rest looked like it would soon follow. The great Western empires had entered into terminal decline, accelerated by godless communist revolutions and by anti-colonial uprisings that would transform the world and drape the red hammer and sickle across vast swaths of the map in the years to come.
Against that backdrop, then, as now, many came to believe that the West’s age of dominance had come to an end and that our future was destined to be a faint and feeble echo of our past. But together, our predecessors recognized that decline was a choice, and it was a choice they refused to make. This is what we did together once before, and this is what President Trump and the United States want to do again now, together with you.
And this is why we do not want our allies to be weak, because that makes us weaker. We want allies who can defend themselves so that no adversary will ever be tempted to test our collective strength. This is why we do not want our allies to be shackled by guilt and shame. We want allies who are proud of their culture and of their heritage, who understand that we are heirs to the same great and noble civilization, and who, together with us, are willing and able to defend it.
And this is why we do not want allies to rationalize the broken status quo rather than reckon with what is necessary to fix it, for we in America have no interest in being polite and orderly caretakers of the West’s managed decline. We do not seek to separate, but to revitalize an old friendship and renew the greatest civilization in human history. What we want is a reinvigorated alliance that recognizes that what has ailed our societies is not just a set of bad policies but a malaise of hopelessness and complacency. An alliance – the alliance that we want is one that is not paralyzed into inaction by fear – fear of climate change, fear of war, fear of technology. Instead, we want an alliance that boldly races into the future. And the only fear we have is the fear of the shame of not leaving our nations prouder, stronger, and wealthier for our children.
An alliance ready to defend our people, to safeguard our interests, and to preserve the freedom of action that allows us to shape our own destiny – not one that exists to operate a global welfare state and atone for the purported sins of past generations. An alliance that does not allow its power to be outsourced, constrained, or subordinated to systems beyond its control; one that does not depend on others for the critical necessities of its national life; and one that does not maintain the polite pretense that our way of life is just one among many and that asks for permission before it acts. And above all, an alliance based on the recognition that we, the West, have inherited together – what we have inherited together is something that is unique and distinctive and irreplaceable, because this, after all, is the very foundation of the transatlantic bond.
Acting together in this way, we will not just help recover a sane foreign policy. It will restore to us a clearer sense of ourselves. It will restore a place in the world, and in so doing, it will rebuke and deter the forces of civilizational erasure that today menace both America and Europe alike.
So in a time of headlines heralding the end of the transatlantic era, let it be known and clear to all that this is neither our goal nor our wish – because for us Americans, our home may be in the Western Hemisphere, but we will always be a child of Europe. (Applause.)
Text of speech:
https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/02/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-at-the-munich-security-conference
This post is brilliantly and directly on point.
“New Study Finds American Workers Have Less Than A $1000 in Retirement Savings,” Professor Turley.
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