We have previously discussed academic journals canceling publications that challenge the orthodox views of mainstream scholars. The latest such example can be found in the Journal of the New Zealand College of Clinical Psychologists, which pulled the 2025 article of Arna Mitchell who questioned claims that psychology as a field is a tool of “white power.” The editors reportedly declared that such conclusions are “inconsistent” with the publication’s “values.”
Dr. Kumari Valentine, a psychologist and former editor of the journal, wrote an article raising concerns over the retraction: “The reason given for the removal was not research fraud, plagiarism, ethical misconduct, or factual error. Rather, the NZCCP Council determined that retaining the article was inconsistent with the values of the College and could perpetuate harm to Māori.”
The article, “He Wero Ano: Don’t Just Tell Me, Show Me How Science and Psychology Are Racist in New Zealand,” took issue with the “broad,” unsubstantiated claims of systemic racism in “psychology across all levels of the discipline,” including that “science itself is a social construct of white Europeans” and “white power.”
Mitchell, a Māori woman herself, also took issue with the view that tribal “ways of knowing should be given equal weight to scientific ways of knowing in the training and practice of psychologists in New Zealand.”
One would think that such a viewpoint, particularly from a Māori woman, would, at a minimum, be welcomed as a provocative and interesting perspective. However, various readers were less interested in reading it or even responding to it. They campaigned to cancel it.
Some did respond, saying they felt the critique was based on a misunderstanding of Kaupapa Maori psychology. That should also be a welcome perspective in allowing a free exchange of viewpoints on the subject.
Some faculty have cried foul, calling the cancellation raw censorship.
This is reminiscent of the controversy at the Emory Law Journal and the firing of an editor at JAMA.
These controversies are a reflection of the viewpoint intolerance that has taken hold of much of academia, supporting groups, and journals.
Journal retracts paper skeptical of ‘white power’ in psychology, says it conflicts with ‘values’
Western Postmodernism is itself a way of knowing, but not equal to others. It has bullied itself into being the policeman of all other ways of knowing. It is the colonizer of all thinking. This is generally what happens with Marxist based ideas. They sound embracing and then eat you.
Maori “ways of knowing should be given . . .”
Apparently, those “ways of knowing” do not include: understanding opposing views, summarizing the opposition’s arguments, and presenting counter-arguments. That Western, rational way of knowing is smeared as racist, misogynistic . . .
Instead, the Maori apologists use the tribalistic approach: We don’t want to know. And if you insist on expressing your opinions — we banish you.
The article, “He Wero Ano: Don’t Just Tell Me, Show Me How Science and Psychology Are Racist in New Zealand,” took issue with the “broad,” unsubstantiated claims of systemic racism in “psychology across all levels of the discipline,” including that “science itself is a social construct of white Europeans” and “white power.”
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The simplest reading of this is that the author of the article is claiming that psychologists are being accused of being racist.
Turley fails to investigate if that allegation is true rather than accepting that the journal might be sensitive about someone blindly labeling their members as racist by insinuation.
Were I to write “There’s no evidence that Professor Turley mud wrestles pigs,” that would insinuate that someone has been saying he does mud wrestle pigs and might imply that there is, in fact, evidence that Professor Turley mud wrestles pigs.
Similarly, someone writing “there is no evidence that psychologists are racists” has parallel implications.
This argument is sophistical because it treats pragmatic implication as though it were evidential implication.
There is a real linguistic point:
> “There is no evidence that X” can imply that X has been alleged.
But it does not imply that there is evidence for X.
Your pig example works only for the first implication:
> “There is no evidence Turley mud wrestles pigs” implies someone has raised, or could raise, that allegation.
It does not imply:
> “There is probably evidence that Turley mud wrestles pigs.”
So you are smuggling in an extra step.
In the psychology example, the better structure is:
1. Some claims or insinuations were made about racism in psychology/science.
2. The article challenged those claims as broad and unsupported.
3. The journal objected, perhaps because it viewed the challenge as inflammatory or harmful.
4. But the existence of sensitivity does not prove the challenged claims were true.
Your move is basically:
> Because denying an accusation presupposes the accusation exists, the denier must investigate whether the accusation is true.
That sounds reasonable until you notice the burden shift. If the original article was responding to claims such as “science is white power” or “psychology is systemically racist across all levels,” then those are the claims requiring evidence.
You are misapplying the probatio diabolica, this is where someone demands impossible proof, such as:
> “Prove there is no racism anywhere in psychology.”
That is unreasonable.
OTOH, there exists evidence entailed by existence itself.
This is where a claim, if true, should leave observable traces.
For example, if psychology is racist “across all levels of the discipline,” there should be evidence in:
admissions,
hiring,
promotion,
publication,
grant allocation,
diagnostic standards,
clinical outcomes,
curricula,
complaints,
disciplinary patterns.
That is not asking for impossible proof. It is asking for the ordinary corollaries of a sweeping institutional claim.
So your argument is weak because it confuses two very different standards:
> “You cannot prove a universal negative.”
versus
> “If your positive institutional accusation is true, show the institutional evidence.”
The first is a shield against impossible demands. The second is basic evidentiary hygiene.