Justice According To Scalia and Thomas: Two Justices Dissent From Giving Death Row Inmate Appeals After He Was Abandoned By Counsel

Recently we discussed the twisted jurisprudence of Associate Justice Clarence Thomas. Thomas is back in another disturbing dissent written by Antonin Scalia in the case of Maples v. Thomas. Cory Maples was convicted of two murders in Alabama in 1997. Since Alabama does not pay for post-conviction assistance, he relied on Jaasai Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz from the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. When the attorneys left, however, the firm let the case drop and Maples was never informed that an appeal had been denied. His time for appeal lapsed. Seven justices lined up to support the right to an appeal, including Roberts and Alito who are not known to support criminal defendants in most cases. However, Thomas and Scalia insisted that there was no need for further judicial review in light of the failure of counsel. If leaving a case entirely is not ineffective counsel, it is difficult to see when such a standard would be satisfied in the jurisprudence of Thomas and Scalia.

The Court supplied an account of the failure of Sullivan and Cromwell in the case:

In 2002, while Maples’ state postconviction petition was pending, Munanka and Ingen-Housz left Sullivan & Cromwell. Their new employment disabled them from representing Maples. They did not inform Maples of their departure and consequent inability to serve as his counsel. In disregard of Alabama law, neither sought the trial court’s leave to withdraw. No other Sullivan & Cromwell attorney entered an appearance, moved to substitute counsel, or otherwise notified the court of a change in Maples’ representation. Thus, Munanka, Ingen-Housz, and Butler remained Maples’ listed, and only, attorneys of record.

The trial court denied Maples’ petition in May 2003. Notices of the order were posted to Munanka and Ingen-Housz at Sullivan & Cromwell’s address. When those postings were returned, unopened, the trial court clerk attempted no further mailing. Butler also re- ceived a copy of the order, but did not act on it. With no attorney of record in fact acting on Maples’ behalf, the 42-day period Maples had to file a notice of appeal ran out.

About a month later, an Alabama Assistant Attorney General sent a letter directly to Maples. The letter informed Maples of the missed deadline and notified him that he had four weeks remaining to file a federal habeas petition. Maples immediately contacted his mother, who called Sullivan & Cromwell. Three Sullivan & Cromwell attor- neys, through Butler, moved the trial court to reissue its order, thereby restarting the 42-day appeal period. The court denied the motion. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals then denied a writ of mandamus that would have granted Maples leave to file an out-of- time appeal, and the State Supreme Court affirmed.

Both the federal court and Eleventh Circuit upheld the denial of relief.

Notably, the majority (in an opinion by Associate Justice Ginsburg) sets out with criticism of the Alabama system noting the state’s “low eligibility requirements for lawyers appointed to represent indigent capital defendants at trial” and that “[a]ppointed counsel in death penalty cases are also undercompensated.” The court then adds “[n]early alone among the States, Alabama does not guarantee representation to indigent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings.” Alabama should be ashamed of such an inimical position in our legal system.

Alabama succeeded in largely uniting a divided court by its draconian approach to criminal justice (Alito filed a concurrence). The court held:

“The cause and prejudice requirement,” we have said, “shows due regard for States’ finality and comity interests while ensuring that ‘fundamental fairness [remains] the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus.’” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U. S. 386, 393 (2004) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 697 (1984)). In the unusual circumstances of this case, principles of agency law and fundamental fairness point to the same conclusion: There was indeed cause to excuse Maples’ procedural default. Through no fault of his own, Maples lacked the assistance of any authorized attorney during the 42 days Alabama allows for noticing an appeal from a trial court’s denial of postconviction relief. As just observed, he had no reason to suspect that, in reality, he had been reduced to pro se status. Maples was disarmed by extraordinary circumstances quite beyond his control. He has shown ample cause, we hold, to excuse the procedural default into which he was trapped when counsel of record abandoned him without a word of warning.

While Scalia expressly “agree[s] with the Court’s conclusion, ante, at 15, that Maples’ two out-of-state attorneys of record, Jaasi Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz, had abandoned Maples,” he still would leave the death-row inmate without judicial relief because he believed the Maples was still technically represented in the case.

. . . if the interest of fairness justifies our excusing Maples’ procedural default here, it does so whenever a defendant’s procedural default is caused by his attorney. That is simply not the law—and cannot be, if the states are to have an orderly system of criminal litigation con- ducted by counsel.

Scalia dismisses the confusion and lack of involvement of the attorneys who tried to retrieve Maples’ procedural rights. However, once again, procedural requirements must be tempered by some notion of basic justice and fairness. The jurisprudence of these justices appear to be impenetrable by such values. It is the triumph of procedure over justice. The record demonstrates that a gap occurred in representation and that he had been denied effective counsel for all practical purposes –or, as the majority found, “he had been reduced to pro se status.” Note: none of this means Maples will wi — only that he will be able to present his appeal to a higher court.

The question is whether the Alabama bar will use this stinging indictment of their legal system to advocate for reforms to bring the state on par with other states in the Union.

Here is the opinion: MAPLES v. THOMAS

52 thoughts on “Justice According To Scalia and Thomas: Two Justices Dissent From Giving Death Row Inmate Appeals After He Was Abandoned By Counsel”

  1. I believe in a nation of laws not of men — that similarly situated individuals will be treated similarly by the government. The basic notions of justness and fairness are based on the basic dignity (human rights, if you will) of all men. Despite the circumstances of my birth or that of any other, I am born no better than another and no one is born better than me.

    I do not believe in a mechanistic application of the law — the machine over the man — as that degrades the dignity of man. I would find Alabama’s failure to provide indigent death-row inmates with counsel to be per se unconstitutional.

    But my appreciation of the basic human dignity must be different than that some of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. I have examined every use of the word “person” in the Constitution and am quite familiar with the Federalist Papers — I can find no usage which indicates that that the framers understood the word to include legal fictions like corporations.

    Scalia’s and his shadow’s dissent reveal not their high regard of corporations but their very low regard of the dignity of man.

  2. For some reason Roberts and Alito (as Prof. Turley has pointed out) voted the other way. They are as much a disgrace as Scalia and Thomas. And they all have lifetime (ie long) tenures unlike the President or Congress who can be voted out. Yes they can be impeached, but it is a hell of a process. Thomas is already in some trouble with conflict of interests etc. but I doubt if it will go anywhere with so many other issues to deal with.

  3. Typorama:

    “SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined” is the text in the court’s opinion.

    “Thomas is back in another disturbing dissent and joined by Antonin Scalia in the case of Maples v. Thomas” is stated in this post.

    The title of the post seems in tune however.

    What up wid dat?

  4. The title of this post is misleading because J. Scalia concluded that Mr. Maples had not been abandoned by his attorneys. This conclusion was based in part on the facts that Mr. Maples filed a pleading showing that the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell was representing him, not just the two attorneys who quit that firm, and that Mr. Maples had a local attorney in Alabama. J. Scalia also points out that other attorneys from the S & C firm had been working for Mr. Maples during the pertinent time.

    As to the 6A right: According to J. Scalia’s opinion, there is no such right here because these were post conviction proceedings, with a citation to 481 U.S. 551, 555 in support of that proposition. I don’t have the inclination to verify that citation (or any others in the dissent or the opinion) but I’d be happy to learn if J. Scalia got that wrong.

  5. Let’s focus on SCOTUS vs Executive rights.
    Take Rumfeld vs Hamdi.
    Wikipeidia reports re right of indefinite detention:
    “Though no single opinion of the Court commanded a majority, eight of the nine justices of the Court agreed that the Executive Branch does not have the power to hold indefinitely a U.S. citizen without basic due process protections enforceable through judicial review.”
    Now does DAA require a new ruling by SCOTUS?
    And has the assassination powers on American citizens been approved by the court?

  6. I think it should be obvious to all that these two never took their positions seriously, and are simply trolling for liberal outrage.

  7. The comment above about Clarence Thomas’s reign over the EEOC is very apt here. The two birds are of slightly different feathers. Scalia has a connection to the Confrontation Clause. Scalia thinks that the original intent of the Framers or Founders of the Constitution is divinity. Yet he gives no credence at all to the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Now on another matter, if I could sick my pack of dogs on those two lawyers and that bumfu law firm I would do so. Can they ever hold their heads up in a court of law in this country again? They said Walk the Plank Jocko, we are aushcfart. ( sp? German for exit on the autobahn.) Sorry for the doglatin here folks I cant yelp it.

  8. Not finding a more appropriate place, permit me posting this email addressed to Dr Turley.

    to jturley

    Dear Sir.

    Where does repeating in public the preamble of our Declaration of Indepence correspond to incitement to revolt, or other violations of law.

    It seems to me that the Declaration clearly says that in certain (therein specified) conditions it is the right of the people to change the system and appoint new “guards”

    I am wondering about taking on this section’s publication in commentary form in on-line publications. Wonder if I will be in violation of the law doing that.

    Particularly this portion may be regarded as incitement:

    “But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.”

    This question may to some seem facetious, but considering my ignorance of the various laws, which I assume is a condition shared by most citizens,
    that it may be best for us all to know what is the status of such publication.

    To my knowledge (how would I know?), I am not on a list of suspected terrorists. So any counsel provided should not elicit prosecution for providing material aid to the enemy. But you are the best judge of that.
    Just want our readers to be advised of risk of association in today’s America.

    Thank you.

  9. Amendment 6 says (as you all know) “and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense”.

    While America has traditionally cited many spectacular reasons for not honoring this requirement, one notes that the Constitution is the Supreme law of the “land”. The Land. And any court in the land is bound to follow it.

    If a state did not intend to adhere to it, they should not have ratified this amendment.

  10. Thomas and Scalia should be recalled from the bench. These two have done the most damage to our constitution and would like to know how to get these fools out of there.

  11. An orderly judicial system is what Scalia is worried about? How about worrying about the important thing? Justice for someone who is accused of murder should override any concern over being orderly. Scalia and Thomas are not just a blight on the Judicial profession, they are a blight on humanity.

  12. Thomas, and to a lesser extent, Scalia are animating the essence of a lot of right wing religiosity masking as jurisprudence.

    That religiosity is represented well by the lyrics of Dylan:

    I’ve been trying to get as far away from myself as I can

    (Things Have Changed).

  13. There is something in the air about imprisoning people without cause. Incarceration fever?

    Why anyone would want a person unfairly imprisoned is beyond comprehension, yet now it is the law of our land. These two reprobates should be considered visionaries in their denial of basic human rights and decency.

  14. Let’s face it the opinions of Thomas and Scalia about criminal cases is merely
    “hang em high!”. To their way of thinking the government is always right in criminal prosecutions and warlike activities, even if it is always wrong i everything else.

  15. Thomas has a history regarding lapsed appeals. When he was head of the EEOC he downgraded age discrimination complaints and somewhere around 7000 of them lapsed. The appellants lost the right to proceed since the rules maintain the appellant as the moving party (for filing purposes) even after EEOC accepts the case as its own to pursue. The lawyers I knew at the time referred to our esteemed Justice as “Uncle Tom”. He was and is IMO. ‘Disgrace’ is too mild a word to apply to his actions and character.

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